It has long been time for a post about the fronts, which I intend to weave together with the deteriorating situation for Russia in wild disorder as usual, which you are probably starting to get used to.
Thanks to those of you who have taken the plunge and pressed the button for a paid subscription, powdered wig bow.
As mentioned, a lot of work goes into the writing, and my attempts to convince you that a paid subscription here is your best investment for eternal happiness continue – taking that step can feel overwhelming, but the euphoria afterward that lasts a lifetime is worth it. Ray Liotta and Nelson Mandela keep writing that they have not regretted it for a second.
We had big plans that were partly torpedoed; the Ukrainian soldier I was going to post texts from probably got upset when my angle was not about killing Russians but his inner journey over four years. I thought there was great value in such a story since everyone else writes about killing Russians, but I also understand that it might not have been the right time for a deep dive into the soul when he still needed to kill Russians. I can also understand that many just want to bury the crap because it is too difficult to try to process what they have been through, and then a spiritual journey with Johan No.1 is probably the last thing they want to do.
I almost have PTSD already after all the years abroad, and my worst experience is just barely escaping being burned alive in a pile of car tires by an angry lynch mob, so nothing to brag about directly.
This guy spent a year in a defensive system and had close combat with 23 Russians, all of whom died – that probably burns away all chances of returning to a normal life post-war unless you are married to the most tolerant wife in world history who will take all the darkness for the rest of her life.
What unfortunately usually happens is that returning soldiers are so dysfunctional that after a year or two they are unemployed, divorced, and drinking non-stop.
“Two tours in Iraq” or our UN missions usually cause damage to veterans, and this war has been so utterly black that many “two tours in Iraq” from our elite units left because they simply could not handle it at all. Left behind were the Ukrainian librarians, engineers, and mechanics who had neither training nor any choice.
If you also come from occupied or disputed areas, you no longer have a house because in Ukraine you don’t get a new house on insurance like we do – then you have to start over from zero with experiences you have very little chance to handle in a country overwhelmed by soldiers who cannot handle their experiences.
We are not there yet, but these are the sacrifices made so that we can have a life in peace and freedom. I also start to feel that since Ukraine has an upward curve now, people are beginning to take this a bit more lightly – wild guess is that the situation for the librarian in his trench in eastern Ukraine has not improved much in the past year.
The Pope and archbishops also backed out of a planned live magician show at the last second unfortunately, but I will try again when we get a new pope. At least I got a response that he did not think the saw-in-half trick was suitable for him but that he could consider sending a cardinal if I was the one in the box instead.
Then I thought I would start doing live streams and begin with YouTube, but Rise of Nations is simply too fun to find time for that.
Anyway, for Russia it is both sweet and sour. Their strategic offensive reserve is being expanded with the Rosgvardia, which has begun mechanizing – if you remember earlier posts about the Baltics, I always include all the letter agencies’ capabilities at +450,000 (old figure), including Rosgvardia, FSB, SVR, GRU, and other more or less private forces that have been set up. Now it looks like some Rosgvardia units have been reformed into brigade format and equipped with body armor, armor, and artillery. They also have various special units attached, such as GROM and drone units.
Rosgvardia reports directly to Putin, and he has an old loyal buddy who commands them. The unit can be used both for power struggles or interstate war in places the Russians consider Russian, such as Ukraine and the Baltics.
When a unanimous group of analysts and media stubbornly claim that Russia has no capability to wage war with the Baltics, do they then count the soon 400,000-strong Rosgvardia in that analysis, or is it excluded – asking for a friend in eastern Estonia.
It is actually a very strong argument that Putin will never try anything against the Baltics – he does not have the numbers. I believe he does, but no one else seems willing to accept that there is a fully graspable strategic offensive reserve at the northern front and various letter agencies.
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2026/02/12/putin-expands-rosgvardias-role-a91934/pdf
The tank fleet was a hot topic a few years ago, and what is in depot is now running out. The honest OSINT analysts working on this all agree that it does not correspond to the losses and that the Russian defense forces today have more body armor and armored unit equipment than at the war’s start in 2022. Moreover, many have undergone REMO and been refreshed.
Since you don’t see anything in Ukraine, you have, like them, concluded that there is a considerable mechanized reserve somewhere, so you get an A too.
