What will happen when the cannons fall silent? Demobilization, a new army and the threat of the RF – Yuriy Fedorenko (Achilles)
Yurii Fedorenko, commander of the 429th separate brigade of unmanned systems, discusses military recruitment, the importance of professional training, and the adoption of corporate management and NATO standards within the Ukrainian defense forces.
Längd 55:40
Speaker 1
Everyone has their own role and place in this war. It was easier for me to face the year '14 than '22. We hand out ammo and tell them to fill the magazines. And at that moment, people start not understanding what goes where. It's a disaster. Our survivability is, realistically, God grant us, for an hour of combat. We bear the responsibility for the indecisiveness of previous generations and specific individuals. Through training and discipline, we will reach the point where it is possible to complete one's mission in war and remain alive. The fact that our close friends are in Harta, I think, is already clear to society. We have already begun moving toward not just outgrowing the level of a brigade commander, but operating at a higher level. If you are afraid of perishing, you are guaranteed to perish. But if you were able to master it, to tame this fear, it will protect you. We have to do even more than we are doing now in order to keep people in the army and form a combat-ready army. Unfinished wars will certainly have a continuation. Certainly.
Speaker 2
Friends, hello everyone! This is "Radiohartya," my name is Serhii Zhadanyi. This is a program called "The Scenario for the Parade on Red Square." A program with a somewhat unserious name, but in reality, we invite serious, skilled, professional people here to talk about what is happening on our front line, what is happening in the defense forces of Ukraine, what is happening in the rear, what, in principle, is happening to all of us. Today, I think, we will have an extremely interesting program, because our guest today is Yurii Achilles Fedorenko, major of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, major of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and commander of the 429th separate brigade of unmanned systems Achilles. Mr. Yurii, I welcome you. I'll just double-check why, since our military officers and commanders are climbing this service ladder so quickly now that Wikipedia might say "major," but you might already be a colonel? So, I'm double-checking.
Speaker 1
I still have a long way to go to lieutenant colonel, and as for colonel, I sincerely hope that we, as a society, as a people, as an army, will be able to ensure a result where the war ends before the moment I become a colonel.
Speaker 2
Well, listen, if that's the principle, then yes, let it end as soon as possible. But, generally speaking, Achilles and I follow you; we love you, cherish you, and respect you. Your soldier-officers regularly visit our studio. Thank you for finding the time. So, actually, let's start with your soldier-officers, if you'll allow it. When you drive along the highway, you see your advertisement "Achilles, stop"; when you visit your social media pages, it also says "Open to the brigade." Essentially, you build your campaign advertising on a principle similar to a corporation or a firm trying to showcase its innovativeness, its "top-tier" status. How does this affect your soldiers? Do they feel a certain excitement, a sense that we are the best?
Speaker 1
I will say more: they don't just feel it, they ensure this result. Because we are used to saying that drones fight the war, technologies fight the war, but we forget that these are just tools. Drones, technologies – they are tools. Who stands behind the drones, behind the technologies? A person stands there. A person who must be trained, intelligent. A trained, intelligent person provides initiative. Initiative transforms into hardware—in this case, unmanned drones, our primary activity—into application tactics and into the ideas that move the world forward. Therefore, we will say that the main value remains, was, is, and will remain for Achilles. And in general, we now see in the system of the Armed Forces of Ukraine what has been deployed for this. It is the person. And these should not just be words that everyone has already overused. These must be concrete steps. If we are talking about concrete steps, I might perhaps get ahead of myself slightly. The survivability of personnel and the ability to ensure a high result are conditioned by two important things. First is training. Because if a person is trained, they are capable of moving this world forward and, which is very important, destroying the enemy on the line of contact and sustaining a minimum amount of damage. That is, remaining in service for a long time. The second component that needs to be mentioned is the resource necessity to provide equipment. Because it is absolutely obvious that for each of us to write well—I don't mean calligraphically, everyone had different handwriting—but to write without mistakes and without GPT-4, a significant period of time was needed and we used up more than one ballpoint pen. Perhaps someone still wrote with a pen, then they will be watching us. Well, that's for me. And then we did—my father told me, because we hadn't started school like that yet. A significant resource went into this. If in order to learn to write, one needs a good instructor, desire, understanding, motivation, a tool, a sheet of paper, pens, then in order to learn how to use drones, one needs to apply them an N-number of times with low efficiency during the training process and then in combat conditions. Therefore, it is equipment; that is, trained people and equipment provide the opportunities to move forward.
Speaker 2
Oh, look, actually, this principle is, well, truly uncharacteristic, non-traditional for the old Ukrainian army—it's the principle of building one's unit as if in a corporation. And in a good sense, without any irony, without any belittlement. This is something that can be seen in the "troika," in AZO, and in our "map," in what you do, and what the "sharp caps" do. Basically, how does it work? You're talking about training, right? Well, it's clear that the better the trained pilot, the higher their efficiency, the better their chances of survival, of keeping them alive. But, truly, there are statistics. And according to these statistics, OHLS really makes it into the top. Being in the "top" isn't just some promotional gimmick; it's statistics, right? How do you achieve it so that, say, you have a pilot, and there is a pilot in a conditional brigade of your neighbor, right? How do you make it so that your pilots are better?
