Ukraine has rolled out a 40-day exercise in convincing Russia that their war is pointless. Most recently, they started sinking the small “river boats” (5,000-10,000 tons) that usually traffic the Don but have been redirected via the canals to transport fuel over to Crimea now that all other routes, bridges, and ferries have been drone-struck into a huge fireball of Russian death.
Not sure exactly how many have been sunk, but we are surely up to a few hundred by now.
UA has also broadened the persuasion campaign for peace to include the entire Black Sea and begun targeting larger ships.
The refineries I started logging at the first operation back in 2023 have now seen over 166 liberation acts with fireballs and leaning towers.
In addition, Ukraine 2026 has also started targeting the entire fuel chain, pipelines, depots, and terminals, resulting in Russia facing a gigantic fuel shortage to try to manage.
But they don’t stop there; they’ve also been probing power plants and gas nodes, besides a massive hunt for air defenses and radars all the way out in Taganrog and Rostov-on-Don.
It’s easy to see that Novorossiysk is on the Excel sheet for targeted objectives a bit further down, but above the Yamal cross.
A fairly large part of Russian heating comes from central district heating plants, often gas-powered, so if they go after gas distribution this fall, it will also get cold for average Ivan besides his car having no gasoline. I believe the intelligence has identified 3-4 nodes which, if taken out, would disrupt 60% of gas supply in Russia.
It seems to have gone so far that Russia is now trying to import fuel from China and some old places in Asia, some places say no.
Not sure exactly how far we’ve come in the 40 days, halfway?
Ukraine has no shortage of drones in any format at all and may be asking for an extended program if they don’t finish in time; I think there could be problems with all the overtime and hitting the ceiling for what labor laws stipulate as maximum overtime per month.
That’s how it looks for Russia, and you know my hobbyhorse that Russia intends to mess with us. The wildfires are raging and the arrests are escalating. Eventually, it will be said just like last year when it was investigated a bit.
That is probably the lowest hanging fruit of all; last year, a few hundred were arrested, several of whom had been paid for their work where it could be linked to Russian pesetas.
The second is really our gas/LNG?
Stocks are 20%-25% below what they should be at this time of year, we have no anti-drone weapons, and we have been effective so our large tanks are well protected from accidents but not sabotage and absolutely not drones, or marine drones.
So far in the war, we call everything accidents and the enormous big molehill is explained away with careless technicians and wrenches.
Downed Ukrainian drones that have been fixed up, RU probably has no shortage of by now, and that could provide a nice conflict surface for them to exploit.
A year from now, Ukraine will have our Gripens in large numbers, many more F-16s, their own JDAMS, and licensed-produced Patriot interceptors.
Diligent as they are, they are also working on their own ballistic missiles and have hinted that they can manufacture nuclear weapons quickly if they just want to?
All of Europe’s measures are also about a year away roughly, where we try to acquire all capabilities and have a perimeter defense worth the name – I thought this would be in place this fall, but if there’s one thing I’ve consistently underestimated in a whole war, it’s the free West. We simply don’t score goals into open nets.
You saw that Ukraine has now received its first Lynx from Germany, so in the area of mechanized warfare, their capability is increasing significantly now. You know from before that they have taken all old vehicles and put new weapon stations on them; half of Europe is involved in this huge refurbishment.
Mine clearance, amphibious combat vessels, shrapnel protection, artillery – basically everything they have received obscene amounts of from us in Europe over the past two years besides what they build themselves in their underground factories.
Crimea is completely blacked out and no fuel, administration and surely also staffs have begun to relocate.
Behind the southern front, Ukraine recently took out a CAA staff with their FABs; everything is buried but UA can reach them with SU-27 and FAB nowadays – that doomsday weapon goes both ways. If the brigade commanders get no response in the field, how do you think they feel and think about sacrificing their lives?
Moreover, the Russian army is extremely top-down controlled, so if it is static in the field, nothing happens.
The brigades at the Dnieper are on a starvation diet – Brovdi has called them completely cut off without maintenance, and he of all people should know what he is talking about, a firsthand source.
