🔥OPERATION “VIVALDI” FROM THE INSIDE! HERO OF UKRAINE “DARWIN” PROMISES TO REACH DONETSK AND THE URALS AND 125th Separate Mechanized Brigade

Speaker 1

At the start, the enemy was the least ready and most broken.

Speaker 2

In recent months, 14 settlements have come under the control of Russian troops, and yesterday – the town of Sviatokorsk.

Speaker 1

Everything was going quite successfully for us, and even this enemy helped us. Even after that, we cannot be stopped. When we go on the offensive, everything changes. In the minds of the fighters, it is simply a dead land; there are only enemies there now, none of ours. When you are the first to enter, you feel as if you are very close to death, but in reality, you are the most alive. The final objective is to reach the Urals. Over all these months, our battalion further gathered strength and combat capability. It was necessary to bring certain positions and certain categories of work up to the proper level. Because we were not yet ready at the beginning of the planning and forecasting regarding how to conduct the fighting. Thus, over these six months, everything aligned perfectly. We managed to plan, develop alternatives, and a certain right moment was chosen. Because at the moment of commencement, I believe the enemy was the least prepared and the most broken, partly by us. At least to the degree he was when we stood before him. So, regarding planning, the start, and organization, over these six months—to some extent secretly, and to some extent not—we prepared the strike plan. And then the operation itself began; that is already another story.

Speaker 5

You say that until then the battalion was not ready, but what does it mean to be ready for such operations, for assaults? That is, in what form or in what condition did you receive the battalion? And when was that point when you said everything, the people are ready to go?

Speaker 1

Preparing, or preparing for an operation, being ready, then for whatever. You can spend an infinite amount of time, no one is ever fully ready for anything. Our unit too, any unit actually. There is a quantitative issue, which is forces and means. You can count the forces and means of our unit, you can count the forces and means of the enemy opposite us,

Speaker 6

possible

Speaker 1

You can estimate how it will go, you can predict anything. Enemy losses, our losses, predicting the amount of necessary equipment, how much of it will remain, and so on. But these amounts, these figures are not always—or rather, they are almost never—the final factor that can guarantee success or failure. Because in war, well, simply everything can happen, and the most reliable and working thing may not work. One must be ready for this, primarily mentally. And the mental state of both the soldiers and the entire organizational and management structure is also very important, and preparing it is probably even harder.

Regarding the battalion, when we took over the battalion, it was long before Operation Vivaldi; it was like a ruin, both quantitatively and qualitatively. The situation was such that it caused problems everywhere: unsuitable people in unsuitable positions, low combat capability and low personnel numbers, forces and assets in poor condition, a lack of experience in proper operation and conduct of combat activities, and overall fragmented management structures, for example, and total demotivation, of course. Now, total demotivation is what must be fought first and foremost. In many places, one has to personally participate in streamlining the processes, although it shouldn't be that way, but it happens. And I think that during the half-year of our stay in this battalion and the stay of this brigade in the corps, the organisms—individual units of the brigade and the brigade as a whole—became more combat-capable and more or less ready for what awaited us ahead. Therefore, once again, the time for the start of the operation was chosen such that we guessed correctly both the state of the enemy and our own state. One of the reasons why it succeeded.

Speaker 5

When we were in the Lyman direction literally a couple of weeks or maybe a month ago, we already knew about these successes, but had not yet spoken about them publicly. And we asked why you aren't talking about such successes, about a large piece of liberated territory. We were told then that the Russians report to their command and the highest command, and their maps look nothing like how the battlefield actually looks. To what extent did it play into your hands that, according to their information, the Russians were already somewhere there near Sviatohirsk? While in reality, you were already clearing it there, Shendre Holumu?

