Russian losses

  • 1420 KWIA
  • 3 Tanks
  • 10 AFVs
  • 85 Artillery systems
  • 3 MLRS
  • 6 Air defense systems
  • 1 Aircraft
  • 1914 UAVs
  • 11 UGVs
  • 526 Vehicles and Fuel tanks
  • 4 Special equipment
  • 5 Cruise missiles

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57 thoughts on “Russian losses”

    1. It is probably Budanov who is pulling the strings behind the defense minister change. Occasionally sends The Old One to scheme a bit in the minister palaces. Budanov’s own Ebbe Carlsson.

  1. Syrskyi said in May that Ukrainian offensive actions had overtaken Russia’s. Daily General Staff data backs him to the day — and shows the deeper shift: Russia can no longer press adjacent axes at once. Volume is back; simultaneity isn’t. Ukraine’s 100+ daily ops grind on.

    Mid-May: Ukraine’s offensive operations exceeded Russian assaults for the first time. Two months on, the tempo holds — 100+ ops daily, no dip, straight through a defense-ministry crisis. Russian assaults rebounded, but now run sequentially, not in parallel. Initiative, sustained.

     

    1. 👍 Sounds hopeful. Speaking of Fedorov, one can generally reflect a bit on the relationship between a defense minister and a military commander-in-chief. Who should decide the direction of an ongoing war? Direction versus execution. There is room for friction here. Now the commander-in-chief Syrskyi remains in his role. It would have been worse if it had been the other way around and he had been dismissed. That’s how I see it.

      1. Exactly.

        DN’s Winiarsky joins the chorus of Zelensky critics and says that Putin is now pleased with the defense minister’s resignation. And paints a doom scenario, just like the hypocrite on the other blog who only recently praised Zelensky.

         

        And the blog itself here (where MXT sticks to its terrace) and Johan have suffered from general amnesia regarding the Ukrainian successes, where Johan explicitly praised the Ukrainian warfare, its tactics, and its smart moves — a work by none other than the same Chief of Defense whom Johan now criticizes.

        The risk is significantly greater if the Chief of Defense has been fired. Then Putin would have had a real reason to rejoice. And this is reflected in some comment yesterday: the Chief of Defense complained that the soldiers had not received what they needed. Fedorov said that they had indeed received it and that they must use the equipment differently. Remarkable, frightening, and clearly a misstep from someone who has not set foot near the front.

        1. Well, 205 😀

          When they switched to corps and gave strong corps commanders autonomy per autonomy – that’s when things got better.

          These corps commanders dare to ignore Sirsky because they are too popular and have large operational areas.

          There is a lot of horizontal communication in the cooperation now that wasn’t there before. They can probably get resources from the special forces.

          Unfortunately, this reshuffle shows signs of a power strengthening rather than what is directly good for the war.

          Now we are not interesting, so we’ll see what Ukraine chooses 😀

          My money is on Sirsky having weeks left.

           

          1. Judgments: yes, in the spirit of the German military strategist Clausewitz; mission tactics. Something we learned in the military, with the opposite situation in the Soviet army, where a knocked-out tank platoon leader put the entire platoon out of combat readiness. Permeates NATO. This is a doctrine where decisions bubble up but the implementation of the doctrine is a top command decision. The Minister of Defense’s decision? Zelensky’s? Or the Chief of Defense’s? And who executed the decision? Who implemented the doctrine in the AFU…🧐

          2. In this episode of Ukraine This Week, we were joined by John E. Herbst, former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, to discuss President Zelenskyy’s recent government reshuffle and the controversial dismissal of Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, which has raised many questions not only within Ukrainian society but also among Ukraine’s international partners.

            The decision has triggered protests in Kiev and other cities for the second day now. Ambassador Herbst said that Fedorov’s dismissal is deeply controversial and highlights his role in transforming Ukraine’s defense industry, developing military technology, and helping Ukraine gain advantages on the battlefield against Russia. He warned that the decision comes at a difficult time for Kiev, as Fedorov was highly respected by Ukrainian soldiers and international partners.