Speaker 1
We are now giving a response to the advertising campaigns, or will it be about the preparation.
Speaker 2
Let's begin, actually, advertising campaign, this technique. Yes,
Speaker 1
I am trying to find, you know, the right path now. We are closing it block by block. When we talk about advertising campaigns, what is very important is that everything you see now about ACHLS is the work of our communications department. There are specific real people who have undergone combat operations, who were professionally engaged in this activity in civilian life. And they generate ideas and push these ideas into the world. Recently—or not so recently, it would be more correct to say—we came to the realization that there is a certain crisis in recruiting in general and in attracting financial and economic resources. This is actually related to exhaustion. With the overall exhaustion of a protracted, long-term, intensive, extremely intensive war. And we asked ourselves: okay, how can we reach those who could potentially strengthen our ranks? Because while communicating with different people, with different creative agencies, including for the purpose of showing the activities of Achilles, who we are, what our principles are—no matter who we turned to, everyone gave professional opinions, but they were different. They are based on their own experiences, fears, on mobilization campaigns, as in the army, meaning everyone has their own vision. And we came to the following. Question number one. We are currently conducting sociological research. This is absolutely necessary to do. The sociology is divided into several parts. Generally, whether they know who Achilles is, what the unit is called? Do they know the commander? Because for a long time, when the drone line was formed, the emphasis was made centrally on the commanders. Do people correlate Achilles, Yuriy Fedorenko, and the Achilles unit? And what is very important, what words should be said, chosen, so that the category we are interested in—men aged 25-50—will pay attention and become interested. Now further: which category might be interested in us? These are all questions that need to be answered. We believe, and I believe so, that the central category of our people will be those who currently work at various enterprises, including the military-industrial complex, and whose deferment is expiring for some reason. They were unable to extend it; perhaps the company failed, didn't get a contract, produced some product that didn't gain wide acceptance. And these are people who throughout the whole time, throughout the entire war, worked, produced products, supplied the front, donated to the Armed Forces of Ukraine; they are aware, but now their deferment has ended. They need to make a decision on how to live further. In the coordinate system of a large number of units, effective and high-quality, we need to ensure they pay attention to us, figure out if it's a fit or not, and as a result, then fill out that application, pass the interview, and we recruit this category. This is the first component. Second, who else could there be? There is, unfortunately—we must admit this—a large socio-economic collapse now, because many enterprises that produced goods that brought in millions—not even hryvnias, but dollars—have reduced their volume, production, reduced the number of subcontractors, and people literally lack money to provide their basic minimum—housing, food. And as a result, this leads to the fact that one must make a choice. And here the defense forces guarantee—even if not as much as we would like, as much as service members would like and need—but it is a stable income. Some financial stability. Yes, absolutely. Well, and a certain social guarantee. And as for the risk factor? Well, listen, where is it safe now?
Speaker 2
Actually,
Speaker 1
now in Kharkiv you just sit
Speaker 2
even in a house, not even at an enterprise, not even at a gas station. And where is it safe now?
Speaker 1
Through training in discipline, we will reach the point where it is possible to complete one's mission and stay alive even in war. Therefore, this is the second category. Will we be able to reach those who, so to speak, "due to their character," stay at home and have been avoiding mobilization for 4.5 years already? I strongly doubt it. But if one out of 100 pays attention and joins the ranks, I believe that it will be a certain social victory. Because we will refute and shatter certain myths that have been planted in people's minds for a long time, both by the incompetence of certain bodies that did not see the need to develop the recruitment of companies, as well as by Russian propaganda, among other things. But these are just my thoughts, right now, which we are discussing. Sociologists must provide a clear answer to the question. And I thank those people who supported the possibility of financing this sociological study. And
Speaker 2
please tell me, how it interrupts, is this a sociological study of sutoakhilesy, or is it the defense force headline?
Speaker 1
We are currently conducting strictly Achilles [surveys]. This is our internal [one]. We have spoken with other sociological agencies that conducted [surveys] for the defense forces to understand in general statistical terms, but we need it targeted and precise. Then, based on the results we obtain, we will understand that we may be so much in the fog of war, a harsh one, as to not see the reality of the civilian sector, because we are, one way or another, already somewhat professionally deformed, we have our own view of the events taking place in our state, which are taking place at the front, so that they will suggest a different idea from the one we have. After this, companies that deal with product promotion based on sociological research should create an advertising campaign that would provide the opportunity to offer, to draw attention to us. And further, Ukrainians differ qualitatively from these other groups in that they are an intelligent nation. And they make decisions for themselves. Whether Achilles or another military formation interests them, or whether they are interested in engaging in some other processes at this moment in time for a certain period. This is
Speaker 2
purely a business company, purely a business strategy, a business approach, a sociological sample, focusing specifically on those people whom you can interest. Does this work?
Speaker 1
It works. I will tell you more: I wouldn't say that this is a purely civilian approach. Because in reality, the civilian sector has taken a lot from the defense forces, not only of the Ukrainian state. That is, the general principle of building a mission, executing tasks, calculating effects, concentrating efforts in certain directions. All of this came, of course. Civilian people adapted this in their companies to their own realities, into a "civilian march," so to speak. But look, how does this differ from executing tasks to destroy the enemy on a specific section of the front? Meaning we understand which target is the highest priority for us, which will have the most destructive impact on the enemy. Then we understand the tool we have to apply. And then, with pinpoint accuracy, with which we direct the strike, we destroy this target. How is a recruiting company different? We first have to figure out who the target audience is. Then we have to offer—only it's not a weapon—but actually concentrate efforts on this specific audience and achieve the desired result.