Don’t know exactly how it looks behind the southern front other than that UA is advancing – probably thirsty and without diesel for the generators there as well.
A point as good as any – much is buried and they have generators for light, air, and their command and control in the elaborate bunker systems. If they get no fuel, it will be dark and boring in the holes.
The drone weapon also needs to charge its batteries besides vehicles needing to be driven, then you have the water supply here in midsummer – which becomes critical first we will see.
Do you see how RU is supposed to turn this around – please feel free to suggest. To me, it looks like unless China joins the war, the adventure in Ukraine is on a downward slope.
RU will mobilize, but as UA increases pressure, dissatisfaction grows among the ground troops in Ukraine, and at some point, they have had enough. A million under arms who have had enough is the Russian elite’s nightmare and really the only thing they seriously worry about.
A sane transfer of power they can handle and some popular unrest as well – the repressive organization is dimensioned for that even if it is under pressure.
If the army turns north from Ukraine and goes towards Moscow, it is game over.
China has also been clear that nuclear weapons are a line they do not accept, and that follows statements from various leaders in Europe – we can conclude that Putin has started to fiddle with them but that everyone intends to draw a red line here roughly. What we do if he wants to test us remains to be seen, but we have probably done what we should.
The US seems like they will vote through sanctions from hell for Russia?
If I understand correctly, however, it is a heavily watered-down proposal with a subjective veto from Trump when he wants, so probably it will be, like with many other things, totally toothless.
Trump also has a balancing act to relate to, and if it becomes obvious that RU is on the decline, he will want to be on the winning side so that his legacy will be that he was always UA’s greatest defender. Exactly when that will happen is a bit hard to predict, but you can be sure it will come.
I still believe that Putin wants to escalate, but he also has – Trump’s midterm elections, his own parliamentary elections, what China thinks, his own elite, and the citizens of the country to consider.
What he decides remains to be seen, but he does not have time on his side at all here. If we enter the razpuzitza sometime in October, it will not be easy for him to come up with anything after that, assuming Ukraine continues as it is now.
There is probably only one real threat – a ceasefire; let’s hope we never get to that, but even Europe must have understood this by now?
Right now, things are really only moving forward on the fronts; this post was actually supposed to be about that but will have to take it next week.
Ending with Fedorov – very unfortunate is my view on the matter, and being dismissed sideways or upwards is somewhat of a Ukrainian classic?
In most wars, there are government changes and resignations when things start heating up; I was looking at WW2 where 5-6 governments in Europe collapsed in sheer panic before Germany even attacked them in 1940.
Ukraine has several plans to act on – internally within the country, externally towards the West, and then against the red swamp enemy.
We in the West have probably moved past accusing Ukraine of all sorts of things instead of supporting them; Scholz at the beginning accused them of having the audacity to want to defend themselves, for example. But if their channels to us disappear, our actual support will probably vanish quite quickly – this is priority one for Russia to try to cut the networks.
A guy like Fedorov managed to open new doors and create opportunities that few had done before him; that is quite clear.
He is also behind Brodi’s and others’ increased drone warfare, which we all rejoice at – without him, it would have been significantly less.
He got Musk to shut off Starlink for the Russians, which I never understood before.
He is also behind several of the agreements with Europe, and getting the drone weapon widely distributed within the organization.
Fedorov has prioritized completely correctly, and it also makes a difference on the battlefield and in the war – the whole country has seen this, and just as we begin to sense a new dawn, the Ukrainians have also done so; they have seen a brightening on the horizon.
Internally in Ukraine, the country is tired of the war but more tired of the Russians; they are a mosaic that barely pulls in the same direction, and as long as the war continues, there is some kind of truce. They want to try to come out victorious from this, and the right man in the right place, according to them, is important. Sirsky is not liked at all, but Fedorov was very popular.
Against Russia – the number of assassination attempts on all prominent figures is probably +20 per person by now, in addition to all campaigns to smear them and create friction. Every little opportunity for friction is maximized by the Russians, and if an extremely popular FM is removed because he has demonstrably dared to tackle corruption and Soviet bureaucracy in the country, it is a godsend for them.