Speaker 1

You really don't need to be Sherlock Holmes to see the video where Putin says they are in Sviatohirsk. Even before this video, he also repeatedly spoke about, you know, pushing us against the rivers, the destruction of our bridgeheads, encirclements, cauldrons, and everything else. And these points of his only reassured us more that everything was okay, that we were doing everything right, and that they still don't understand. Of course, at different stages of the operation and at different levels of the enemy's command structure, they understood some things less and some more. We started with the fact that there was total lying, of course, by everyone everywhere. Probably, the battalion commanders still more or less understood where they were. We even heard the enemy's radio transmissions where one says, "did you see, you know, in the news that we are already there," and "no one returned from there." And he's like, "wow, yeah." Meaning, they understood something there. But further and further and further up. Lies accumulated because, I think, they fear the consequences for failing to execute orders. And here, whether the order was realistic and whether the commander did everything possible plays a secondary role. The primary role is played by the fact of non-execution, and for that, you can fall from a balcony—they fall often—so, I think, that is why they lie.

Speaker 5

Already somewhere on the conveyor belt of battalion commanders, or brigade commanders?

Speaker 1

After the battalion commander, the picture sent up was slightly embellished. And this embellishment accumulated with each new one. Then, as we continued moving, started moving, and advanced further, more information reached the commanders of, say, divisions. They had already abandoned their illusory pictures of them being deep in our rear. And I think that after Andriy Biletsky's statement about his presence in Svyatohirsk and the events around that, they already understood the actual layout, so the front was finally clear to both sides. They began to react aggressively, specifically, just bombing with KABs. Just many such KABs, KABs fired blindly, not very targeted. And on the front, of course, they began redistributing forces and assets to somehow hinder our advance.

Speaker 5

Now everything has become known about where the front line is, that you have cleared. How are the Russians reacting now? What is left of these three armies? Are they being reinforced, or is someone being thrown there? They were stunned by this news and by the truth of what is actually happening.

Speaker 1

I believe that we have done a great deal of work in terms of destruction, in bringing these armies to a state of inability to fight. Not totally, of course, but enough for it to be difficult for them. And in such a state, the organism, even if it receives reinforcements, cannot truly stabilize and level out, because here the issue is no longer the number of personnel or something else; the issue is the structure, which is already ceasing to exist. That is, the systematic nature of management, the controllability of the unit, the presence of forces and assets in certain places, the total demoralization of their personnel—this is something that cannot be fixed by reinforcements. That is the first point. Second, if reinforcements are sent to the enemy, if larger forces go there, he is forced to take them from somewhere. In other words, there are other directions, there are certain target reserves that exist for their own task, because the enemy has his own intent there, his own plan, and he adheres to it. If we force him to redistribute these assets, it is one hundred percent beneficial because, first, the enemy plays by our rules, meaning he is forced to respond where we are attacking, and second, he is forced to abandon some other ideas where he intended to put those reserves that he sent to us. Does it help them? Of course, when more of the enemy's personnel arrive at their positions, when they have more assets, it hinders us and helps them. But for this to be total and create a state of our inability to advance, at this stage, I can say that this is not exactly happening. In other words, I think everything has been going quite successfully for us, and even this enemy rabble helped us. Even after them, we can no longer be stopped.

Speaker 5

Is there a chance that they will withdraw forces from the Kramatorsk-Sloviansk offensive?

Speaker 1

There is a chance for anything, I think. I don't know in such depth, because one needs to possess a very large amount of varied information to make such conclusions. But it's just logical: if there are serious breakthroughs somewhere, they are forced to redistribute forces, and even large forces, if the situation requires it. For instance, I believe that the Kursk operation forced the enemy to transfer forces, which were intended for the Kharkiv offensive, to Kursk, near Vovchansk. They had just started advancing there. Such a situation may or may not be the case here, who knows. And no one knows how many of those forces they have. But that this is a positive trend, that is 100%.

Speaker 5

Of course, perhaps this question should be put to Andriy Biletskyi, but at your level of competence, I want to ask: do you have some final task, a final goal? Or do you say, we cannot be stopped, the movement continues? This is generally Vivaldi's slogan. That is, do you have some final task? Or is it, after all, to reach the borders?