            At the same time, Herbst claimed that Ukraine’s successes with drone warfare are putting increasing pressure on Russia, especially through attacks on Russian forces, energy infrastructure, and on the occupied Crimea. He said that Ukraine now has the ability to create serious challenges for Moscow and that the war, with continued Western support, could be approaching an end.
            https://youtu.be/9wSwtsx-wZw

          3. Sirsky came in February 2024 – today.

            Yes, he definitely pushed the corps system 👍

            However, he has retained full control over the “assault” units as a deployable reserve.

            I liked the course offensive that Trump destroyed for UA, so he definitely came up with sensible operations.

            Kharkiv, he was probably behind that?

            My point is a bit broader, Fedorov, Poklot, keeping Syrskyi.

            Those the citizens don’t like vs those the citizens like.

            Zelensky, Zalizhny, Syrskyi and everyone else are nothing without the shooters, the citizens, and money from the West.

            If you check who has been moved now, there are some who have excelled.
            The focus has not been on what is best for the country/war but something else.

            If the result of Fedorov is that Syrskyi also gets removed and Zelensky might be forced to hold elections soon – was that well handled by Zelensky?

            The parliament refused to vote and the soldiers have taken to Twitter – all following a decision.

        2. Unfortunately, it is impossible to know what lies behind this, whether Fedorov is a bit too much and is interfering in Sirsky’s area. However, one would think it would have been better if Zelensky had managed to mediate between the two gentlemen and set clear boundaries for their areas of responsibility.

          He has surely tried, but failed, and had to dismiss someone, and then chose the one who (should) have had less impact on the war.

          War is not just about equipment and soldiers. The army must be motivated and have trust in its leaders. I believe the dismissal of Fedorov hits precisely this trust. He seems to have been popular, modernized the conduct of the war, and taken the war to Russia in a more tangible way.

          If one wants to be a bit conspiratorial, there may have been demands from the USA (possibly the EU) to scale down the destruction of Russia’s oil/gas infrastructure. Trump has his special operation in the Middle East that disrupts the oil/gas market, and does not want the oil/gas supplies from Russia to be completely stopped, as that would increase pressure on Trump to end the war ahead of the autumn elections.

  2. There is a bit more in the reshuffling of Zelensky that is not yet being discussed, the SBU for example.

    I believe this will continue and it is an extremely poorly chosen timing.

    Now the unit commanders and the shooters are starting to weigh in on Sirsky as well.

    I think the parliament refused to vote before they went on leave?

     

  3. Sometimes media logic comes through. The one that is supposed to generate clicks and income. It then involves different kinds of clickbaiting such as fearmongering, painting the devil on the wall, blowing up conflicts, and more. It becomes tiring in the long run if/when reality is somewhere else.

  4. Yes, I saw it on the internet that he had fallen out of some window. 🤔😬 You can claim anything about anything. True or not. And news can be fabricated. The internet is a jungle nowadays.

    1. Apparently content farmers from India are attacking everything, even the UA war 😀

      The OSINT people are arguing with them, but that just generates more traffic…

      I’m trying to stick to the OSINT people, but this one slipped through.

    1. I am fascinated by the AI films showing some lion chasing a buffalo – created but could be real.

      We have elevated film actors to their roles and trusted news anchors during the Cold War.

      Films and written texts have given us history neatly arranged, the winner writes history, as they say?

      But it’s getting harder 😀

      Just waiting for AI-created scandals that take hold and gain a life of their own. Just before the election, a shaky film is released of Helden standing and laughing as he fills the car with diesel and sprays DDT on the weeds with a flatbread roll in the other hand.

      Rarely does one manage to debunk quickly and many seem to go by the latest impression, so timing is important and can provide that % needed.

      The amount of lies in the media before this election and of all the 8 parties themselves is striking, so why not top it off with revealing AI films for the optics? 

  5. Jo Budanov is the chief of staff nowadays 😀

    Yermak was fired after too much corruption, right?