There has also been talk of elections this autumn, and Zalizhny intends to run; maybe Fedorov became a bit too popular?
Just because there is a war does not mean ambitious people do not want their chance for a career.
When citizens see that those in power are not doing what is best for the country but have some hidden agenda, they get angry; in Ukraine, it is full war, so if broad layers of the population get angry, it can affect the war as a whole.
The spearhead holding the line in the trenches over in eastern Ukraine – those are the ones that count, and they live in a reality that no one else is even close to, so they need everyone to pull in the same direction. What is good for them is good for the country, and Fedorov was good for them.
If the spearhead decides to leave the trenches and go home, then the war is over; everyone else can misbehave in different ways, and it will be harder for the shooters in the trenches, but it is that doorstop that ultimately counts.
Now we will be showered with propaganda about why Fedorov was terrible, and also why he was good from both camps, but I think we can at least conclude that he single-handedly pushed through a development that started to make a real difference. Yes, of course, it must be followed up with a ground offensive and the whole palette, but without the drone weapon, the Russians would not be standing like thirsty camels over by the Dnieper gasping, for example.
Probably you can draw good conclusions by seeing what Brodi says going forward.
If you like Fedorov, you should immediately run to a paid subscription here on my Substack; the numbers still need to go up so I don’t get fired as well.
Don't forget to donate, Ukraine's cause is ours! Support Ukraine!
Russian losses:
1370 KIA
4 Tanks
6 AFVs
65 Artillery systems
7 MLRS
4 Air defense systems
1 Helicopter
1879 UAVs
13 UGVs
489 Vehicles and Fuel tanks
4 Special equipment
3 Cruise missiles
Slava Ukraini
That Zelensky chose Syrsky over Federov and that he explicitly said that the war is entering a new phase which justifies this choice speaks well for an imminent ground offensive following the current 40-day campaign?
💥👍
Finally a yellow wall, it’s not every day, and a juicy introduction, which I look forward to continuing to read.
+1
N Slobozhansky 0↘️
S Slobozhansky 19💥↗️
Kupyansk 3
Lyman 10💥
Slovyansk 23💥
Kramatorsk 1↘️
Kostjantynivka 20💥↘️
Pokrovsk 37💥💥
Oleksandrivskij 2
Huliaipole 17💥
Orikhivsk 10💥↗️
Prydniprovskij 0
Localized 142↘️
Unlocalized 107↘️
Total 249↘️
Ratio unloc/loc 0.8
👍
Looks like the Russians are stretching themselves to try to stop Ukrainian successes. Waiting for the magical number 1.01 in the ratio, not that it practically means anything but it indicates even more of a turnaround.
Syrskyj is directly responsible for the Ukrainian successes we have seen, which have now escalated into a stable offensive that has penetrated Russian military capability. The Chief of Defense, not the Minister of Defense, is behind the military’s implementation of short- and medium-range drone warfare, which largely accounts for the success on the front.
Pehr,
the offensive is definitely underway and has been prepared for a long time 😀
Another thing is that Ukraine must meet Russian mobilization this fall, they still have problems with personnel issues.
Whether firing Fedorov helps or hinders new recruitment, we will probably see
From what we can see in hindsight, it seems unfortunate. However, I think “kick” is a strong (albeit correct) word. He seems to have been offered retreat positions that were at least equally good. I think it’s about a power struggle; unfortunately, I don’t understand what a power struggle is about in this situation. Isn’t it better to wait until a formal election has been announced?
Yes, because the whole country understands that it is a personal power struggle while at the same time they are required to sacrifice their lives.
Exactly, but 205’s repost from Gregg below makes me feel more at ease.
I believe Gregg is right; the reality of war is paramount. A new phase is underway, as he touched on yesterday. The greatest criticism comes from outside Ukraine, the very definition of desk warriors!
Update 17.06.2026
Let me return to the defense minister change one last time. I analyze the situation from a military perspective because I am well anchored in that reality.
Most analyses of the Ukrainian government reshuffle have focused on individuals.
Who won?
Who lost?
Who is closest to Zelensky?
I believe almost everyone is looking at the wrong thing.
