Report on Russian losses and activities over time

Here follows a report on the Russian losses in the war in Ukraine. We go through the most important categories where we both look at how it has been for the entire war and also take a closer look at the past year to more easily see any trends in the near term. The statistics extend up to May 9.

Today’s loss report will be posted further down, as a comment to this post.

Many thanks to Ragnar Bjartur Gudmundsson who provides the statistics, feel free to follow him on Bluesky or on Twitter.

Summary

The war has continued with the same intensity over the past year. Russia carries out roughly the same number of attacks and suffers essentially the same losses in terms of personnel during the period. Regarding tanks and other armor, it has not changed much as it was already low before, but what we can see is that the increase in drones has been enormous, both at the front and in the nightly terror attacks. At the same time, we can sense that it seems to have leveled off somewhat towards the end, which may indicate that Russia is now having difficulty increasing production, but it is probably a bit too early to be certain.

Ukraine is knocking out more artillery than ever while Russian usage is decreasing, which is somewhat contradictory, but it is probably because different things are being reported. The increase in other vehicles is rising but this is probably because Russia is using fewer but more vehicles.

So far, no slowdown of the war can be seen looking back a year, however, the intensity was higher earlier in the war. Russia is likely at the level they can maintain and Ukraine matches it. Nothing in the statistics so far directly points to a turn in Ukraine’s favor, but nothing points to Russia gaining an increased advantage either.

Russia continues to take a few fields every day and still holds the initiative for now, but the speed of their advance has increasingly slowed and that is probably the main sign that they have soon reached their culmination point and that Ukraine will instead gain an advantage.

Killed and wounded Russian soldiers (KWIA)

Regarding Russian personnel losses over the past year, there have been no major changes. It has fluctuated a bit around 1000 per day and the average is 1032. We have had a few isolated days with really high losses (1730) but also days with under 700.
So no special trends can be read during the past year except that towards the end it has been slightly above average.

Looking at the war as a whole, one can see that the current losses are high. There has been a period with significantly higher losses but overall losses have been lower and the average for the entire war is 874/day compared to the 1032/day we have had during the past year.

The intensity of the war is still high. There are rumors that Russia can no longer produce enough personnel to replenish losses. That may be true but it is not visible in the loss reports.

Russian losses of soldiers in the war in Ukraine over the past year, killed and wounded:

Russian losses of soldiers in the war in Ukraine from the start of the war, killed and wounded, monthly

Russian losses of soldiers in the war in Ukraine from the start of the war, killed and wounded:

Russian tanks

Regarding losses of Russian tanks in Ukraine over the past year, it looks roughly the same as for personnel losses. It has fluctuated a bit up and down but no clear trend can be read. Towards the end, it is actually the opposite of KWIA where losses are somewhat lower than for the entire period. Losses per day during the past 365 days are only 3.11/day.

There are rumors that Russia is not sending newly produced tanks forward but is building up reserves and that this is one reason why we do not see such high losses. That may be partly true, but at the same time I believe they simply have difficulty producing many more. The remaining tanks in stock are probably largely wrecks. Before the war, it was estimated that between 250-400 tanks were delivered per year but that would apply to the total, including refurbished and upgraded tanks. I have not been able to find any figures on how many were actually newly produced.

Personally, I believe Russia has mainly focused on quickly renovating older tanks rather than expanding the capacity for new production. Partly because it is faster and partly because they had large quantities of old tanks from the start. One reason we do not see many new tanks in Ukraine may simply be that there are not large quantities of them. The 1134 tanks knocked out over the past year may well be roughly the level they can produce in renovated tanks if the stock of old ones deteriorates more and more.

At the same time, I also believe it is very likely that they are saving the new ones to build up a reserve. They cannot use up all tanks and leave the rest of Russia unprotected, but I also think it is about tactical adaptation. Drones have made it much easier to knock out attacking tanks and the costs are probably seen as far too high, so they use them less and less.

Looking at the whole war, the trend is clear. Tank losses are among the lowest during the entire war. There have been shorter periods with similarly low losses earlier but the low losses have now continued since August 2025. The average for the entire war is a little more than twice as high (7.64/day) as during the past year.

Russian losses of tanks in the war in Ukraine over the past year from today:

Russian losses of tanks in the war in Ukraine from the start of the war:

Russian armored vehicles (APVs / AFVs)

Regarding other armored vehicles, we see the same trend as for tanks. Not much has happened over the past year. There were some higher losses at the beginning but since then it has basically stayed at the same low level with an average of 5.8 per day.

Just like with tanks, when we look at the whole war, losses of Russian armored vehicles are significantly lower now than before. The average for the entire war is 15.4/day, so in that respect, losses of armored vehicles have decreased even more and are now about 1/3 of the average, which is a bigger decrease than for tanks where it was closer to 1/2.

Also regarding armored vehicles, I believe the same reasoning I gave above applies. They do not have as many in stock, but probably also choose to use them less and surely save newly produced ones in a reserve.

Russian losses of armored vehicles in the war in Ukraine one year back from today:

Russian losses of armored vehicles in the war in Ukraine from the start of the war:

Russian artillery

When it comes to losses of Russian artillery in the war in Ukraine, however, there has been a change even during the last 100 days. Losses have more than doubled at the end of the period compared to the beginning. The average for the entire period is 38.5/day while towards the end it is over 80/day.
Even when looking at losses over the entire war, we see that losses have never been higher than before.

Should one then conclude, contrary to the case with armor, that Russia can produce or refurbish significantly more than a year ago? I find that hard to believe, although it may possibly be that they receive help from, among others, North Korea with deliveries, but I am doubtful that this is decisive.