Speaker 1

The final goal is to reach the Urals. How? Here, the operational task is to cut off the Lyman salient, making it impossible for the enemy to advance in this direction and preventing the possibility of encircling the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration. This is a minimum program for this stage. Beyond that, I don't really know, and I'm not very sure what can be said.

Speaker 5

Now the cold will already begin to set in, and the weather will worsen. To what extent will this reduce progress, or slow down your progress and the ability to repel some of these offensive operations of the enemy, in short, what do you expect? Withdrawal, there, October, November, not to mention winter.

Speaker 1

First of all, in reality, it is possible to both advance and defend at any time of year. It's just a matter of more or less, but it's possible, everything is possible. However, statistically and logically, there are more advances in summer with the greenery because there is more masking, natural masking, which allows an infantryman to cover certain distances. During winter, the clarity of the air, plus the absence of leaves, allow UAVs to control the entire front line more thoroughly, as a result of which an infantryman is forced to constantly remain in cover. And this leads to the logical holding of the line instead of advancing. However, there are other methods. Sometimes they try to advance with vehicles. I remember a few past winters where the enemy prepared mechanized breakthroughs towards winter, even attempted them. Meaning this is also possible. Regarding autumn, for example, rains on the contrary force UAVs to disappear from the sky. Thus, the infantry can advance further. You can't guarantee anything, in short, but it can be said that, most likely, the main part of the offensive from both sides will be in the warm season. That is, I think we will switch to defense on both sides again, the closer we get to winter.

Speaker 5

But now with such a leveled line.

Speaker 1

Of course. With the grey zone cleared. The grey zone is a very big problem in general. Where there is a grey zone, more often than not, it doesn't become green—conditionally ours. Sometimes it does, but it's very difficult. We took this issue as the first to resolve, resolved it, and it helps a lot. I think it would work the same way across the entire front. And getting into a clear line before winter would be very advantageous.

Speaker 5

How long does your infantry stay in positions? Jumping ahead, I know that two months—this directive about two months in positions—is an absolutely stillborn order or directive. Nobody follows it, not because someone is bad or good, but because sometimes it is even impractical, dangerous, and there is no one to replace them with. It's like this everywhere, in every brigade I've spoken with; well, a commander cannot ensure this rotation for two months. Well, I don't know, maybe some do, please write in the comments, but I haven't encountered any such cases. That's why even the infantrymen themselves say that if we only go in for a week and come out for a week, we'd rather stay longer. Yes, it is exhausting, and drops don't always happen because they are shot down. In short, I think that two months is great, but in real conditions, how long can you supply the infantry that has reached the forward positions like this? Well…

Speaker 1

Actually, of course, situationally it can be explained this way. Why do you sometimes have to stay for a long time? First, a long route, complex logistics. Second, pure security. There are periods when moving even to the rear to go home is more dangerous for an infantryman than remaining on position. Third, there is sometimes an insufficient number of rotation groups, or reinforced units, so infantrymen are forced to stay longer. But in our case, actually, during this operation, we managed to keep people for up to two months. Of course, the terms were closer to two months. But this was realistic for us. Perhaps we were in more comfortable conditions for ourselves for a certain period of time. There were cases that were worse. But this is the optimal amount of time. I have had cases before when this was impossible. And I am convinced there will be more in the future.

Speaker 5

So, let's talk about the people, actually, and not just the infantrymen. And in the operation in Ivaldi, were there any deeds performed by the infantry, perhaps they distinguished themselves. That is, perhaps they have already been nominated for an award, or will be nominated, or maybe they took many prisoners. Were there instances after which people were honored.

Speaker 1

There have already been very many. We have already submitted very many awards for infantrymen. Indeed, I was always impressed; an infantryman, in reality, from where he is, does not fully understand the situation. And

Speaker 5

then it turned out like this, wow, did I do this?