The interesting part is not who is leaving; the interesting part should be why Ukraine is now choosing a completely different type of defense minister.
That says much more about where the war is headed than the people currently moving between various ministerial posts.
Mykhailo Fedorov did a lot of good for Ukraine.
He was the architect behind the digital revolution. Diia became an international role model. The Ukrainian state became faster, more efficient, and significantly less bureaucratic. He also drove development in drone technology and digital innovation, areas where Ukraine today is world-leading.
No one can take those achievements away from him.
But the Ministry of Defense is not the ministry for digital transformation.
It is the authority that, during an existential war, must coordinate one of Europe’s largest military powers.
There, being innovative is not enough.
You must also understand the military culture.
For a long time, there have been reports of an increasingly strained relationship between the Ministry of Defense and parts of the military leadership. When a civilian leadership tries to change an organization that is simultaneously fighting a large-scale war, conflicts almost always arise.
That in itself is not unusual.
But there are limits.
Attempts to digitalize everything at once created friction in an organization where some decisions still must be made within seconds under fire.
Initiatives such as lie detector tests within the defense industry may also have been perceived as an expression of distrust towards people already working under extreme pressure. Regardless of intent, such measures risked weakening relations between the ministry, industry, and military leadership.
When a country is at war, trust is a strategic resource.
It cannot be replaced by apps or control systems.
That does not mean the reforms were wrong.
It means the timing and implementation became increasingly difficult to reconcile with the reality on the battlefield.
At the same time, the war has changed.
Two years ago, much was about quickly building capacity.
Today, it is about optimizing a system that is already enormous.
Ukraine has carried out a comprehensive reorganization of its brigades into army corps. New command levels are being established. The drone weapon is integrated into all units. Logistics, training, intelligence, and industrial production are linked in a completely different way than before.
That requires a different kind of leadership.
When President Zelensky now chooses to appoint a person with a military background to the post, he sends a clear signal.
The Ministry of Defense must primarily be led based on the needs of the war.
Not based on political or technological visions.
That does not mean that digitalization or innovation become less important.
On the contrary.
They have become an obvious part of Ukraine’s defense capability.
The difference is that innovations must now be subordinated to military reality – not the other way around.
That is also why I believe many interpret this incorrectly.
This is not necessarily a rejection of Fedorov’s work.
It is an acknowledgment that Ukraine has entered the next phase of the war.
The first phase was about survival.
The second about building a modern military.
The third is about winning a prolonged war of endurance against a numerically superior opponent.
In that phase, the interaction between the political leadership, the general staff, the defense industry, and frontline units becomes absolutely crucial.
That is precisely what this government reshuffle is really about.
Not about a name on a minister’s door.
But about Ukraine now adapting its entire state leadership to a war that will be decided by professionalism, endurance, and military efficiency – rather than political experiments.
That is why I believe historians in the future may not describe this as an ordinary ministerial change.
They will describe it as yet another step in Ukraine’s transformation from a state at war to a state fully organized to win
SLAVA UKRAINI
https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1L4qiFRxqA/?mibextid=wwXIfr
205,
yes, Sirsky is the Chief of Staff and the Ministry of Defense is supposed to support.
Before the corps system came, Sirsky was notorious for micromanaging, which hindered rather than helped.
Fedorov praised the 3rd AC in his speech, one of the war’s best units which has now been given greater autonomy.
Sirsky has a “go-to” unit, Skala. They have been extremely reckless with lives.
Fedorov’s reforms were not finished, in a month or two there was something big underway which is now unclear if it will happen.
That the drone pivot has eased the pressure on the shooters is clear, so they were probably very satisfied.
We will see what comes of this but it was a power struggle rather than an incompetent person being fired. First he is fired and then everyone is urged to behave maturely for the country’s best.
I don’t think Fedorov will go quietly, probably he will join forces with Zalizhny who was also dismissed because of the election – we will see.
That Gregg doesn’t think it was good that Fedorov tried to clean up corruption is interesting – optics are important for Ukraine.