Speaker 2
You understand, it is strange and unusual. You are speaking primarily about people who are not yet in the Defense Forces. Usually, when commanders talk about recruiting, they mean those who have already been mobilized. When sergeants go to the training center, they simply talk, advertise their unit, and make selections. It might be such a principle: you are tall, you cannot fit into a tank, you can be an artilleryman; you are strong and sturdy, you can be a scout. This sounds mechanical, but nonetheless, [it is] about the mobilization resource. Do you believe in it?
Speaker 1
Yes, I usually perceive the resource as equipment, if we say… Well, we are talking about people, so it sounds mechanical. At the state level, it has changed; this is capital, this is mobilization capital. I will try to explain. We are staffed from the balance. That is, these are transfers to us from rear military units. Through things like advertising, the return of individuals who left military units without permission, transfers from other military brigades where commanders do not object. And of course, there is the civilian sector. Simply, why do we speak actively specifically about the civilian sector? Why do we emphasize this? Because rearranging the terms doesn't change the sum, and we must fill the defense forces. Because the more civilians come to the defense forces—yes, it is a long road. It is convenient to work with a military person; they have general military training. He undergoes specialized training, adaptation in the unit for literally a month or a month and a half, and he can already perform combat missions at a basic level. With a civilian, you have to wait until they complete the BZVP, then, depending on which training center is conducting it, you need to understand what additional training is needed, conduct this additional training, and then specialized training. That is, from the moment of mobilization to the moment they join the ranks and begin performing tasks at a basic level, it can take 4.5 months. But we must engage these people, because the more people come to the defense forces, the more opportunities the defense forces have not only to perform tasks as assigned, but also to recover personnel. Regarding recovery, I will give an example. You charge your phone about twice a day, I think. Well, something like that. For me, sometimes it's up to six, depending on how much it drained and where it's interesting. Everything needs recharging. I gave an example with technology. It is exactly the same with a person. A person can feel physically healthy, but be emotionally and psychologically burned out. Because the defense force is the most difficult work, objectively. And it is also very important that many have formed a biased view and portrayed the support organs in a negative light. That is, those who work on ensuring the functioning of the entire military unit—I am speaking now within the framework of the brigade—on the functioning of the landing strip itself, on their support. That, like, these guys are fighting, and these are doing support, so they aren't exactly fighting. Look, everyone has their own role and place in this war. If there is no person who scours and finds a resource, deploys a drone, then logistics to bring it to a certain base, and then a technician who brings it into compliance for combat use. Performs modernization if necessary. Then everything goes to the battalion. Then a specialized munition arrives. Prior to this, a security protocol will be processed so that there is no possibility of exploding on one's own equipment, on one's own drone. Then all of this must reach the position. And then, from the position, a trained serviceman, who has a prepared drone, a stinger, who has a specific area for task execution, a specific target—makes the shot. Therefore, this is teamwork. Depending on the risks placed on each category of military service officers, it is limited, in particular, by salaries. Those who deal with support receive less, those who directly perform combat missions receive more financial and economic resources. But I just want to draw attention and insist that this is teamwork. An engine cannot work with one piston, without all the other tools that actually make it an engine. Therefore, I am infinitely grateful to the entire team of the 429th Brigade XLS, better. And I also thank the representatives of the defense forces. Because the experience, skills, knowledge, support, and brotherhood during the execution of combat missions that are provided to us are truly incredible. And there is something to compare it to. If you compare the year '22, '23, the communication and interaction, and in '26, I believe that the defense forces overall have grown very, very strongly.
Speaker 2
He believes there is a possibility to compare it with 2014, when you took part in the ATO. And we remember that Ukrainian army, with all due respect to all the guys and girls who defended Ukraine. We realized that the Ukrainian military now is, to put it mildly, and the difference from what it was then.