Speaker 1

Yes, it is. I remember myself that I once took part in an assault, then came home, watched the camera footage, and I was more scared than I had been in battle, because I thought that it was lucky we got out. A fighter understands that someone is shooting at him, that he is being bombed. He doesn't understand the overall picture. Whether, for example, there are neighboring units to the left or right, or not. Whether there is a gray zone near him, whether everything is controlled, or what amount of forces and means are working in his interest, whether large or small, enough or not enough—he can't even assess this. That's why I sometimes observe, for instance, an infantryman who is, well, undoubtedly, in very difficult conditions, and he might not even realize it, but he does incredible things. When a person doesn't spare himself, takes risks, succeeds, and then makes it out, that is simply the peak of courage—we always nominate such fighters.

We had fighters who were wounded. One fighter was wounded. He went for evacuation. He was hit again, wounded in the leg a second time. He gave himself first aid. And he wasn't dying, but he could no longer walk. He lay down. He lay down on a route where our forces move, and the enemy infiltrated there. We tell him, can you move a bit, crawl; there are no ours near you right now, the evac will come, but until it arrives, you'll have to wait, maybe you can move toward it. He says that he can't walk, but he will shoot. And he sat there for about a day and killed two enemies who were going along that route, while wounded. He just lay there with an assault rifle, saw them, hit them, and they died. He says, killed, there, killed another one. Then a small vehicle arrived, he climbed in and left.

This impressed me very much, because he didn't even show any tone of exhaustion. He simply understood it as a situation that had arisen, which one must deal with. You have to get out of it, there is a solution, and the solution is exactly this. If it is conveyed to an infantryman that the best way to survive and ensure that on war is to kill the enemy, the war changes immediately. Because he thinks that this is all a natural disaster. That it's not Russians bombing him, but just things flying in. These KABs are just falling on him. If he understands the enemy, if he understands the methodology of victory, which is the destruction of the enemy, then he becomes much more effective, and he succeeds much better, and such fighters survive and are safe much more often. And I was very often impressed by such things. Countless situations where two or three of our fighters took a very large number of enemy combatants, enemy forces, prisoner.

Speaker 5

In this operation or in general? Under

Speaker 1

time

Speaker 5

this

Speaker 1

operations. They took one person, he told them where who was, what was happening, they went further, somewhere they lured them out, somewhere they entered into battle, destroyed them. And this is also just basic war, but on a segment, over some distance, it is visible how the same people can manage to do a great deal and then withdraw.

Speaker 7

I am addressing our command regarding our surrender. We surrendered to the third army corps because we did not want to die in vain.

Speaker 8

The officers just ran away from us. They turned off the radio, told us to lift the circular defense, and to hold on. That's it, the radio is off.

Speaker 7

At the positions, we had no water. We had to drink water from puddles, we had to drink our own urine. One of us died there because his body was dehydrated. We had no food. We had to eat tree bark and grass.

Speaker 9

We ate nettles, that is, we made nettles with horilka and a bit of broth.

Speaker 7

We got sorted there, stayed. For a month and a half, I ate normally here for the first time.

Speaker 4

I mean Plin. Although you brought a lot of shit here and brought a lot of sorrow, I wish you no ill. I wish that more of your compatriots ended up like you, in such a status. Then, God grant, the war will end sooner. Because otherwise, the war will not end. We will fight you exactly until you leave from here.

Speaker 1

At the very start of the operation, we cleared the infiltration, and then it was time to move to the offensive. These are different things. Because clearing infiltration is like clearing your own rear. There, the enemy feels insecure; their resources cannot reach them. Whether or not a drone might fly in upon his request, drop him food, or strike our building. But most often, they don't reach them. And this is safer for us. And we feel comfortable because everything of ours reaches. We can provide maximum support to our fighters during the clearing of infiltration. We can even deploy armored vehicles, because it is difficult for the enemy to sneak up on them, as they are far from him. But when we move to the offensive, everything changes. Because in the minds of the fighters, it is simply dead land. Only enemies are there now, none of ours. You are the first to enter there, you are in total danger. It may seem that way. And the first success, the first liberated kilometers, the first route, the first enemies killed by small arms fire—especially by small arms fire, when our fighter killed an enemy. This was very important and, in fact, very heroic for them. They even began to perceive themselves differently, seeing that they were capable of such things. And there were many such instances.