Yes, they reshuffled a lot and do it once a year but if you excel at your job you should be allowed to continue. Fedorov has been active since day one of the whole war and is behind quite a bit of the drone weaponry.
Gregg does not criticize Fedorov; on the contrary, he gives him credit. And I want to give Syskyij credit for the result that — and it was probably Syrskyj himself who announced it — in May, for the first time, the AFU surpassed the AFRF in the number of attacks. This is something Syrskyj has been responsible for, and it has been his actions that have elevated the drone weapon from successful units like the birds and implemented it widely. So no credit taken away from Fedorov. But no one gives credit to Syrskyj, who has had more direct impact on the success than anyone else. Just because you have 100,000 artillery shells waiting does not mean hitting the target. No more than a Russian pensioner can make any other difference on the front than wasting Ukrainian ammunition.
Yes, I understand what you mean, I am mostly against the discussion that everyone should move on because it is not good for the war – which is exactly what Sirsky and Zelensky have just done 😀
This is how the Financial Times summarizes the whole thing, pretty much in line with how I perceive the situation with Fedorov.
https://www.ft.com/content/06865b90-5b62-46c5-ae8d-147842b41cd0?syn-25a6b1a6=1
We will see how this ends, worth noting is that the head of SBU was appointed acting FM when the parliament refused to vote in Zelensky’s pick.
He has led Alpha and “knows drone warfare which is the important thing”.
I still find it funny that everyone writes that Fedorov should take one for the team and not engage in power struggles when that is exactly what Sirsky did to get rid of him.
We will see how far the ripple effects reach here, that the MoD amused itself by distributing funds they shouldn’t is not exactly unknown and it seems consistent that Fedorov tried to get at that which has given him many enemies. Presumably, the MoD has the largest budget of all I guess and the control is still poor.
The Ukrainians themselves know all this and that is probably why they got sour about it.
It was back in May that experienced brigade or corps commanders resigned in increasing numbers and because of Sirsky.
https://militaryland.net/article/skilled-officers-leaving-ukrainian-army-amid-totalitarian-command-style/
I find it very hard to see what the thinking was here if there were no hidden unsavory motives, now Ukraine has corps commanders so the Chief of Staff role has diminished, they themselves have pushed for it so they could avoid micromanagement and it is starting to work. Beyond that, the special forces hold a lot of strategic capability which is supplied when needed and surely there is quite a lot of horizontal communication now.
The Chief of Staff role becomes less and less operationally important while the MoD’s role in bringing in new capability has undergone a huge shift over to the drone weapon which this year 2026 really broke through seriously.
When Zalizhny was fired, a whole bunch of brigade commanders were removed and Sirsky immediately appointed his own.
It is quite clear that it is not just Fedorov – Sirsky who have problems with each other but that it is a much broader problem, we will see if Prokopenko or Biletsky weigh in 😀
They are so influential now that Sirsky leaves them completely alone.
https://militaryland.net/article/opinion-syrskyi-needs-to-resign/
Yes, I have a little grudge of course since my favorite Zalizhny was maneuvered out in 2024 when the opportunity opened and everyone who worked with him was fired on the spot.
Noted.
Who went out with the claim that AFU made more attacks than the Russians in May?
https://militarnyi.com/en/news/syrskyi-offensives-ukraine-exceed-russia/
We probably did it even before Sirsky, supported by your statistics 😀
👍🎯
On this Friday evening, I’m making a new attempt with dry academic humor.
Statement:
There are 10 types of people. Those who understand the binary number system and those who don’t.
😕
Classic 😂
Have a wonderful Friday buzz, those of you who have the chance.
😅
People close to Ukraine’s Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi are trying to intimidate protesters into stopping the demonstrations against the dismissal of former Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov. This is stated by one of the leading figures behind the protests, Dmytro Koziatynskyi, to Kyiv Independent.
The decision to remove Fedorov has been very unpopular in Ukraine, and the protests have increasingly been directed against Syrskyi, after it emerged that President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s decision was rooted in conflicts between the two.
Koziatynskyi’s former commander, Alina Mykhailova, states on social media that the USF unit contacted her and demanded to know which unit he served in because he had posted messages about the protests and urged people to participate.