Speaker 1
You understand, my issue is that I am not representative in this situation. It was easier for me to face the 14th year than the 22nd. And here I will also try to explain why. I served in a special unit of the National Guard of Ukraine. We were basically trained for conducting combat operations in urban areas, including counter-terrorist activities. Like so, liberating a city from… Essentially, the so-called mopping up. And I was surrounded by contract soldiers, big guys—mostly guys; there were no girls in the unit, mostly guys. Who were basically trained to perform joint operational actions and knew how to fight. When we entered the area of operations, the first battle—since we had never been in battle before that, before the year 14—when we entered the firefight, I tell you, no one even had time to get scared, even when there were 200-300, the first battle was very hard. For three hours and twenty minutes we fought, the enemy was waiting for us, we fell into an ambush, but that is a separate story for another conversation. We suffered losses and, look, throughout this entire period we simply functioned mechanically, basically doing what we were trained for. And I tell you, the first shot I fired, overall in this war, in this period of the Russian-Ukrainian war, I saw that fire was being directed at us from behind a monument in a cemetery. And for a second, a flash went through my head, look, not a stupor about shooting the enemy, but a stupor about whether I [would hit] a grave or a monument. And I remember what flashed through my mind, because there was such a beautiful monument. I thought, people spent money on this, Ukrainians, you understand? And you'll damage it? Yes, so imagine, in this whole situation, such a thought flashed through my mind, and then I was like, whatever, and I opened fire, the point went silent. When we had already come out of the fight, and about 30 minutes had passed, when we began to cover the guys who had died, that's when the fear came. A fear such that everything began to go numb, that the brain began to catch up with what had happened in that moment in time. We were quickly regrouped, and two days later we had the next battle. Before this battle, I have to tell you, well, I went to pee about seven times. Just constantly wanting to pee. The second battle was extremely difficult for me. Why? Because of this feeling, the awareness of what awaits, the memories from the first experience of battle. That is already some kind of experience. Oh, it was straight up scary. But it looks like this. You have to pull yourself together. It looks like, uh, there's no water, why did I think there was water. Like that, you know, like with a bottle, you have to break this fear. And when I broke the fear, the second [battle], we go through the battle, okay, then it snowballed. Then I no longer wanted to constantly go to the toilet, didn't feel the squeeze and so on. Experience already acted, multiplied by the training we had, and by the understanding of the processes, what kind of war we had entered. What the specifics of these combat operations were, because depending on the settlement, the specifics of conducting combat operations were absolutely different. And I drew a conclusion for myself as to what fear can be compared to. It can be compared to a large predatory animal. If you give yourself over to it, it will tear you apart, you will guaranteed perish. If you are afraid to perish, you will guaranteed perish. But if you managed to master it, to tame this fear, it will protect you. Meaning it won't let you stick your head where you shouldn't stick it. And will give the opportunity to controllably perform the necessary spectrum of tasks that fall on your shoulders, or the shoulders of your squad, platoon, company or battalion. And why I say that the 22nd year, for me personally the beginning was harder, and from what moment? First, I had experience conducting combat operations in 2014. I was wounded, I lived through this additional experience. Meaning I already understood what war is. And when signing up for the territorial defense, I understood that time was needed, at least a year after the adoption of the law on territorial defense, in order to build up this tool, to basically teach people at least a little bit of something and to coordinate. And when the war began, on the first day we called those colleagues with whom, by the way, I still serve. And decided, so, where are we gathering. Right here, came here, took over the premises. That's a separate story, it takes a long time to tell. Took over the premises, and the 128 parent 12 brigade, territorial defense, began to form there. I understood what awaited us, because the war is different. The war is not like it was in 2014, the enemy's fire impact will be different. But, like, I was upbeat. Upbeat. And at what moment did I realize that the situation was much more complicated. And it will be with me for the rest of my life. If fate gives the opportunity, then we will fix this as a team. I'll try to explain. The line stood in the shape of a letter, like this, an infinity. Well, yes,
Speaker 2
the start of full-scale shelling – both in Kyiv and in Kharkiv,
Speaker 1
what is in others
Speaker 2
cities, whether in Kryvyi Rih or in Dnipro.
Speaker 1
Absolutely. We found weapons, everything there, well, better. There is a separate block about this that needs to be told. Conventionally, we are equipping the fourth company, 128th battery, 112th brigade. We bring the weapons—that was a separate story, how a grandmother provided two Kamaz trucks for us. We bring the weapons—well, once again, we'll leave it as a mystery, I'll tell you later. We distribute them, distribute ammunition, and tell them to fill the magazines. And at that moment, people start not understanding what goes where. Understandably. And there is this stop, 110 people are standing there. Who has combat experience? There were three or five, I don't remember anymore. Who served, who knows what a Kalashnikov rifle is? And mostly, they hadn't picked one up in a long time. In other words, we had young people, middle-aged people, people of quite a respectable age, motivated by the result, motivated to defend their homeland, ready to enter battle, understanding that the tank columns had already moved. But their level of training was zero. And at that moment, I'm thinking, this is a disaster. Our survivability is realistically, God forbid, not for more than an hour of combat. If we get hit now, get into a scrap, a big battle, an hour maximum. And this realization—what we started to do. We quickly, instead of dispersing the people and letting them rest so they could sleep, because it was early morning. We split them into groups, assigned to each group two people who had served in the Soviet army, or not in the Soviet, and so on. Simply the structure of the rifle, how to load the magazine, how to chamber a round, where automatic fire is, where single fire is, what the sight is, what the front sight is, how to aim at the enemy. In twos or threes, well, the work was generally about positioning, so they wouldn't shoot each other. And the next day we already left to carry out tasks. And at that moment, I realized two things. Look, at first I didn't exactly become scared, but I shrank, I realized that the great problem wasn't just that the people were unprepared. Then I realized that we have no choice, we have to do everything we can. And we began to do what I told you. And mentally and morally, I came to the conclusion that the least the state can give to its citizen is to make them someone who can protect themselves, their family, their home, their street, their city. That they will have a basic level of training. Therefore, I'll jump ahead, perhaps. But I believe that Ukraine, given its geographical location, considering that the war with the Russian Federation will last forever, will never end, only be active or passive. Hot phase. Absolutely. We must move to the Israeli scenario, where everyone will be trained in conducting combat operations. And when the enemy assesses the economic component, the political component, the social component, the general national resistance that can arise before crossing the state border line with combat, understanding that everyone among us is prepared, he will not do it. They will destroy the state in a different way. Through energy resources, gas, electricity, other things, political influence, and so on. Everything we saw before 2014, but they will not go to direct war. And in this is the tool for survivability and security for our state, for our children who are small now, and for those Ukrainians who are yet to be born. We will be trained, we will not have war in the perspective of the next 57 years.