Speaker 5

And does your infantry go out for several tours? I know that in other brigades there is one rotation, and that's it. He no longer goes as infantry, he's already a pilot, or does something in the TCC. Are there those who go out many times?

Speaker 1

There are those who go out many times, there are those who go once, there are even those who come straight to us, and if their competence allows and there is a desire, they become a drone operator immediately. But we try to put everyone through the infantry, as to whether this happens and why. Yes, this works very well because, first of all, it is very valuable experience for a soldier. He goes out, he understands where he was, what was happening there. If he becomes a drone operator tomorrow, he will understand, first of all, how to work, and how he would have wanted them to work in relation to him when he was an infantryman. He will be more responsible and will learn better. But, on the other hand, the path of an infantryman over many conventional rotations is the greatest combat path, and, in reality, commanders are made from exactly such infantrymen. From those who were assault troops, infantrymen, soldiers for as long as necessary. But most often, we consider two things: their desire and their competence. If they are capable of being an artilleryman, being a drone operator, then we make it happen, especially if they want to. But there are those who stay where they are; sometimes they themselves are satisfied with what they do and are ready to continue.

Speaker 10

Let's go, let's go, let's go! To one tree

Speaker 10

Twenty meters, got him, damn, he's ours. Good. Take them out, to the left, one tree forward! Approaching, heavy on the right! Take him out, with a wallbang! Mine

Speaker 5

Every time I am impressed by such people, you know, as they say, a war person. Like, let him fight, he will fight in this war, he will go to another war. And, yes, there are such people. Do they still exist, in general? Is it the youth, perhaps, or old officers, perhaps?

Speaker 1

There is always, recently, one comrade of ours, who came very young, at the beginning of the full-scale war. He fought then, then he was transferred there to another position, a rear one. And he came up to me and asked to go to the war again. And there, he already arranged everything with everyone, said, no, I will go fight. And he went again. I think that this is normal. And this is what is real. And in war, and in life in general, actually. Because people think that it's because something is wrong with his head, or that he loves adrenaline. In reality, it's not like that. In reality, people love war and love this experience. And I am sure that throughout their whole life afterwards, they will remember not how they sat with friends in a bar, but they will remember how they stormed a copse. Precisely because this period of life, these events, they mean something real, something existential, where you are, as if, very close to death, but in reality more alive than in all past periods of your life. That is how it should be. Whoever is like that is very lucky in life.

Speaker 5

I even wrote down your phrase. “The brave perhaps does not live forever, but the coward does not live at all.” And so

Speaker 1

I can't say that I came up with it, it's a slightly adapted existing phrase, but, yes, I like it.

Speaker 5

Now everyone is talking about Operation Vivaldi on all channels, and we are talking about it as well. But recently, not so long ago, actually, in the Oleksandrivsk direction, 26 more villages were also liberated. That is 745 square kilometers, but no one is talking about it. Is it because Vivaldi is somehow special? Or is it simply a problem with PR and communication in the other direction?

Speaker 1

It's hard to say, because they could have had the same situation with an information blackout, for example, because it wasn't possible to announce it in a very specific way. I don't know. I think it's not a problem, actually, to tell even like this from the phone what you did there. Whether they do it or not, I think someone has a plan in their head as to why it's necessary and why it's not, just as it was not possible for us to do it for a long time. And generally, if someone is liberating, I like it; let it be louder than Vivaldi, as long as the territories are being liberated. We just, well, need to cover it in the right way and continue liberating.

