How the RF modifies “Iskanders” during the war | Militarny reports

In 2026, Russia more than doubled the number of ballistic missile strikes on Ukraine. At the same time, 13 enterprises that produce and modernize Iskanders on Russian territory are still not under sanctions by any country. New modifications of Iskanders have greater range and improved capabilities for bypassing modern air defense. At the same time, the defense forces regularly strike Russian enterprises that ensure the production of these missiles.

How the Iskander is designed, where exactly it is produced and how it is modernized, as well as what strikes the defense forces have already carried out against Russian missile production enterprises, we will analyze in this video. My name is Anzhelika Kalchenko, this is Military Reports. Let's begin.

Straight to the main point. Range. For the missile terror of Ukraine, Russia uses at least 7 types of ballistic missiles for the Iskander-M complex. The most common is the 9M723-1 missile. For a long time, in open sources, including Ukrainian ones, the indicator for the 9M723-1 ballistic missile was stated as approximately 500 kilometers.

But data published by the Main Intelligence Directorate give a different picture. The basic Iskander-M missile covers about 390 kilometers. At the same time, the missile itself is far from small. It has a length of 7.2 meters, a body diameter of 920 millimeters, and a launch mass of about 3.8 tons. Almost half a ton of this mass falls on the warhead.

About 450 kilograms. Depending on the version, it can be cluster, fragmentation-high explosive, high explosive, or penetrating. The 9M723-1 flies along a quasi-ballistic trajectory and uses an inertial and satellite navigation system with correction in the final section for guidance. That is, even the basic version is no longer just a missile that simply flies a predictable trajectory.

But the Russians are consistently trying to increase the range of the Iskander. And one of the results of this work was the 9M723-2 missile. In the summer of 2026, during one of the combined strikes on Kyiv, the Russians used it in combat conditions for the first time. In the community, this missile is linked to the modification conditionally called Iskander-1000. Its declared range is up to 550 kilometers. This was achieved by increasing the engine, and along with it, the launcher. The rest of the main parts remained identical to the basic missile.

Back in 2025, it became known about contracts of the Machine Building Design Bureau, in which 18 9M723-2 missiles were ordered. The cost of one was about 2.5 million dollars. So this is not a fundamentally new missile, but a development of an already existing design. And although it is currently a small-batch production, Russia has already brought it to combat use.

But increasing the range is not the only change the Russians are making to the Iskander. The war in Ukraine forced them to adapt the missile specifically for operation against modern air defense. First, maneuvering. The missile constantly changes trajectory and actively maneuvers during acceleration and approach to the target with overloads from 20 to 30G. To shoot it down, an interceptor missile needs overloads 2-3 times higher for interception. And this is extremely difficult to achieve. Second, altitude.

In certain sections, the missile flies approximately 50 km above the ground, and its design has a small effective scattering area and a special coating that further complicates detection. Third, guidance. The inertial system brings the missile to the target, and then an active correlation-extremal optical homing head D9B918 is activated. It forms a map of the terrain and compares it with the entered data. According to the Russians, the head is resistant to EW and even allows launches on moonless nights.

That is, the target to be intercepted maneuvers faster than the interceptor missile can react.

But that is not all that helps the Iskander avoid being shot down. Initially, decoy targets 9B899 were installed on the 9M723, up to six per missile. They were ejected in the final section when the missile detected a threat from air defense. Now, before we figure out exactly how these traps work, make sure you have subscribed to our channel and turned on the notification bell to always stay up to date with the latest military news.

The traps emitted radio signals and imitated the signature of the missile. So instead of one target, 6-7 marks appeared on the radars. The defense system had to spend time and ammunition on fake objects. However, according to the community, based on analysis of fragments, containers with traps are now being removed from some missiles.

In their place, additional "Kometas" are installed. This is a satellite navigation module with resistance to electronic interference. Its antenna system allows the missile to maintain GLONASS and GPS signals even under strong jamming. That is, if previously the missile hid from direct interception, now it primarily prevents itself from being knocked off course.

The production of the Iskander is not carried out by a single plant, but by an extensive cooperation of Russian defense enterprises. Its structure was revealed by the GUR as early as 2025, publishing a list of 49 companies involved in the production of the complex. The intelligence agency names the Machine Building Design Bureau as the main developer and executor of state contracts for the production of 9M723 missiles.