Speaker 2
Where you speak about training, about preparation, basic training, which, well, is, obviously, should have been an integral part even before the start of the war. And, obviously, after this war it will be, it will remain. And it should be informal, as it was, let's say, in the Soviet Union. Rather, it should actually function, as you mentioned, as it is in Israel. But here, look, the thing is that one way or another this army, which was formed from us, the Defense Force, we were indeed formed mostly in 1922 with volunteers, from people without combat experience. And these were both uneven fighters and uneven commanders. That is, you too, you are not career military. Despite the fact that you had ATO experience, you entered from civilian life and created a unit. And there are actually many such units. And, on the one hand, I assume that professional generals, career generals, will say that it is a suboptimal option when civilians create a unit. On the other hand, we see how they develop—this is also like the Khilesta or other units that you mentioned. Essentially, is the presence of this experience in managing civilian structures in the army a plus or a minus?
Speaker 1
Definitely a plus. Because you have a system, you have a structure. And additionally, if you manage a certain business process, you have a clear marker of your efficiency. You either make money, or you don't. Well, like, if you aren't making money, then that's the kind of entrepreneur you are. In war, everything is a bit more complicated. If in civilian life you risk your social status and money, then in war, it is life. Both for military personnel and civilians. And I have to tell you, I would break down this thesis that, like, oh, look, how it actually turned out that people from a civilian environment came and they, like, were able to create cool projects, effective, highly efficient units with a minimum number of losses. We are operating with positive experiences, positive examples, which, unfortunately, are the minority, not the majority. Now look, because, I believe, the root lies in 2014. This same period was in 2014, before 2014. The social situation in the state was such that the vast majority of Ukrainians did not identify the Russian Federation as the enemy. Absolutely. Therefore, at that point in time, it would have been impossible to do so. What I am talking about is if everyone had been prepared. But when it already became clear that here it is, the open history of this day, Russia had actually already committed an act of aggression, its soldiers entered and occupied Crimea, its soldiers are in Donbas, they have the opportunity, they have the desire to escalate the conflict. Therefore, the law on territorial defense should have been adopted not in 2021, but in 2014. And preparation should have begun in 2014. And there would have been social support for this. Perhaps not throughout the entire territory of Ukraine. But correct information campaigns, simple coverage of what was happening in ATO, JFO, how it was happening. And additionally, training of personnel would have allowed us to meet the big war in more favorable positions. And it's not a fact, by the way, that the big war would have happened exactly
Speaker 2
in such a format. And did it actually start like that?
Speaker 1
We can only talk about this. This is already the past; the past cannot be changed. But we are in the present, where in this incredible life, the reality that surrounds us is not shaped by someone else. We shape it ourselves. Look, for some, God created the earth. Higher powers, cosmic theory. Whatever is closer to someone. Everything that surrounds us, everything we are wearing, everything we hold in our hands, and so on. This was created by people. No one other than people. Accordingly, if we are talking about the architecture of security, it is also made by people. We influence our reality. Therefore, we have drawn a conclusion—not all of us, but everyone should—about where we made very global mistakes that led to increased losses. We understand where we are now and what needs to be done in the future to lay a strong, a strong brick foundation so that our children and grandchildren will not fight, that they will be protected. To achieve this, we need to approach it correctly from a social perspective. How would I do it?
Unknown speaker
Look,
Speaker 1
It is absolutely obvious that big business, Ukrainian, medium business, it influences the agenda, including and
Speaker 2
on the political agenda. No, highs, that on the political, even on the state of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Speaker 1
Directly. If we communicate and talk it through with them, communicate with state bodies and set up the subsequent policy, the information policy, because as I say, our viability lies in preparation. If you do not want your children to fight, you must be prepared and your children must be prepared. If information resources support this, if business supports this, and business is interested in this. Why? Because if the security environment is still good, then it means loans, additional opportunities, investments, and so on. And together, by a collective agreement, social and public, we must recognize the problem, must recognize the mistakes we made, and ensure that these mistakes do not happen in the future. Because in essence, we are now bearing responsibility for the indecisiveness of previous generations and specific individuals.
Speaker 2
Listen, but one way or another, what you are saying, behind it somewhere stands the word reform, the word change. I am talking now about changes and reforms of the defense forces. And you spoke about this as well, and I have your quote somewhere, regarding the prospects of army reform. In order to carry out the reform, you say here that a financial and economic resource is needed, social guarantees, appropriate packages, salaries, and so on. But one way or another, we are faced with the question that it is not enough to simply end the war, it is not enough to teach everyone how to use weapons, but it must be so that the forces that will remain, the army that will remain, is prepared for the possible continuation of the war. How is this to be done?
