Do the victors really write history? Borders, war and historical memory: a conversation with Vakhtang KIPIANI

Speaker 1

The word honesty and war do not stand parallel. Deception in war is a legitimate method of conducting combat operations. Before uniting, it is necessary to definitively and decisively differentiate. How we live now, whether we are there or in Kharkiv, or in Sumy, or in Zaporizhzhia, we are not at a resort. This is war; there was such a discussion where sparks were practically flying. This is a discussion between historians Volodymyr Viatrovych and Grzegorz Motyka. Russians propagandize in order to bomb the heads of their citizens. The enemy uses history as a weapon. These flags and maps were drawn by the victors. Stalin, Churchill, Roosevelt. A Ukrainian soldier in a Russian uniform will be knocking on the doors of Poland, Lithuania, Romania, and other nations in the Caucasus or in Asia. We fear neither ourselves, nor the past, nor the reaction of others.

Speaker 2

Greetings, dear radio listeners. This is Radio Hartiya. My name is Oleksandr Kut. And today my guest is Vakhtang Gkipiani, a historian, an officer of the Khorunzhiy service of the Hartiya corps. Welcome.

Speaker 1

Greetings.

Speaker 2

Today we are talking about what happened at the Book Forum. We are talking a bit about histories, of course. That is why I wanted to discuss this historical cluster. And in one cluster, perhaps, the most uncomfortable pages of the Ukrainian past are gathered. What is the logic that holds this program together?

Speaker 1

In the cluster, there are officially about 17 events, plus there were 2-4 events outside the cluster. In which I either took part, or I organized, or asked the forum to pay attention to. That is, together it is about 20 events. And the general logic was not to avoid difficult questions, or complex questions, or necessary ones. Society must, one way or another, talk through or hear them. Some things are needed for self-confidence. We talk about this. We are afraid of neither ourselves, nor the past, nor the reactions of those around us. Yesterday there was a very interesting discussion about the 14th Waffen SS Division Galicia. And I think that those who came heard the confidence that we cannot write the history of the Second World War without an understanding of this phenomenon. And today the discussion will be about how we should write the history of the Second World War. That is, these events, one way or another, they are between

Speaker 2

oneself

Speaker 1

link them. That is, I wouldn't say that all the events of the 20s are connected, you know, like a string one after another. But there was no less [thought], when they were being conceived, about what needs to be discussed so that they would form a certain coherent picture. So that a person… And we have such—I'll say, in a good sense—sectarians, who attend all the events of the historical cluster; people are interested, they ask questions, and well, they listen. Some people even write something down there, to think about it. Therefore the halls are full, at least in our cluster, for sure. And there is sometimes a lack of time for a full discussion to take place, for there to be a book. It would be important to have a book for each event. Unfortunately, not for all topics. Over the last year, for example, publishers have published some things. Many authors are in the army, many authors have switched to something else.

Speaker 2

Therefore… Thoughts, perhaps even, possibly, towards rethinking, because there was some kind of certain point of view. Specialists talked together, also listened to people from the side, and boom.

Speaker 1

I won't reveal a secret, but about six years ago, for example, before the start of the Great War, I approached one of the publishing houses and proposed publishing a book about the Holochyn division. And they thought about it, even consulted with lawyers, and said that we wouldn't be able to handle it. Because, they said, we would be hated for promoting or glorifying fascists.

Speaker 2

Just on

Speaker 1

background. And they refused, they refused. Now, I am sure that they would… It was the same publishing house that said, come on, give us the text. No, well

Speaker 2

Maybe it makes sense to return?

Speaker 1

No, there is, but there is no time. And all those people, for example, two or three, with whom I planned to do this as associates or consultants, they are all in the army. So this is to the point that—I hope—this book will one day be as I imagined it. Because there are other books; they are published, and republished, and translated. That is, I cannot say that there are no books on a certain topic in Ukraine. Whatever topic you take? The Ukrainian Revolution, our twenties and thirties, Drohosvitova, dissidents, Independence. There are a number of books, and sometimes brilliant ones.