    Budanov wanted to stay at GUR, he spoke out on the matter.

    I have the impression that there was something about Kursk that was negative for him?

    He mostly writes about unity and internal matters these days.

     

  6. Der Totaler Krieg

    Is based on the writings of the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz. Clausewitz had argued in the early nineteenth century that war is a societal issue. Common and all-encompassing for all politics, social planning, and production must be to fundamentally defeat the enemy. The entire population must be mobilized for war-oriented activities.

    Somewhat like what we see in Ukraine where grandmothers participate in the production of war materials.

  7. Johan, imagine that you are the Chief of Defence and MXT is the Minister of Defence. You are missing a function or it is not working. You get a response from MXT, which you probably recognize: yes, it works but you are using it incorrectly:

    “The young Minister of Defence, who had only been in office for six months, wanted to build the defence around technology, digitalization, and innovation. Syrskyj, on the other hand, felt that Fedorov did not listen to what the frontline units really needed, sources told Ukrainska Pravda. According to the information, Syrskyj believed that his men did not receive enough material while Fedorov, for his part, could respond that they had received everything but used the material incorrectly.”

     

    If you were Zelenskyj, wouldn’t you side with the Chief of Defence and dismiss MXT?

    1. What I believe you will soon discover is that this will go far beyond Fedorov – and that is my point from the beginning.

      There is a lot of dissatisfaction but there is a truce; last week many felt that Zelensky broke that truce and that they have the right to act – that is what I believe will happen.

      If Fedorov had stayed, everything would have continued as usual. He performs wonders.

      Probably Syrskyi would have continued as well, but now both have to go – not ideal at all.

      And everything is initiated by Zelensky.

      There you have the problem.

      Problem two is that Syrskyi is deeply unpopular but it only comes to the surface because Fedorov had to leave.

  8. CB500four,

    Well, that suspicion is already out there – that the USA or someone else orchestrated Fedorov’s resignation.

    I find it hard to believe that would be true, and if so, it will probably come out.

    He is behind what several countries in Europe have asked UA to stop doing, fighting in the Baltic Sea area.

    The drones over the Baltics that led to the Latvian government’s resignation.

    His warfare has made Putin consider nuclear weapons.

    Could theoretically be something like that, we’ll see.

  9. Fedorov is probably a bit like Budanov – a prodigy.

    Budanov would have been removed a long time ago but the USA apparently liked him.

    Budanov wants to stay at GUR.

    Power struggles all the time in UA but this one will probably escalate unfortunately.

    The corrupt who have been forced to resign are only when the citizens or the parliament have had enough, never initiated internally.

    This, and probably Budanov, and definitely Zalizhny are power struggles.