Speaker 1
There is a huge problem. What am I insisting on? Top military personnel who came from a civilian environment have shown extremely high results; generally, the military are talking about one point. As soon as the war ends, I will immediately leave the defense forces and live my best life. It seems, to [incomplete],
Speaker 2
cutlets
Speaker 1
from sergeants, from commanders. Absolutely. But there is a problem. It lies in the fact that it is not explained publicly. What is not explained? Politicians cannot do this because they listen to electoral preferences and they are oriented toward them in one way or another, always, in all countries. This is not only in Ukraine. This starts, first and foremost, with the most democratic countries, like the United States. Well, yes. Always, always. What do people say? As connected people, how should we spend support? Absolutely. But there is Israel, which was able to hear what people were saying, but was able to offer that reality which gave them the opportunities, while being surrounded, essentially, to have their own state at a point in time. And to have a protected state, a sufficiently secure state, a state in which investments are coming in. Therefore, I also ask you to realize, Ukraine will not be as we knew it before 2008, 2009, 2010. It will never be like that. Ukraine will never be as we knew it from 2014 to 2022. Everything has changed very significantly. And when we talk about post-war reconstruction, the creation of additional jobs there, the organization of living space and many other things that provide opportunities, hope that we will return to the life that existed before. This is an illusion; these are all tools for providing a certain social welfare that is being discussed. We will have only one main challenge. Security. That is, when the hostilities, the active phase, end, we must do even more than we are doing now to keep people in the military and form a combat-ready army. Because the security factor directly affects the possibilities of implementing the previous block. Investment for housing construction cannot be attracted because, in order to build housing, there must be a job. In order to have a job, a factory must be built. In order to build a factory, investment must be brought in. Preferably investment from abroad. And money from abroad will come only when this factory can be protected. When it will not be destroyed in a year. Absolutely. That is the essence. Our main challenges are security-related. Therefore, right now, at this point in time, I have to say that this task, essentially, partially concerns the current government. But mostly these will be the challenges that those who will be in power will have to face. Listen, but,
Speaker 2
Look, Mr. Yurii, you've started with a very interesting question, it seems to me. It's hanging in the air, everyone is talking about it—that one way or another, as we look to the future, we understand that the end of the war means, one way or another, demobilization. This is what, I think, most military personnel want, because those soldiers have been fighting not for the first year, nor the second, and not even the third. And, accordingly, we are faced here with certain objective realities. In a Ukraine that is not at war, it obviously should not maintain a huge number of military personnel. But there is such a thing as, essentially, the brain drain. Because indeed, right now there is a large number of people in the defense forces who would not be here if this war were not so total, if it were not full-scale. Many civilians joined who would not have gone to fight; they would have done their jobs, helped the military, but now they are inside this structure, inside this machine, and they apply their experience, their brains, their qualifications, their professionalism. And in many cases, this indeed yields the best results. And so we have… You said it, and I agree with you here, that most of these people will probably be demobilized; they will not remain in the defense forces. Not because they are not patriots, but because they are businessmen, IT specialists, they are engineers, they are bankers; they have their jobs, which they love and which they dream of returning to. How, essentially, can the drain of these people, these brains, these ideas, this creativity, be compensated for?
Speaker 1
The risk is that this component is being promoted. Like, our main task is to hold the line, and then, well, like… Somehow it will work out. There is also an additional social challenge. A certain inequality. Let me try to explain. Look, at the current moment in time, I am 35 years old. The age from 25—that's when you've already finished your studies, done everything—and so, up to 40-45, it can be compared to a rocket flight. But let's take a civilian one, so that it evokes positive associations. That is, we have a reserve of health, we already have a guideline for where we are flying, in the form of knowledge. We have the opportunities to achieve our goals, to reach that same social orbit that we envisioned for ourselves. At this moment in time, as military personnel, we are burning this fuel, engaging in military affairs, building a military structure. Other categories who provide for the front, specifically referring to manufacturers, they provide the front with necessary means; without them, the war is not possible, they always help, and they support the front, we are infinitely grateful for this. But they are acquiring that same capital.
Speaker 2
Their territory is more well-thought-out.
Speaker 1
She does not deviate from how
Speaker 2
They planned it before the war. Absolutely.
Speaker 1
Their orbit, it will be completely different. And when the hostilities end, a question of very severe social injustice will arise, that those who fought will be looking into the restaurant windows of those who actually provided, it will always be fulfilled. Well, they didn't actually fight, but their work is no less important. I understand, right? There is another question here. And life will have to start anew. But in what case? This is in the case if we do not resolve this at the state level and on a social level, because without people it is impossible to make this state decision that the security factor is the primary one. And we will strive—how to say it correctly—and we will work as hard as possible to ensure that the Defense Forces are funded and that serving in the Defense Forces has a prospect. After the end of hostilities, if shooting stopped tomorrow for the communities, no one will be let go anywhere. One can't even hope for that.
Speaker 2
Well, obviously, one can mention the experience of the Second World War here. The First, perhaps, less so, because the war there ended very, very specifically. Now, the Second World War, when it seemed everything had ended, signed, yet the troops still stand and are ready to continue at any moment.
Speaker 1
You mentioned the First World War, this is my greatest fear, because the German army did not lose. The German army held its ground and it was possible to conduct not only defensive actions but offensive operations, and offensive operations were carried out in the last region. Society could not withstand it, it could not withstand it.