It seems that about 250 T90Ms are produced per year, and new production of BMP-3, BTR, and various body armor is also high (I compare here with us in Europe to define high). Since Rosgvardia is receiving new materiel, units not earmarked for Ukraine should also have received new equipment?
I am sitting and reading a bit, and Leningrad MD is apparently prioritized for new materiel.
Then Russia is taking giant steps towards a larger mobilization, where they are also preparing for unrest within the country that will be crushed hard Russian style if needed. Part of this mobilization is to fill out the skeleton of units belonging to Leningrad MD, which today consist only of a command structure.
Putin only has this left – escalation against us in Europe and mobilizing more soldiers to Ukraine. If he chooses to forgo that, the downward curve will be steeper and the war will end even faster.
It goes on until it can’t anymore, and historically when this level of pressure has been reached in the samovar, it has resulted in a violently bloody revolution. They managed three times during the 20th century, which is almost a world record.
Lots of rumors and just that – rumors.
Patrushev in a sickbed, the Rotenbergs on a long vacation in Dubai, Putin’s possible successor and longtime ally inexplicably dead, coup rumors, and FSB working weekends.
To me, it looks like Putin could dangle at a gas station any time, but until he does, this will keep going strong.
Was it fair of us in the West to let Ukraine take the full hit – no, not at all. But this is the reality we have to deal with, that we in Europe want peace but are not preparing for war.
Russia is fully occupied holding back right now and so far it looks like a stalemate but it absolutely is not.
We see daily how Ukraine is striking deep and it is damaging Russia beyond what they can absorb in the long term. The sanctions have worked terribly because Europe still buys Russian gas, oil, and sells equipment to Russia, but the more violent Ukrainian sanctions make a difference.
At the fronts, OSINT analysts have had to keep quiet due to threats of mobilization, so full opsec has applied. They can’t mobilize me because they don’t know I am in the Dominican Republic, I reveal everything below just as long as you don’t reveal to GUR that I live at Avenida 25 de Noviembre number 7 at the top.
At the Dnipro front, Russia has around 20,000 troops (according to Brovdi) and that figure matches well with what they had there previously, so it might be accurate.
The 144th Mechanized Brigade has been moved down to the Dnipro but beyond that no capabilities have been added by Ukraine.
Since Ukraine has nearly completely cut off logistics, Russia has acute problems with fuel, food, and water. Which of these will be the triggering factor remains to be seen. The units along the Dnipro have always been low priority to begin with.
Also according to Brovdi, they have started receiving approaches from “brigades” probing the possibilities of surrender.
One of the CAA staffs was knocked out not long ago and the drone coverage is total, both 0km-50km and medium range 50km-200km. Very little movement in and out so the situation will not improve.
Ukraine can use precision aircraft with FAB quite unhindered in the area and fights bunkers every week – FAB is a terrible weapon also for the Russians, it goes both ways.
Now I lost a long section that had to be rewritten which always saps Christmas cheer but we press on.
Up near Kamyanske, the spectacular thing is not that Ukraine has pushed back the Russians all the way from Primorske but that it is two VDV divisions with attached special forces that have conducted that retreat when their order was their own offensive. Since it is the Russian armed forces, it takes a lot before they retreat a whole mile during their own offensive.
Besides the BARS units holding the southern front, there are no rapid reaction forces in the entire area. The BARS units used to be battalions but have apparently been merged into quite formidable units, probably better than what I usually mock.
Nothing is coming in because of Ukraine’s fire control over all access routes, so Ukraine is a few brigades away from the strategic offensive reserve from being able to conduct offensive operations in this entire area. We will wake up one morning to a toppled Twitter.
A bit further up in Donbass just north of Pokrovsk lies the 90th TD and I have the impression they are in poor condition. A few days ago a large mechanical failure was carried out against Dobropillya which I believe the 90th TD was part of and it was smashed already during the advance. An area I keep my eyes on most because the 90th TD is the only heavier unit in that area and was supposed to be in poor condition even before this disaster (for them).
At Lyman, according to Russian maps, an encirclement is now forming, earlier Ukraine had reached Yampoliivka and now they are trying to reach the watercourse south of Makiivka. Our maps are not at all accurate according to the Russians, even the OSINT analysts who still don’t dare to post their own maps but leave hints to the Russian maps.