Looking at the statistics (see further down) on Russian artillery attacks, we instead see that they have decreased. The artillery attacks reported are likely from artillery pieces and not smaller mortars (otherwise the numbers would be significantly higher). However, mortars are probably included in the loss statistics.

My theory is that it is Ukraine’s drone capability that now allows them to easily identify and quickly take out even smaller, less mobile mortar groups (which also do not have a long range and must be close to the front) and that this accounts for most of the increase. Rather, the decline in Russian artillery attacks indicates that they are finding it increasingly difficult to deploy pieces and probably also ammunition.

One possibility is, of course, that they have also adapted their tactics here and do not use artillery as extensively but instead rely on drones. They may also be putting newly produced equipment in reserve.

Losses of Russian artillery in the war in Ukraineone year back from today:

Losses of Russian artillery in the war in Ukraine from the start of the war:

Russian losses of rocket artillery (MLRS)

Here we see a similar trend as for regular artillery with an increase towards the end during the past year, however losses were significantly higher earlier in the war if we look at the whole. The conclusions regarding artillery above also apply here.

Losses of Russian MLRS (rocket artillery) in the war in Ukraine one year back:

Losses of Russian MLRS (rocket artillery) in the war in Ukraine from the start of the war:

Other unarmored vehicles (logistics)

Here we see a sharp increase over the past year but also for the entire war as a whole. This is probably a combination. Today we see that the Russian army increasingly relies on simpler vehicles such as motorcycles, small buses, and trucks etc. The heavier military transport vehicles are probably running low and the costs to replace them with civilian vehicles become high. At the same time, Ukraine’s drone capability has increased both in quality and quantity so that today it is relatively easy to take out even motorcycles.
It is probably both a matter of shortage and tactical adaptation from Russia’s side combined with increased capability on Ukraine’s side.

There are more losses but each individual loss is probably smaller. Previously they took out military trucks and troop transport vehicles while today they take out motorcycles.

Losses of Russian unarmored vehicles in Ukraine one year back from today:

Losses of Russian unarmored vehicles from the start of the war:

Special equipment

Losses of special equipment have been low during the past year, but we possibly see a slight increase towards the end, though this is probably coincidental. Looking back to when the war in Ukraine started, losses increased for a long time but now we are in a period with very low losses.

This may be a sign that Russia has difficulty producing, for example, larger radar complexes as vehicles etc., or that they simply do not dare to place them near the front. It may also be that Ukraine has taken out most of all fixed installations and that Russia has not rebuilt them, so it is simply harder to find targets. Difficult to draw any conclusions.

Losses of Russian special equipment in Ukraine one year back:

Losses of Russian special equipment from the start of the war:

UAVs, unmanned flying drones

The past year shows a massive increase in losses of larger drones, while the peak seems to have been reached and towards the end we see large fluctuations. It becomes even clearer how large the increase is when looking at the war as a whole. It is obvious that Russia has greatly increased usage but also that Ukraine’s defense keeps up and manages to shoot down the majority of all UAVs. It is difficult to assess how much Russia’s production of e.g. Shaheds can continue to increase. They are cheap and relatively simple to produce. It is vital that Ukraine can expand its capability and that they get all the help they need.
If Russia continues to increase at the same pace, Ukraine risks having its infrastructure, energy production, and even its industry (military as well as civilian) destroyed.

Moreover, the constant attacks with civilian casualties wear down the population. Surveys show that more and more want to see peace negotiations even though most are still unwilling to give away land to Russia.

Losses of Russian UAVs in the war in Ukraine one year back from today:

Losses of Russian UAVs from the start of the war:

Russian air defense

There is not much to say here. Ukraine continues to take out Russian air defense at roughly the same rate as throughout the war. It is usually between 0 to 3 per day, with 0 being the most common. The average over the entire war is 0.88 and for the past year somewhat lower at 0.59.

Losses of Russian air defense in the war in Ukraine one year back from today:

Losses of Russian air defense from the start of the war:

Russian artillery attacks

Here the statistics go back 250 days and one can see that it slowly decreases. From about 5,000 per day down to about 3,000 per day. There is no explanation regarding the numbers but I conclude that it refers to heavier artillery and not simpler mortars with short range.

Whether the decline is due to shortage, tactical adaptation, or if it is being saved as a reserve I reason about further up so I will not repeat it here.

Russian artillery attacks the last 250 days:

Russian suicide drones

Contrary to the above, the use of drones is increasing sharply. Here they have gone from just over 5,000 250 days ago to just under 10,000 recently. Just like Ukraine, Russia is increasingly focusing on FPV drones and we will probably see these numbers continue to increase going forward.

Regarding drones, Russia is probably dependent on China; the upper limit likely depends on China’s production capacity and Russia’s ability to pay for the components (assembly is probably done by themselves).

Russian suicide drones in the last 250 days:

Russian airstrikes and KAB

The regular airstrikes remain at a fairly stable level of around 70 per day. The use of KAB, however, has roughly doubled in the last 250 days, but we can also see that it seems to have leveled off and stabilized in recent months. Hopefully, the Russians have reached the peak of their capability so we won’t see even higher numbers going forward. Note that the red line representing KAB is a seven-day average. We have had days where Russia has dropped over 300.

Russian airstrikes and KAB in the last 250 days:

Combat engagements

The number of combat engagements varies greatly over time but has not changed significantly in the past year, and this corresponds fairly well with the Russian personnel losses.

Combat engagements over the past year

Captured territories

This shows, among other things, the size of the land area that Russia and Ukraine have captured (or rather recaptured in the case of Ukraine), represented by the red bars. Since the turn of the year, progress has slowed down for Russia, and we also see that Ukraine has retaken some areas. Although the last bar for April is somewhat higher, my interpretation is that Russia is finding it harder to continue advancing while continuing to suffer the same high losses,