Speaker 2

Yes, but for the theme, roughly speaking, certain focuses, they are different. And so they still need for such a

Speaker 1

development. Discussions are a kind of promo, essentially, for future books and future discussions already surrounding the text.

Speaker 2

We are talking about the history of the past, and we cannot always even make sense of it, and we cannot fully accept or rethink it now. But history is happening, and at this moment, we are essentially reconstructing it. So what happens to history when it becomes part of a modern war, and what, let's say, intellectual honesty is required for the creation of one's own narrative, which will subsequently become history, from which our children will learn.

Speaker 1

Well, to be honest, I don't know, the words honesty and war do not run parallel. Deception in war is a legitimate way of conducting combat operations. Therefore, to say that we must be extremely honest during war, because it's not about… But this is

Speaker 2

probably about honesty with oneself

Speaker 1

more. With oneself, yes, but the enemy sees this honesty. And he uses your weaknesses. If you say, we did it wrong here, and if we do this, it will also be wrong. And the enemy hears this. This so-called cognitive domain, that is, the domain of the battlefield associated with consciousness, is one of the actual battlefields where the Russians began combat operations long before the start of the '14 and '22 years. Therefore, during the war, a certain part of the nation's intellectual capabilities must be directed not toward pure reflection or scientific research for its own sake, but toward saving the country, saving society, saving specific people, and preserving the possibility of returning to a normal, as far as possible, flowing scientific and social life after the war. Because here one cannot say that everything can be done simultaneously, because there are things—we see them in a wonderful intellectual discussion—otherwise there is no war, and it is expensive, good, and wonderful. But, for example, on the battlefield, we still have to understand that the enemy uses history as a weapon, and accordingly, if we describe the design of our missile, the fire-pain or the discovery of our engineers, then the Russians will copy it or, at least, will know how to counteract it not in three months, but already. Therefore, we do not reveal ourselves, and a certain part of historical discussions has such a, I would say, muted character. We understand that maximum openness, for example, in the assessment of national movements of, for example, the 20th century, can be harmful. I am a service member, I understand this.

Speaker 2

They can twist it as needed.

Speaker 1

They don't have a piece of paper, they don't have prohibition, command of the map. That is what we are not talking about. We are talking about everything. Starting from the training course with our recruits,

Speaker 1

Basic training, before basic training, after basic training and so on. We talk about everything as honestly as possible, completely. Our average recruit is not a young man.

Speaker 2

He already has his own

Speaker 1

concept, often

Speaker 2

terribly twisted.

Speaker 1

very Soviet or very pro-Russian, or some very banal conspiracy theories in the head and so on. Therefore, he cannot be fooled by some propaganda. It is necessary to tell how it was. Why did the OUN arise? Why did people join the division? Why did dissidents fight when there was no reliable hope? And did they win this war? Why is our symbolism like this? Why do the Russians want to kill us so much? Could we have avoided fighting? And what would have happened next? In other words, all these honest answers are a partial reliance on history. Because it is one thing that we could tell about the Holodomor, about how Russians, if they use weapons of mass destruction, they do not stop until the end. But then people saw, for example, Bucha, or Izyum, or now nameless places in the area of Mariupol or elsewhere, where they killed in the same way, only not by hunger, but with other tools, likewise without thinking about the consequences. They think that if they win the war, then history will forget this. That's all.

Speaker 2

will write off.

Speaker 1

Write it off, because the winner takes all. And that is why we need utmost honesty within, with ourselves. But in public representation, we understand that the enemy, or our opponents, some of our Western neighbors, can use this against us.

Speaker 2

And can we already write about the war that is happening now, or do we have to wait a certain amount of time?

Speaker 1

As a rule, historians have the privilege of writing history when it is already clear and finished. Not because they are afraid to take responsibility because the course of events will begin tomorrow. Simply, if some operation, some war is ongoing, then you cannot understand, for example, whether the use of a certain type of weapon or certain mobilization measures has justified itself or not. Because you don't know, maybe it did justify itself. For instance, we criticize something now, but perhaps it is the most effective way. Or perhaps, conversely, it will be a failure and will not lead to the desired result. Therefore, as a rule, historians write—right now there are already dozens, actually, of books about this war—as a rule, about those operations or those phases of the war that are already definitely over. There is a certain body of books about the so-called ATO/JFO, meaning effectively the Russian-Ukrainian war, in that undeclared and even not fully recognized phase for society, well, that it is some, as the Russians say, SVO, meaning it's as if it's not a war. Well, we did it too, ATO/JFO, it's also the same kind of form.