– I know that the command of my former battalion received inquiries from higher authorities about where I was, even though I have been a civilian for over a year, says Koziatynskyi.
https://kyivindependent.com/veteran-and-lead-figure-in-pro-fedorov-protests-accuses-people-close-to-syrskyi-of-intimidation/
Omni more:
Zelenskyy’s difficult choices – why Fedorov was dismissed
Volodymyr Zelenskyy faced a tough choice. The popular defense minister Mykhailo Fedorov, praised for modernizing Ukraine’s defense. Or the commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrskyi, who has led the army in the middle of an ongoing war.
That is why the president chose the general – and triggered a political storm.
Why was the Ukrainian defense minister really fired?
Volodymyr Zelenskyy has justified the decision to replace defense minister Mykhailo Fedorov by saying he wants to see more unity – that the political and military leadership should move in the same direction. This also aligns quite well with reports in Ukrainian media about a bitter power struggle between Fedorov and the country’s commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrskyi.
It is said that it was not an easy decision for the president to dismiss the minister, according to sources who spoke to Ukrainska Pravda. One informant told the newspaper that Zelenskyy had difficulty expressing himself and tried to explain his decision to the members of parliament for ten minutes.
– It seemed rational, but it was clear that it was an extremely difficult step for him to dismiss Fedorov.
The 35-year-old former tech entrepreneur openly talks about the power struggle against commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrskyi. (Dan Bashakov /AP/TT / AP)
Fedorov and Syrskyi are described as people who “live in two different worlds.” The young defense minister, who had only held the position for six months, wanted to build the defense around technology, digitalization, and innovation. Syrskyi, on the other hand, felt that Fedorov did not listen to what the frontline units really needed, sources told Ukrainska Pravda.
According to the reports, Syrskyi claimed that his men did not receive enough material while Fedorov could respond that they had received everything but used the material incorrectly. The day after the dismissal, Fedorov confirmed that the background was indeed a difficult conflict with the commander-in-chief.
The reshuffle in the Ukrainian government has become a political crisis.
Why did Zelenskyy side with the general?
It is hardly because Oleksandr Syrskyi is particularly popular or that Zelenskyy actually questions Fedorov’s work. Instead, Ukrainian media describe how the conflict eventually became unmanageable. Zelenskyy was forced to choose between the reform-driven defense minister or the more traditional commander-in-chief Syrskyi, who is still described as a person with a certain status.
– Well, I cannot allow the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff to fight each other while the country is at war. Ideally, both should be replaced. But I cannot do it at the same time, Zelenskyy is said to have told the members of parliament.
Oleksandr Syrskyi talks with intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov. Syrskyi is seen as a classic military man, trained in Moscow. (AP)
Fedorov himself says that he pushed to try to replace Syrskyi and Chief of the General Staff Andriy Hnatov. Zelenskyy had no plans to do so and is said to have received an ultimatum from the generals: either them or Fedorov, the newspaper writes.
At a press conference in Kyiv, Fedorov explained how he then tried to cooperate with Syrskyi and reform the Ukrainian army technically to be able to win the war with minimal losses.
Why are people so angry?
Because many believe that Fedorov has been incredibly effective during his short time as minister, with major investments in drones and technology. Therefore, many were also shocked and surprised. Protests have broken out around the country and the major Ukrainian newspapers write indignantly about the decision.
In an editorial, Kyiv Independent writes that it is largely thanks to Fedorov that Ukraine has regained the initiative in the war for the first time since autumn 2022. The newspaper calls the dismissal one of Zelenskyy’s most damaging decisions since the full-scale invasion and argues that the president has a “tendency to dismiss high-ranking officials and commanders who become too popular.”
People demonstrate against the decision in Kyiv on July 16. (Danylo Antoniuk /AP/TT / AP)
Many say it is a battle between the new and the old. Syrskyi, a trained commander at a military school in Moscow, represents “the old Soviet way” of doing things, says 26-year-old soldier Maksym to Kyiv Independent.
– Syrskyi should definitely be replaced. It’s very simple.