Speaker 5

I am just very upset because we were also in the Oleksandrivka direction at the time when they were already advancing there. And the Russians again did not know, well, and they reported untruthfully as well. Then it turned out that, suddenly, such a huge territory had been liberated. I don't like the communication; the Air Assault Forces claimed that they did it, although there were many other infantry mechanized brigades involved. And we suggested, let's show it, and we'll go there, and that's it. And there was simply news that 26 villages were liberated and that's all. And no one knows who did it, which villages they were, or what was done. That's why I really appreciate how Trika communicates about this operation. I want to talk more—you already said that informational silence was very important. And, for example, in the Kursk region, yes, it was repeatedly stated that the Kursk operation was successful precisely because everyone remained silent and no one knew. How were you able, in general, to create such an informational vacuum? And also before Andrii Biletskyi went public, there were certain leaks on X, on social networks and so on, by those OSINTers. Tell me, how harmful is this work from a military perspective?

Speaker 1

Well, regarding what does not depend on us—OSINTers, third-party observers, or even the enemy—then, as far as I know, the corps worked to reduce the number of leaks or to eliminate them entirely. And regarding what we did, there was actually nothing tricky about it; if everyone is responsible and adheres to information hygiene, then such operations can be carried out, even more complex operations, and it is all possible, as for the impact it has. Well, it's simply logical: if the enemy understands our intent, if they understand where we are moving, they can adapt, reinforce themselves, and deny us such an opportunity. It's not a fact that someone in another direction will take advantage of this. Of course, one should follow the advice given by the forces conducting the offensives. In our case, the corps made certain efforts and explained it to us, and it worked. More or less, probably with some problems, but it succeeded. I think, actually, the coverage of Vivaldi at the time it was announced was also somewhat forced. As much by our decision as it was simply no longer possible. But this information silence, layered over the enemy's lies, as well as some other moments, provided a large part of the effectiveness on the battlefield during the operation itself.

Speaker 5

I remember when Kombrykh wrote an angry post, your Kombrykh, Foka, that one feels like swearing, screaming, and so on. We prepare for half a year, sacrificing a healthy life, and someone just takes and reveals this information. And there were even comments under his post from the fighter himself, saying it seemed like my sister called me and told me about this operation, which she found out about through Instagram. Regarding this operation, at least the trio declares publicly that for the first time, there was a landing from an NRC "Kamikaze" drone. Please tell us, if your brigade also carried out these landings, these operations, what are these wonder-drones, heavy bombers, how much do they carry, are they small "Kamikazes" of 14 kilograms, how much can some "Vampire" carry?

Speaker 1

Our brigade hasn't done such a thing yet, probably will be doing it soon, but in a few words I can tell you what a drone is in war in general, how it all happens there.

Speaker 5

No, there's no need to go that far.

Speaker 1

The "Kamikaze" UGV was indeed deployed from a bomber, and the bomber is quite large, of a specialized type. This "Kamikaze" was small. What did this provide? Unlike a simple drop of ammunition, a "Kamikaze" drone can also drive. It can drive and detonate exactly where a bomb would not hit. Into a gap, into a basement, and so on. This is truly effective, and it offers a great deal in terms of future prospects. Moreover, we add to this that it was the enemy's rear, meaning it is even on the front line. One can indeed enter a headquarters, some enemy control point, and blow everything up there. This is cool. And in general, we use UGVs with combat modules, and they strike the enemy there using heavy machine guns and grenade launchers. And we use them, of course, for evacuation, for logistics. And ordinary drones, and bombers, heavy ones, light ones, and all in the world. Such a collaboration of drones is, in principle, I think, a first in war, and it sounds promising. Now, I think we have a goal to simply expand this experience.

Speaker 5

And, by the way, about the brigade. Heavy mechanized, right? It's not a drone-assault one. But it seems to me that they are all already turning into drone-assault ones. Do you just work more with heavy bombers, or how is it? Or are you also developing artillery? I understand that this is a question for the brigade commander, but tell me from the battalion level. That is, is there a difference between a heavy mechanized one and a drone-assault brigade now, at this stage of the war?