There are about a dozen Russian units inside this encirclement who, if they try to retreat, must cross a few crossings over the watercourse which would then become the bloodiest possible shooting range.
At Kostyantynivka, Ukraine has deployed units from its strategic offensive reserve and the city is probably still contested even though good news otherwise is scarce in the area.
Russia has come closer to Slovyansk – Kramatorsk which is one of the attack vectors they have prioritized and the cities are under the Russian FPV drone coverage.
At the northern front, it is still my belief that Russia is holding an offensive reserve for the Baltics hidden and that this is the reason for the buildup of capabilities both Russia and Ukraine have had in the area.
Since the North Korean 11th AC will take over guard duty at the northern border at some point, it will probably become harder for Ukraine to carry out offensives into Russia now/soon. Not militarily but politically, as it is then Russian territory defended by North Koreans, optics still matter (unfortunately…).
There is no information about any movements in the area except that Zelensky recently confirmed that the 11th AC will be reinforced with another 30,000 troops. That is actually not a bad idea at all provided the North Koreans don’t choose to invade Moscow instead.
The new Chief of Defense has made several statements that are sensible, drone weapons and continued offensive operations increasing. The season for offensive operations lasts until sometime mid-October.
The corps system seems to work well where experienced troop commanders push forward within their respective areas and then the Chief of Defense has a strategic offensive reserve he can move around for larger operations.
Putin has tried to force Belarus to project a threat against Ukraine to tie up their capabilities but so far Lukashenko has slipped out of it.
There is enough graspable capability to start operations at the Dnipro without weakening other fronts for Ukraine.
A Russian mobilization after the elections in September will not make a difference at the fronts before November so there is absolutely a window for Ukraine to exploit in the near term now that they have the advantage in drone warfare.
Russia is also actively working with drone interceptors and their own autonomous AI loitering drones, with China’s help they have at some point caught up. Normally such an advantage lasts about half a year.
You also know that Ukraine has learned the hard way to keep quiet, especially the US and Europe have leaked everything to Russia before so this year we have to guess a bit now that OSINT analysts also keep quiet.
That Russia intends to mobilize is a sign of weakness but they also have a considerable strategic offensive reserve they do not want to burn away in Ukraine.
But there is another layer to that onion – you have to get your reserves to the breakthroughs and with Ukraine’s new fire control in depth, that just became much harder.
Preliminary bombardment is anyway in full swing and then offensive operations usually follow, Kramatorsk – Slovyansk will be a concrete wall for Russia to bang their heads against and Ukraine has historically struck at weak spots or flanks instead.
Now everyone that counts – Budanov, Zelensky, Drapatyi – have just been absolutely clear that they intend to liberate their country and that a ceasefire is not suitable for that, the signals from Ukrainian officials are hard to misinterpret.
You already know that Ukraine has hoarded obscene amounts of shrapnel protection, mine clearance, amphibious combat vessels, artillery, and everything needed for mobile warfare. The drone weapon has a big bonus, which is that if you are at the top of the curve, you can fight mechanized yourself.
They have also recently started rolling out CAS with FAB, so we can add that to the capabilities available in their “uber for artillery,” which they probably renamed Delta now that it was going to be marketed internationally. Maybe Uber has contacted them about trademark infringement?
From my comfortable position in the stands, the stage looks set and the fact that we don’t hear anything because OPSEC is watertight is only good news.
Really bad news from the fronts will also speed up Putin’s deep marination in diesel; it could also cut his plans for escalation, but in that case, Ukraine needs to get there first.
Putin is probably now significantly more pressured than we think, and then there remains a last all-in for all dictators with some self-respect. We can assume that dog still has some bites left, but on the ground in Ukraine, especially down in the southwest, they are hopelessly behind in maneuvering space, like in a cramped collapsing mole tunnel roughly.
The EU is basically saying the right things, most recently at the UN, with one exception – things are going well for Ukraine now, so the focus should be on Ukraine getting its land back. A ceasefire automatically means frozen fronts, right?
Then Russia can calmly destroy the negotiations for as long as it wants; of course, Ukraine knows this very well, so let’s hope the EU doesn’t put too much pressure here.
That we in Europe are war-weary before Ukraine is not exactly heroic optics, and the urgency for a ceasefire probably has more to do with LNG than the torture-murdered children in Ukraine.
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Russian losses in Ukraine