  10. Gregg on Syrskyj again:

    “18.07.2026 Morning update

    Stop judging General Syrskyj by how often he appears on Facebook
    There is something deeply ironic about the debate over Ukraine’s commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrskyj.
    Many of those demanding his resignation have never led a company, never planned an operation, never visited a brigade staff, and have never stood a few kilometers behind a frontline where decisions are made under constant threat from FPV drones, glide bombs, and ballistic missiles. This applies especially to the blogger Denys Davydov who is fiercely critical of Syrskyj. The difference between him and me is that I am monthly at the foremost frontlines, I sleep and eat together with soldiers and officers, I accompany them to positions in kill zones. I see, feel, and smell the atmosphere out at the front units much better than anyone thousands of kilometers away.
    Yet they are completely convinced that they know better.
    Why?
    Because Syrskyj does not produce enough Facebook posts.
    That actually says more about our era’s information society than about the general himself.
    We have created a culture where people believe that visibility is the same as competence. Where a general who gives interviews and publishes videos is automatically perceived as decisive, while a general who works quietly is seen as passive.
    Reality does not work that way.
    Wars are not led from social media.
    They are led from operations rooms, communications centers, and brigade staffs where thousands of decisions are made every day – decisions that will never be shown on Telegram or Facebook.
    I regularly meet soldiers, battalion commanders, brigade leaderships, and technical development groups along the front. I see how the war changes on site. That does not mean I hold the whole truth, but my conclusions are at least based on real observations and conversations with people who actually fight the war – not on screenshots from anonymous Telegram channels.
    So let us leave emotions aside and look at the results.
    When Syrskyj took over, Ukraine was in a strategic disadvantage:
    – Russia had the initiative.
    – Ammunition shortage was acute.
    – Mobilization was poorly functioning.
    – Western aid had slowed down.
    – Russia produced more artillery, more drones, and could absorb enormous losses without the front collapsing.
    No general in the world could change these fundamental conditions overnight.
    The first task was therefore not to win the war.
    The first task was to prevent Ukraine from losing it.
    That succeeded more than well!!!
    Since then, Ukraine’s armed forces have undergone one of their biggest transformations since the invasion began.
    The command system is replacing the previously more fragmented leadership structure. This means shorter decision paths, better coordination between brigades, and a significantly more effective operational leadership.
    Drone warfare has at the same time gone from being a complement to becoming the very backbone of large parts of the battle. FPV drones, Vampire systems, reconnaissance drones, electronic warfare, and precision artillery today work as an integrated system instead of as separate functions. This was in place long before Fedorov entered the picture. Fedorov, on the other hand, is hyperactive on social media.
    I have personally seen how this works out at the front.
    Storm groups are no longer sent forward first.
    First come the drone swarms.
    Then come the heavy bomb drones.
    Only after that does the infantry advance against an opponent who is already disorganized, demoralized, and often partly defeated.
    It is a completely different doctrine than just a year ago.
    That development has not arisen by itself.
    At the same time, Ukraine has changed the very geography of the war.
    Two years ago, almost everyone discussed the frontline.
    Today, the war is just as much about refineries in Russia, air bases hundreds of kilometers behind the front, ammunition depots, railway hubs, radar stations, command centers, and the Russian defense industry.
    That is no coincidence.
    It is a deliberate operational change where Russia’s endurance is attacked systematically instead of only measuring success by the number of regained square kilometers.
    That is exactly why I have for a long time in Gregg’s Endurance Index claimed that the map has become an increasingly poor analysis tool.
    The real battle is about endurance.
    About the ability to continue producing ammunition and keep airports open.
    That is exactly where Ukraine today directs an increasing share of its resources.
    The results are also beginning to show.
    The Russian offensive is advancing more slowly than before.
    Losses are increasing.
    Increasingly large resources must be moved from the front to protect targets deep inside Russia.
    Air defense is moved to Moscow.
    Air bases are dispersed.
    Refineries are forced to stop production.
    The railway network is repeatedly subjected to disruptions.
    The war has moved into Russia’s own depth.
    Is this a coincidence?
    No.
    It is the result of a long-term operational strategy.
    Does that mean Syrskyj is infallible?
    Of course not.
    No general is.
    He makes decisions that cost human lives. Every commander-in-chief in an existential war does.
    He can be criticized for individual operations and individual decisions.
    That is both legitimate and necessary.
    But the criticism I increasingly see is not based on military analysis, it is based on frustration, on emotions, and on social media.
    Those are two completely different things.
    I would like to ask a question to all these experts.
    Which general would have done a better job with exactly the same conditions?
    With fewer soldiers.
    Less air force.
    Less ammunition.
    An opponent with a larger economy, larger industry, and almost four times larger population.
    Who?
    I still have not heard a credible answer.
    History will not judge Oleksandr Syrskyj by how many interviews he gave or how active he was on Facebook.
    History will ask only one thing.
    Did he succeed in transforming a numerically inferior army into a force that could withstand a great power, change the character of the war, and step by step break down Russia’s military endurance?
    That is the question serious military historians will discuss.
    The rest will mostly be noise from people who have confused social media with reality.
    Right there lies the biggest difference between a blogger and a commander-in-chief.
    One produces content.
    The other produces results.
    SLAVA UKRAINI”
  11. The corps system is in the process of replacing the previously more fragmented command structure. This means shorter decision-making paths, better coordination between brigades, and a significantly more effective operational leadership.