Speaker 1

Well, as for the direction of development, we are developing everything. Of course, as is always the case in war, for one thing to be developed, you have to put in fewer efforts somewhere else, because you can't do everything. But in the battalion, for example, and in the brigade as well, I think we try to maintain a balance, because it is naive to think that soon there will only be drones, there will be no artillery, and then there will be no infantryman either. It won't be like that, that's for sure. Countermeasures are also developing, everything is working. Everything works in different quantities, at different stages of the war. For example, tanks can rarely be seen now, but they haven't actually died out, they can be used. Sometimes we use them in masses. And, perhaps, after some time, a stage will come when they will return on a large scale to the battlefield. That is, we use everything.

Regarding our "heaviness", why "heaviness"? I think the idea of heavy mechanized brigades at the time of their creation was in their heavy mechanization. That is, these are tanks, heavy armored vehicles, and a calculation for a mechanized offensive, for mechanized warfare in general. That is, there are many mechanized brigades. A heavy one should be designed for, specifically, the specifics of riding in tanks, in BMPs, for delivering fire strikes using equipment, and so on. What do we actually have? Actually, it's more like just a name regarding all brigades. Both airborne assault and all ordinary mechanized ones. Everyone storms and everyone defends, everyone uses drones and everyone uses equipment. Perhaps the specifics are only there in the combat capability of the brigade, but this actually does not depend on its name or the type of troops, whichever is named, for example. That is, perhaps someone has a plan and perhaps someday it will be implemented regarding each brigade sticking to its own specifics. But I am sure that they will all have all types of weapons, and their direction of development will depend only on the will of the commander or on who is better at what.

Speaker 5

To native Donetsk in tanks?

Speaker 1

Definitely, on leopards.

Speaker 5

How do you feel about the idea, which is very popular right now, of moving the war underground? Is this even possible?

Speaker 1

The war underground is going on now, it has been there for a long time. I think that even the First World War can be considered a war underground. It should be understood that underground warfare is possible when there is an opportunity to dig. By the way, drones are also used for digging, but they don't do as much as one would like, but they are used, they dig. To dig, the sector needs to be stable. A stable sector and defense provide the opportunity to dig deeper, forward, backward, and so on. Back in the days of the ATO, when I was at the positions, we always extended the trench toward the enemy to meet in a tunnel. We didn't reach them that way, but that was the plan. And this intuitively happens everywhere where the line and the sector become stable. When we talk about an offensive, liberation, or the enemy's offensive, we cannot talk about underground warfare because it is simply impossible. Underground, at such a speed, such a large number of people cannot advance constantly. Therefore, the war can move completely underground only if we stop, for example, at the borders, and we have such a sluggish war for a long time, as it was then. Then, yes. But it's unlikely, I think. By the way, it is not as reliable there as it seems. They say that some are like, that's it, everyone underground, because it's already impossible to be above ground. If everything is done correctly, everything is possible, as it is everywhere. For example, how we fought the enemy's drones. This is electronic warfare (EW) suppression, this is the destruction of pilot crews, this is the destruction and damage of command posts, communications, and all that. Plus, the infantryman, he trains to shoot at drones. He does it. We segregate our drones from the enemy's, constantly making it so that the situation is clear. And all this provides the opportunity to move on the surface, and at different times of the day. For example, we know that the enemy has more night drones, or he knows that we move and drive at night, he will focus there, [so] we will switch to the day. This greatly reduces his effectiveness. If everything is done correctly, and these are basic things, there is no secret there, then you can also fight on the surface. Underground war is like a war from Terminator, where there will only be drones. Well, it's cool, but hardly possible.

Speaker 5

By the way, do you believe in a drone war, one that's completely roboticized, so that the infantrymen are some kind of…

Speaker 1

Avatars? In a thousand years, probably. Now – no, it's impossible. First, a human still controls the drone; second, there are basic things. If we speak right now, can a drone replace an infantryman, it needs to be repaired, its ammunition needs to be changed, even brought to it. Sometimes moved; it just falls, it needs to be picked up. We had a case when we were evacuating an infantryman, his leg was torn, he was riding on a nerka, and the nerka drove into a hole and fell. And he climbed out, picked it up, climbed back in and drove further. Meaning, he saved himself in this way. Such things are banal, small, but still necessary. And reacting to a changing situation, a drone cannot do that; this camera does not allow a normal drone operator to operate. It can perform some tasks. Perhaps this will expand, and over time there will be even more of them. But as for the infantryman disappearing, I don't believe it, or maybe in very, very many years.