42-year-old soldier Denys, who has fought for more than four and a half years, agrees. Fedorov pushed for important reforms that are needed now – much more than a ministerial change.
– He achieved more in six months than others did in three years.
Several of those most dissatisfied with the decision are young people, explains Russia expert Malcolm Dixelius to Studio Ett on P1. Ukraine has not previously called up people under 25, and many of these are now worried about having to go to war.
– Now many of these demonstrators say “now we lose hope again. Now it will just be like before and the war will continue,” says Dixelius.
Malcolm Dixelius: Very unusual protests (Studio Ett, July 16)
https://omni.se/a/k0dopQ
Yes, it is starting to reach storm strength in Ukraine.
This is what Fedorov achieved 😶
https://mod.gov.ua/en/news/mykhailo-fedorov-highlights-22-key-achievements-of-the-ministry-of-defence-of-ukraine-during-his-tenure
Here you are promised great warmth but then this happens. I will complain to MXT.
On Saturday, the cold and rain are coming.
But already on Friday evening, there are storms in Skåne and Dalarna.
– Staff with chainsaws are helping to clear the roadway again, says Henrik Eriksson at the rescue service.
Oops. It looks good here.
Just passed Trollhättan. 22°C now in the evening.
Some risk of precipitation this weekend but then sun again on Monday.
Apparently no more parking spots on the west coast, I overheard at lunch. A sharp increase in foreign tourists.
You are getting exactly what climate scientists have warned about for a very long time (even though they thought it would happen faster).
Extreme weather.
32 degrees in Gävle and floods in Skåne.
Then some people think it’s completely OK because it evens out..😉
Mark delivers an economics lesson just in time for Friday evening.
Teaser It doesn’t look very good for the Russian bastards.
https://youtu.be/_q5VwzE4nUQ?is=vF0vwRviQchXIzFI
Treasure as the new SBU boss?
Not exactly a Budanov that one 😐
Sirsky will probably get fired, this isn’t going away.
Rest In Piss
“Противник не відмовляється від своїх намірів захопити українські території та створити так звану «буферну зону» на півночі. Попри значні втрати, нарощує виробництво озброєння, готується до подальших наступальних дій на широкому фронті, шукає слабкі місця в нашій обороні та намагається здійснювати інфільтрацію в міжпозиційний простір.
У таких умовах фортифікаційне обладнання, інженерні загородження та антидроновий захист є одними з ключових складових сучасної оборони. У поєднанні з ефективним вогневим ураженням і професійними діями наших воїнів вони забезпечують стійкість оборонних рубежів, знижують наступальний потенціал противника та допомагають зберігати життя українських захисників.
У першому півріччі 2026 року нам вдалося вийти на планову та системну роботу з інженерного обладнання ешелонованої оборони, розвитку антидронового захисту й підготовки населених пунктів до оборони.
Під час чергової робочої наради з питань фортифікацій заслухав доповіді командувача угруповання об’єднаних сил, командувачів угруповань військ (сил), голови Адміністрації Державної спеціальної служби транспорту, керівників обласних військових адміністрацій та інших відповідальних посадових осіб щодо темпів і якості інженерного обладнання рубежів оборони, облаштування антидронового захисту та готовності населених пунктів до оборони. Детально проаналізували проблемні питання, визначили конкретні рішення та першочергові завдання.
Наше завдання залишається незмінним — не дати ворогу реалізувати свої загарбницькі плани, утримати ініціативу в обороні та стабілізувати фронт.
Попереду ще значний обсяг роботи, яку необхідно виконати своєчасно й якісно. Від цього безпосередньо залежать стійкість нашої оборони, ефективність бойових дій і найголовніше — життя українських воїнів.
Дякую всім, хто щодня працює над зміцненням оборони держави: військовослужбовцям, командирам, фахівцям Державної спеціальної служби транспорту, керівникам обласних військових адміністрацій, органам місцевої влади та всім залученим до цієї надзвичайно важливої справи.
Працюємо пліч-о-пліч.
Слава Україні!” – Головнокомандувач ЗС України / CinC AF of Ukraine генерал Олександр Сирський.