     
    Drone warfare has at the same time gone from being a complement to becoming the very backbone of large parts of the battle. FPV drones, Vampire systems, reconnaissance drones, electronic warfare, and precision artillery today operate as an integrated system instead of as separate functions. This was in place long before Fedorov entered the picture.
     
     
    It is a completely different doctrine than just a year ago.
     
    This development has not arisen by itself.
    (higher up in the Gregg post)
      1. “But the criticism I increasingly see is not based on military analysis, it is based on frustration, on emotions, and on social media.”

        Shares the feeling.

  12. Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky is considering dismissing Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi. This is reported by a Ukrainian source to the Financial Times.
    Syrskyi has become one of the main targets of the protests following the dismissal of the former Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, who was very popular in the country.
    The dismissal is said to have followed an internal power struggle between Fedorov and Syrskyi.
    According to the source, Zelensky can remove Syrskyi if he finds a replacement who can ensure a smooth transition without weakening the defense at the front. However, the considerations are said to have begun only after the protests broke out.
    https://omni.se/a/2pj2vr

    1. Volodymyr Zelenskyy is considering sacking Ukraine’s commander-in-chief, who is known as “the Butcher”, as he seeks to navigate a path out of the biggest military leadership crisis of his presidency.

      Oleksandr Syrsky’s leadership of the armed forces has become a lightning rod for protests that have grown since Zelenskyy fired the civilian defence minister after a deepening rift between the two leaders became untenable.

      According to a senior administration official, Zelenskyy is gathering military commanders this weekend to hear their assessments of the battlefield situation and to interview candidates to take command of the army.

      That person said Zelenskyy was open to removing Syrsky from his post if he could find a commander who would ensure a smooth transfer of power while maintaining a strong defence along the 1,200km front line.

      Zelenskyy fired Mykhailo Fedorov as defence minister this week after Syrsky presented the president with an “ultimatum” to remove the 35-year-old cabinet minister, according to Fedorov.

      The move exposed divisions over Ukraine’s military strategy and the willingness of the armed forces to address its shortcomings just as momentum in the war against Russia has swung in its favour.

      But the president’s consideration of dismissing Syrsky came only after protests over Fedorov’s sacking broadened on Friday night into a wider campaign against the commander. Thousands of Ukrainians gathered outside the presidential administration building in what was one of the largest protests in years. They chanted, “Syrsky out!”

      Dmytro Koziatynskyi, a military veteran who organised the demonstrations, wrote on X that the movement’s primary demand was Syrsky’s dismissal, followed by Fedorov’s reappointment.

      He called on Ukrainians to return to the streets at 8pm on Saturday.

      Zelenskyy told reporters this week that the relationship between Fedorov and Syrsky had grown so bad that the two were no longer on speaking terms and could only communicate when the president himself acted as meditator.

      “Without me they don’t sit down together [to talk],” he said. He had “wanted unity very much” between Fedorov and Syrsky but “did not achieve it”.

      Fedorov told reporters in an extraordinary press conference on Thursday that Syrsky had blocked his efforts to reform the defence ministry and accused him of enabling corruption. He gave Syrsky credit for his successful efforts in defending Kyiv in the early weeks of the 2022 invasion and counteroffensives in Kharkiv and Kherson that autumn.

      But he said that “if we want to defeat the enemy asymmetrically, with minimal losses, we need to change the commander-in-chief and chief of the general staff”. Pointing to Ukraine’s escalating drone strikes against Russian targets, he said the nature of the war was changing but that Syrsky was not changing with it.

      Overnight, seven people were killed and 51 wounded by Ukrainian drone attacks near Moscow and in the Tambov region, Russian officials said.

      Syrsky did not respond to requests for comment and in a statement on Thursday did not address the allegations directly.

      ​Fedorov said he had urged Zelenskyy to fire Syrsky, saying a reboot of senior military leadership was needed to defeat Russia.