Speaker 2
the economy. Actually, yes. And these traumas that were suffered, the moral traumas that the army suffered, this later resonated and this later was reflected in the events of the Second World War
Speaker 1
of the war actually. But let's say the following here, let's say, through what measures the political leaders managed to stabilize the situation. Those restrictions that were introduced after the defeat in the war, if my memory serves me right, it was an army of a hundred thousand, of which only four thousand were officers. What did they do at the moment? They understood that the political situation would change, the political situation is never eternal, just like any agreements. And they did a very simple thing. They began preparing their sergeant corps for several ranks higher. As platoon commanders, enemy commanders. And as a result, when the political situation developed such that it was already possible not to adhere to the agreement… They had a ready officer corps. Incredible. With immense experience, which began its history from the times of the Napoleonic Wars. That is all together. Great
Speaker 2
need
Speaker 1
revanchism. Absolutely. And when they say that Hitler in 15 years, or in 12 years, created super-powerful forces, no, he reaped the fruits of a century of preparation, a century of preparation of his troops, even more. And as a result they were able to realize it; unfortunately, it took the form that we saw.
Speaker 2
This is a story, in my opinion, I don't know whether to agree or not, also about the fact that unfinished wars will definitely have a continuation. Definitely. I tell you.
Speaker 1
more, that even finished wars will also be… Lusa must be handed over
Speaker 2
stepping on the same rake from time to time. And when a war ends, at least more or less, with something resembling justice, then there is a chance, at least, for some creation of a balance of power and the adoption of some international security norms. I am here
Speaker 1
I'll speak about Khartsiya separately. That Khartsiya are our close friends, I think that is already clear to society. We respect them boundlessly. And while communicating with the commander of your corps, Ihor, he tells me, "I'll tell you something, but I need to say it in a way that I don't offend you." I say, "This is a very interesting start to a conversation for a colonel, go ahead." He says, "Look, you have a truly effective brigade, you're in the top overall, but from what I see in communication with you, you are still fighting like a battalion commander. That is, you haven't yet acquired the capacity for overall management as it should happen in a brigade." And I start arguing with him, "the result is on the scoreboard, top fifty." He says, "Look, I have no intention of offending you. Just listen, because we have to fight for a very long time yet, and I am interested in your military unit developing actively and intensively as well; we also feel your support. That is, it is very good when different branches and types of troops and forces work together on the battlefield, achieving a single goal." And they gave me Serhiy Volodymyrovych, your
Speaker 2
just lying,
Speaker 1
I don't know what other words to choose, we are taking a course on operational art with him. I must tell you, I had blinkers on my eyes like this, like this, and with every lesson they expand, expand, expand, expand, expand. What is the basis? The basis lies in preparation and procedure. I will now explain why I am saying this. Serhiy Volodymyrovych says, let's conduct such a social experiment. He takes a piece of paper, says, and gives me a piece of paper and a pen, says, draw a certain animal. Only so that I don't see, and you don't see what I am drawing. I draw this animal, we close it, he says, now I'll show it. He clearly defined the task as drawing an animal. We take them out, and he has one animal, and I have another. I think this was also covered somewhere. And further, the logic is as follows. Look, and if we now defined a task to, regardless, achieve a certain result. The task was stated to draw them the same, but the difference in the vision of execution, you see, is not so small. So, in order for that animal we drew to be the same, for this we must work in a single coordinate system, of training. A common training standard, a common, let's say, formula, a common working mechanism. Of course, the idea comes first. No amount of money can do what you can do for an idea. As a result, with every, every, every week, month of being in close communication, this has its direct impact on the military unit Achilles. Why? Because I continue my training and we have already started moving toward not just outgrowing the level of a brigade commander, but working at a higher level. This will take a certain period of time. But this has an immediate effect across the entire brigade. We changed the approaches to the training of rank-and-file personnel, and to the sergeant's. I said, look, friends, I don't care at all at this moment what you will tell me and your commanders, that everyone is busy, we are working at the limit of our capacity, everyone is working at the limit of their capacity. I am ready, even where possible, on the line of combat operations, to slightly concede some of our own capability in order to send them for training.
Speaker 2
Do you understand?
Speaker 1
This is strategic planning. Look, officer corps, junior officer corps, senior officer corps. In the Achilles units, where we worked this out and [they were] trained, so the sergeant personnel and officer personnel, they went through certain procedures aligned with the brigade command post. The workload level for personnel is decreasing, and the efficiency of task execution is increasing several times over. For our listener, because we have progressed so professionally, to make it clear, we say NATO standards, NATO standards,
Speaker 2
NATO standards.
Speaker 1
To put this in plain language, let's imagine: you speak Chinese, I speak, for example, English, our operator speaks Hindi, someone else speaks French, and so on. And in this whole group, let's try somehow to perform a joint task. This will be quite difficult. But if we all speak one language and have the same procedure, how will we do it? Believe me, neither the language barrier nor any other will become an obstacle; we will achieve the desired result. There are countries that have shown how this should be done. For example, Finland. They had no prospects or possibility of joining the North Atlantic Alliance for absolutely clear reasons. But they completely switched to this system. That is, they configured all their forces to work as it works in the countries of the North Atlantic Alliance. Perhaps, from the point of view of pedantry, even somewhat better than in the base countries. And then they waited for their time. When Russia's great war against Ukraine began, it was absolutely obvious that the focus in Russia shifted toward Ukraine, and the political situation developed such that they simply did it like coupling train cars. And then they entered the general systems. Will NATO ever conduct combat operations? Who knows? Maybe this alliance will be reformed. But if all countries know how to fight in a single coordinate system, this one way or another ensures collective viability. Definitely.