Speaker 2

Books, somewhere it goes, yes, somewhere it

Speaker 1

It goes. Therefore, it is as if it has a limited character and so on. Therefore, regarding the ATO/JFO, that is, about the Russo-Ukrainian war in its first phase, dozens of books have been written, and historians, and not only participants in the events, historians generalize using both a documentary basis and the memories of eyewitnesses, well, and so on and so on. There are certain books about individual operations of the great war already, as I call it, what is often called the large-scale or full-scale invasion. There are some about the Kharkiv, about the Kherson operation. And accordingly, this operation was completed, at a certain point, a certain result was achieved, as a rule, positive for us. And so there are historians who wrote the history of the Kharkiv operation. And this can be summarized, although perhaps there is not all of it there, well, not the truth, but the information, because part of the materials is obviously, well, not open, and the historian does not have access to materials of, say, the ground forces, or special operations forces, or brigades or then still battalions.

Speaker 2

That's for later.

Speaker 1

That's for later, yes. But at least the analysis of available sources provides the opportunity to write a history, and people are interested in figuring out how it happened that the powerful Russian army advanced, like, toward the Kharkiv or Kherson regions, forever, and put up billboards, like, in Kupyansk or Kherson, that Russia is here forever, and then this "forever" ended in a few months.

Speaker 2

This is very important from the point of view of the serial information war as well, because these books are being published, and the war, for example, continues, but in parallel, the enemy is also publishing a huge amount of literature.

Speaker 1

They say it's a lot.

Speaker 2

Yes, and literature, and if we don't even look at the side of some visual materials, which we try to fill in some way, so that they win certain…

Speaker 1

They make a lot of movies. But

Speaker 2

Perhaps it is already our task as historians, among others, to document and pass on our perspective.

Speaker 1

It must always be present. Because if a group says that the enemy attempted the war, and we did not enter this field, then they believe they will win it. Therefore, in every space, they work on the radio, we work on the radio. They work on television, we work on television.

Speaker 2

Counteraction.

Speaker 1

They are in movies, we are in movies, they are in books, they are among intellectuals, in the West. We must work, and there are already, of course, steps, and Ukrainian studios are appearing, and thank God, there are more translations than before into those languages that are crucially important for representation in the world, such as Portuguese, because of Brazil, Spanish and the rest of Latin America, Arabic, and Chinese. Because perhaps not even for mainland China, but for the Taiwanese, who are also in a situation before a war, before a great war. Therefore, our experience of self-rescue—because we see, nevertheless, the great and truly very important help, for example, from European countries and America in the first stage of this war—we see that, ultimately, a nation saves itself. That is, no weapon—without it, it would have been much harder—but no weapon fires on its own, it does not improve itself, and it is our warrior, from the infantryman, from the stormtrooper to the staff officer who plans, who applies, who provides, who can only through joint efforts write the history of the war.

Speaker 2

All the technological sophistication, the preservation of its personnel, and the approach to tactical operations, unlike the enemy, who in a more classical execution, uses their human resource and so on. It is clear here why Ukraine is still holding on. Both through heroism and through a non-standard approach and thinking. And I am interested, from the point of view of presenting historical narratives and information propaganda, in what way one can fight these millions who, unfortunately, are still in Russia, and whether it is through a certain creativity or how?

Speaker 1

I think I don't have any direct, closer connection. I think that part of certain units of the defense forces are operating in the Russian direction, on the territory of Russia. That is, it should be so, and I think that certain actions are taking place. After all, we see the actions of destroying the enemy in Siberia, in Petersburg, in Moscow, and so on. We see the actions of some partisans.