      Fedorov and Syrsky held fundamentally different views on how the war should be fought. The defence minister saw drones and automation as the future of warfare, while the general remained committed to a traditional approach centred on assault infantry and artillery.

      Ukraine’s western partners and Nato officials had worked closely with Fedorov and supported his reformist plans at the country’s opaque ministry of defence. His sudden removal was a shock, according to a western defence attaché in Kyiv.

      Syrsky, a stern-faced commander trained in the Soviet military tradition, is known among some troops as “the Butcher” because of his willingness to sustain heavy casualties in pursuit of military objectives.

      Syrsky assumed the role of top commander in February 2024, after the controversial sacking of his popular predecessor, Valeriy Zaluzhny, who now serves as Ukraine’s ambassador to the UK.

      Military veterans and active-duty troops joined the protests against Fedorov’s firing and in support of Syrsky’s dismissal on Thursday and Friday, in a rare sign of public dissent from the military ranks.

      The protests swelled on Friday night, with many thousands of demonstrators turning out in Ivan Franko Square outside the presidential office in Kyiv, and in big cities such as Lviv and Odesa.

      Zelenskyy is also still in search of a new ambassador to Washington, according to aides. His top choice remains former prime minister Yulia Svyrydenko, was dismissed in this week’s cabinet shuffle, said one aide, although she turned down the offer this week.

      People close to the president said that he was still trying to convince her to take on the role, which comes at a crucial moment in the war and in the relationship with the Trump administration.

      © The Financial Times Limited 2022. All Rights Reserved. FT and Financial Times are trademarks of the Financial Times Ltd. Not to be redistributed, copied or modified in any way.

    2. Zelenskyy Aims to Contain Anger Over Defense Minister Ouster

      Telegram from BLOOMBERG / Omni Economy
      16 July 2026, 11:38, updated 16 July 2026, 18:39
      (Bloomberg) — Volodymyr Zelenskyy said the ousted Ukrainian defense minister remained part of his team even as Mykhailo Fedorov insisted he’d turned down a position as a presidential adviser, deepening a rift within the country’s ruling elite at a pivotal moment in the war against Russia.

      The abrupt dismissal of Fedorov, a popular minister and one of the architects of Kyiv’s successful drone warfare, triggered street protests across the country and dismay among foreign allies. It exposed tensions inside the military in the fifth year of the war at a time when momentum on the battlefield has turned in Ukraine’s favor.

      Zelenskyy admitted as much on Thursday, telling reporters that he had to act because of a conflict between Fedorov and military Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi, a Moscow-educated, highly experienced, but also more traditional commander.

      “The president should not choose sides during the war,” Zelenskyy said. “But if the parties cannot solve the issue, then I have to solve it.”

      Zelenskyy added: “Mikhailo remains in the team, we will talk over the format later.”

      The ousted minister told reporters Zelenskyy had refused his request to dismiss Syrskyi, whom he accused of obstructing his defense reforms and eventual removal.

      Syrskyi “isn’t ready to talk openly, eye-to-eye about problems,” Fedorov said. “Instead of coming up with a way to asymmetrically defeat Russia, he came up with a way to divide the country — and that’s where the problem is.”

      He said he was offered a job by Palantir Technologies Inc., but hasn’t decided whether to accept it for now.

      Syrskyi responded with a post on Telegram that highlighted his own role in the 2022 defense of Kyiv, adding that Ukraine needed to focus on “an effective strategy that is now demonstrating concrete results.”

      “I thank Mykhailo Fedorov for his work as the Minister of Defense of Ukraine,” Syrskyi said. “I wish him to continue to remain in the Ukrainian team.”

      Zelenskyy said later Thursday that he’d asked Yevhenii Khmara, acting head of Ukraine’s SBU security service, to serve as acting defense minister and would seek lawmakers’ support for his nomination as minister.

      “Yevhenii Khmara has gained extensive and, in many respects, unprecedented experience with technological combat operations,” the president said in a post on X. “This is exactly where our defense efforts should be focused during this war.”