And the direct serial production of missiles is carried out by the Votkinsk plant. This is where the main products of the complex are formed. But the Votkinsk plant is only the tip of the production chain. Separate enterprises provide it with critical components. For example, the Morozov plant produces solid-fuel charges for rocket engines. The Serpukhov plant "Metalis" supplies accelerometers for the strapdown inertial navigation system.

And the companies PSB Technologies and Pantes manufacture PLAT kits for the Kometa system. At the same time, the GUR notes that of the 49 identified enterprises, 13 were not under sanctions by any country of the sanctions coalition. That is, even despite sanction pressure, the cooperation network continues to function, providing Russia with the ability to produce and modernize the complex's missiles. And this structure itself shows a characteristic of Russian missile production.

A finished "Iskander" is the result of the work of dozens of enterprises, each of which is responsible for a separate part of the system. Now Russia produces about 60 9M723 ballistic missiles for the "Iskander-M" every month. In July, this

The target was even exceeded; 65 missiles were produced. That is, production rates remain very high. But this does not mean that the Russians are managing to accumulate such missiles. On the contrary, the intensity of their use in certain periods exceeds the production rates. For example, in July alone, Russia launched 107 ballistic missiles.

Part of this volume consists of other missiles, not just the "Iskander". However, the fact itself shows that during large-scale strikes, Moscow is forced to spend accumulated stocks. This is clearly visible from the remaining stock. In April, intelligence estimated the stock of 9M723 at over 200 missiles, and by the beginning of August—at approximately 130 units. That is, despite active production, stocks decreased during periods of intense strikes. This is also confirmed by the study of wreckage. A significant portion of the missiles were manufactured shortly before the strike.

Likely, production plans were not met, and missiles went to the front almost immediately after manufacture. Therefore, the Russian MIC is still capable of maintaining a high production rate, but "Iskanders" are not steadily accumulating. And this means that for the preservation of the intensity of strikes, the continuous operation of enterprises that produce missiles and their key components is critically important for Russia.

That is why strikes on Russian defense enterprises are significant not only as the destruction of individual production facilities. They create a risk of disrupting the entire chain through which Russia currently compensates for the expenditure of "Iskanders". Fuel is one of the most vulnerable links in production. On the night of August 16, 2026, the Naval Forces of Ukraine struck the "Kamyanskyi" plant with "Neptune" missiles.

The enterprise is part of Rostec and produces solid-fuel charges for 9X-820 rocket engines used in the "Iskander-M". It also produces charges and igniters for 9X-837 booster engines of the cruise missile from the "Iskander-K" complex. Another strike hit the place where missiles are produced in series. "Flamingo" cruise missiles hit the galvanic shop of the Vodkin plant, located approximately 1,300 kilometers from the Ukrainian border.

In addition to the 9M-723, the plant manufactures the RS-24 "Yars", "Bulava", and "Oreshnik". How did this affect the strikes on Ukraine? The most noticeable deviation from the trend is seen specifically in the spring of 2026, when after successful missile strikes on critically important "Khletsyuga" enterprises producing "Iskander-M", the use of ballistics sharply decreased. In February, Russia used 116 ballistic missiles; in March, only 39; in April, 61.

In summary, we see that the "Iskander" continues to evolve. Russia is increasing the range of the missiles and introducing new systems designed to help them overcome Ukrainian air defenses. Parallel to this, Russian defense industries are working at high rates, close to the limit of their capabilities, trying to compensate for the massive missile losses during mass strikes on Ukraine.

At the same time, Ukraine systematically carries out strikes on enterprises involved in the production of ballistics. If this pressure continues, it will be increasingly difficult for Russia to maintain current production rates and, consequently, to conduct massive missile strikes with the same intensity. And if you are interested in knowing how Ukraine is preparing to respond to ballistic threats, we recommend watching this video. In it, we tell about Coral, the Ukrainian interceptor missile, which in the future may become one of the own sources of replenishment for the ammunition of Ukrainian air defenses.

That is all from me. Thank you for watching Tsimilitary. See you.