Speaker 5

Finally, I would then like to ask, how did you even come to this? How you cultivated in yourself this philosophy of war and all the values that the unit carries.

Speaker 1

I think that my personal path is not universal for everyone, but I can share a bit about it. First, I think that in childhood, for children, for boys, it is intuitively interesting—things like fighting, war. Children love martial arts, children love playing with swords, children love toy soldiers. All of them, the absolute majority. Then they adapt to ordinary life, perhaps choosing something peaceful, or something new, or they settle down, as they say, that the maximalism has passed. Actually, I think this is the loss of youth in one's head, when you give up dreamy things and move on to practical things. Practicality is the most boring thing there is in life. I guess I remained interested in this longer than others. At the beginning of the ATO, simply the fact that it was happening very close by didn't allow me to remain uninterested. I was forced, not so much to be interested, but to take a side, to take some part. And then it built up inside me, and I decided that, after all, how could I, while events of historical scale are happening, not be at the cutting edge of events, but do anything else instead. Sir!

Speaker 10

Hello! Whoa, the first trophy.

Speaker 6

Our artillery and tankers worked very well. Blew the turret off the tank, those bastards. Most likely the ammunition load exploded. Opa, the Red Banners.

Speaker 1

The value of what you do, if during historical events you are not at war but at home, is measured simply by the duration of your comfortable stay. A stay that makes no sense, meaning simply existing for the sake of existing. Therefore, I decided that I absolutely must be where history is happening. I was helped, in a way, by real-life examples of other people who went to fight there, my acquaintances. I was perhaps helped by some literature and books. And personal choice, of course. And now I can say that I took part in many assaults, then commanded; some things succeeded, some did not. It was the best time of my life, and it is still continuing. Undeniably. Therefore, regarding where to draw motivation, one should not base assessments of our victory on economic forecasts or geopolitics, political relations, certain agreements, or memorandums. In reality, I simply know that we will win, because that is the logic of the world. That is how the war began, that is how it was during the ATO, and that is how it will end. With our hundred-percent victory. Dreams come true more often than political forecasts do. Therefore, I am convinced we will win, and I advise all viewers to manage to take part in this victory.

Speaker 5

You said that every man who was at war will obviously remember someday in old age not that he was drinking in some bar, but which grove he stormed. Which grove will you remember?

Speaker 1

Oh, I'll remember them all. I remember them as if it were yesterday. Both the groves and the villages. Well, most vividly, in a couple of words, I liked it in Bakhmut. It was a very great aesthetic experience. Aesthetic? Yes. In reality, fog, city ruins, fire. I saw a HIMARS strike right in front of me, 50 or 30 meters away. And a firefight with the enemy, equipment. It's impressive, just like a painting. All these destructions, they somehow force you to look at what is happening from another side, and they shape something that you won't see anywhere else. In Avdiivka it was great. In Avdiivka I was no longer an infantryman, I was a company commander, but I was at the coke plant itself. Our building was hit three times, everything collapsed, everything was in dust. I was lucky, and a few more of my comrades, we survived. We remained intact, we just climbed out. Someone climbed out wounded, someone, unfortunately, died. And I moved through the coke plant, everything was burning, smoke, fighters. My people were nearby, we were moving, I heard conversations over the radio. I also saw, I saw how my fighters fight from a drone, over the radio, that it was very courageous and dignified on their part. And that week was very unique in the life I have lived, and I liked it. As for the groves, every grove is one endless grove. You are constantly storming it, and you dash and dash, and then another 100 meters of the same grove, here it's bare, there it's not. I remember everything, I remember who was with me, I remember who, unfortunately, died there, how many enemies we killed. This was also very interesting, impressive, and useful for my personality, for life experience.

Speaker 5

God, life is one continuous landing, I was just completely floored.