      The tensions at the top of Ukraine’s defense establishment emerged as thousands of people rallied near a theater in central Kyiv on Thursday in response to calls on social media to oppose the removal of 35-year-old Fedorov. Appointed to the post just six months ago, the youngest minister in the government had won widespread praise for his focus on military efficiency and developing Ukraine’s drone capabilities.

      “We see how much better our weapons have been and how much better our drones have been with Fedorov than they were before,” said Yelizaveta Riabenko, a freelance book editor who joined the crowd with a sign saying “Convenient people instead of effective people means defeat.”

      European officials and diplomats are highly critical of the ouster and view the decision as damaging for Ukraine, according to people familiar with the matter, who requested anonymity to speak freely about the issue.

      European Union Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius said in a Wednesday interview with the European Pravda outlet that news of Fedorov’s departure came as “quite a big surprise.” While changes in government were sometimes needed, “my personal opinion is that a lot has been achieved” during Fedorov’s time as defense minister, Kubilius said.

      The minister has won plaudits from many Ukrainians, including soldiers, as a key contributor to Kyiv’s recent military successes, including relentless drone strikes that have triggered fuel shortages across Russia.

      Fedorov’s efforts to revamp the military proved too sweeping for Zelenskyy, a person familiar with the matter said. For instance, he dismissed all the deputy ministers who’d served under his predecessor, including two highly experienced generals.

      “We should have been even more decisive in dismissing those who stood in the way of reform,” Fedorov wrote in a Facebook post late Wednesday.

      Ukraine’s parliament on Thursday confirmed Sergii Koretskyi, the chief executive officer of a state-run energy company, as the new prime minister after Zelenskyy nominated him to replace Yuliia Svyrdyenko.

      The protests erupted almost exactly a year after thousands of Ukrainians took to the streets across the country to oppose legislation that would have effectively defanged the country’s two anti-corruption agencies. Zelenskyy eventually reversed course and dropped the legislation in the face of the popular outrage and under pressure from international allies.

      Fedorov was appointed defense minister in the previous government reshuffle in January that came in the wake of a major corruption scandal. He was previously deputy prime minister in charge of Ukraine’s digital transformation.

      He moved to ramp up production of combat drones, which proved highly effective in Ukraine’s operations including in strikes behind Russian lines on logistics supplies, and to increase military pay to encourage more volunteers to join the army.

      He pledged to audit military personnel to identify soldiers serving in the rear who could be reassigned to the frontline, and to overhaul military recruitment offices, which have become a frequent target of public anger for their heavy-handed methods of drafting soldiers.

      “Only now have we gotten the sense we have some kind of victory,” said Liubov Velychko, a journalist and investigator who attended the protest in support of Fedorov. “We were just seeing hope being born and they got rid of him.”

      –With assistance from Alberto Nardelli, Julius Domoney and Yurii Stasiuk.

      (Adds acting defense minister appointment in 11th and 12th paragraphs)

      ©2026 Bloomberg L.P.

    1. Hmm, you would think that Zelensky could have foreseen the reactions that firing Fedorov would cause.

      Now also firing Syrsky, I don’t think makes things better, it gives the impression that Zelensky doesn’t know what he is doing.

      Fedorov and Syrsky were not pulling in the same direction, and in war it is very important that everyone pulls in the same direction, or at least solves their problems internally or puts them aside until the war is over. The troops should not have to doubt their leadership. 

      At the same time, I think Fedorov should have accepted the position as advisor, that would have calmed the people. It is better to be “promoted sideways” when possible than to step down.

  13. One thing 205 that Gregg writes is that the drone weapon was before Fedorov.

    Don’t think that’s true because Fedorov has been working on it since 2022.

    Fedorov is one of the architects of the drone weapon.

    That’s why he was so popular, partly because lives are saved and then they get at Russia.

     

  14. So it’s quite messy…

    Zelensky is taking a long weekend to try to handle this.

    The best thing would be if both stayed and they drew a line over the debacle 😀

    At least the optics turned out bad

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