Speaker 2
Look, we then come to such a logical conclusion, and this will probably be the end of our conversation, that one way or another Ukraine is obviously doomed to European integration, and to economic-political and military European integration. NATO is, one way or another, our path, not because we want it or not, but because on the other side, we have Russia, which is simply destroying us. And, as you absolutely stated my opinion regarding Fraglov, why would it stop doing this, stop wanting this in 5-10-50 years? Accordingly, what does this say? That these NATO standards we are talking about, whether abstract or physical, real or conditional, they require some implementation. Accordingly, if we are talking about army reform, we cannot fail to talk about state reform. This is already a question for you as a current politician, as a politician with experience. Therefore, the state, one way or another, must also somehow adapt to new realities and change. Obviously, this awaits us. Who is such a state? All of us. You, I, our operator. Now look, this is a digital question. Mr. Yuriy, write down again what is running through. This is not an accusation, this is not a projection, let's say, on the president or on the parliamentary course. I am talking about citizens, about all of us. Those who choose, those who voluntarily join the army, or do not, which is also a kind of choice. I am talking about the state specifically as all of us.
Speaker 1
As you understand, I move in political circles, I will definitely say everything I think. Believe me, sooner or later, this will be about different categories. Right now, I am not getting into a fight for one reason. For example, when certain people, who are honored with the high privilege of being people's deputies in Ukraine, come out and say that this war with Russia needs to be ended somehow, as if Ukraine has some key to how it can be finished. It is absolutely obvious that the end of the active phase of hostilities is impossible as long as Russia has the capabilities to conduct active combat operations of offensive campaigns. Their desire stems from their capabilities. They have the desire because Putin's chair stands firm as long as there is an external enemy, as long as the war against Ukraine continues. That is the essence of it. Therefore, Ukraine unfortunately does not have the tools that would provide the opportunity, even through offensives, to end these combat
Unknown speaker
Actions.
Speaker 1
Only capitulation. But capitulation is the burning out of every Ukrainian. We have already gone through this. And I must tell you more, that there is a part of people who think to themselves, "Well, the world is no longer as wild as it was in the last century." Like, yes. But the situation is complex, in what way? Now they, the Russians, understanding the mistake that from their point of view their grandfathers made—that they didn't burn out the Ukrainians enough, didn't burn them out completely. Now they seek revenge in this. They strive to tear apart everyone and realize that which was not realized in the last century. That is to say, the world has now become even more threatening. And the temporarily occupied territories and where territories are occupied by the Ukrainian military clearly show the true face of the Russian executioner-occupier.
To conclude the thought, what needs to be said here. When we talk about the state, we usually—it's not only, if we talk about politics, we try to find some name that is to blame for all our problems. For what we have on our table, for what we have in our house, for what we have in our yard, for what we have in our state, for what is happening in science, and so on. In all spheres of life. But the truth lies in the following. That in order to have a government that will move the world forward, we must be conscious voters. In order to be conscious voters, education is needed. I am convinced that the majority of our viewers, while they are professionals and they are smart, they push this world forward in their own place. But if you ask what the president is responsible for, for example, specific ministries, what the Verkhovna Rada is responsible for, and so on, and so on, and so on, I must tell you that there will be a muddle. Therefore, this political culture—we must deal with ourselves first, become as conscious as possible. Then we can evaluate: is this just a beautiful woman or a professional politician? Is this a man from the village, tall and handsome, or is it a person who can implement what they write about? Therefore, if we talk about any changes, and including if we talk about the reform of the Ukrainian military, we need to look in the mirror and recognize that the reality where we will be today or tomorrow depends not on someone else, but depends on who you see in the mirror.
Speaker 2
Where do we absolutely agree? I think that in general, Ukrainians should look in the mirror from time to time, to evaluate themselves more soberly, to get grounded, to understand that much depends on us moving forward, but there are some things, responsibilities, that we voluntarily cast off, and then we
Speaker 1
Someone is giving it away. Something like that, but we will definitely change it.
Unknown speaker
Well,
Speaker 2
Actually, Yurii, we could talk and talk; I think we will have another opportunity to talk with you ahead, especially since Giles and Hartia are indeed nearby now, and for us it is a great honor, and it is very interesting to observe your work. Therefore, I thank you for finding the time, for coming, and for sharing your thoughts. Friends, this was Yurii Fedorenko, commander of the 429th separate brigade of unmanned systems. And Giles, as you know, whom you could not have failed to hear of, because it is indeed one of our most prominent units, units of the defense forces of Ukraine. Mr. Yurii, thank you very much for coming to us, and we spoke with you a bit about the scenario of the parade on Red Square, on Radio Hart. Thank you.
Unknown speaker
Thank you.
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