Speaker 2

We

Speaker 1

We see some anti-war leaflets, or we sometimes see heroic acts of our former compatriots who ended up as Russian citizens against their will in the courts. And we see that some people help them, and this too, probably, is done to some extent as assistance from people from Ukraine. Therefore, we try to do this. And I think that the scale of what is being done is impossible to evaluate as an observer. But I think that we do not have so many resources to influence Russians. And that ton of waste paper, which Russians produce every month to bombard the heads of their citizens, we cannot influence.

Speaker 2

But we can influence and try to affect the world.

Speaker 1

It is also difficult here. An imbalance of resources. Therefore, it is very important when we show, for example, to certain nations, that we are fighting with pure intentions, that we truly do not have a profit-seeking nature, and our tools, hands, thoughts, and so on, are clean. But, to be honest, the situation is not bad, because Western support, regardless, may be insufficient, as we would like, but it is substantial, and there are a lot of nations—Danes, Swedes, Lithuanians, Germans, and many, many others—who have actually helped us a lot, and there is also a lot of unknown aid. And, for example, people do not fully understand how many cars, say, conditionally on Lithuanian plates, are an integral part of evacuation, shuttling, and so on. That is, we are talking about tens of thousands of cars; that is, our Baltic friends from various countries, from Lithuania in particular, are doing a lot, but people may not see this, because these cars last there for one or two operations, and then they burn somewhere in the fields of the Kharkiv or Donetsk regions, and other cars come to replace them.

Speaker 2

We get used to a certain amount of help, but probably, before speaking, I reached the point that we must influence other countries, but first of all we must influence our fellow citizens, and this means, precisely, there is work, including, with history.

Speaker 1

Bole, all this is not infinite.

Speaker 2

Yes, but if we can convince some, remove the myths they had in their heads, then it will be, and these people will carry abroad, among other places, narratives that are already clear, which will be able to counter Russian ones later. I would like to return to the forum and the clusters. One of the central events of the cluster was the conversation with Marta Bagachevska Khomyak. Could you tell us how her work—how they influenced a certain understanding of Ukrainian history?

Speaker 1

Ms. Marta is an American historian; she does not like her female historian [role], but she is a prominent figure in the Ukrainian women's movement, she is a scholar. She graduated from Columbia University, had a study at Harvard, and wrote about a dozen books. Initially, she specialized in the history of Russian intellectuals—those few, as she ironically says, who dreamed of or spoke about freedom there. And they lost, meaning both in 2017, and we see that now actually liberal or freedom-loving Russian thought is deep under concrete and cast iron, and lead, and militarists, fascists, and rashists, as we call them. And so Ms. Marta back in the 80s—perhaps even in the 70s, probably almost 50 years ago—wrote a book that has been a kind of bestseller for all researchers, it seems, of the women of Ukrainian history. The book was called "White on White"; they republished it recently, and I brought to the presentation, to this conversation with Ms. Marta, the first Ukrainian edition from the 90s, and it was such a modern white, very beautiful book about this movement. Why is this necessary? Because when we write the history of Ukraine, or when we thank our defenders, or when we realize that certain things are taken for granted, there is the labor of millions of people behind this, including millions of women. And in the history of Ukraine, this labor, this feat, this dedication, and this kind of invisible, like Murashka's, daily labor, it is not always recorded and emphasized, and it is not valued. And that is why we research, and I also read this book, and, of course, other works by researchers of Ukrainian women's history, because this allows one to form a certain lens, which can be applied to today's war. Already now, there are tens of thousands of women in the units of the Defense Forces. I was at another event, also in the historical cluster, where it was about women in the liberation struggle, and researcher Tetiana Shvychenko said—I just didn't hear if this was in the Defense Forces in general or only in the Armed Forces—73 thousand women. So 73 thousand is more than most armies in Europe.

Speaker 2

So we have a whole army of women, like some country

Speaker 1

European. More than many European countries. This is to the point that these women are definitely no longer such invisible material for the great history of Ukraine. No, they are writing this history. Here at the forum was our sister-in-arms from another brigade of the National Guard, from the Rubizh brigade, Oleksandra Dovedenko. Her call sign is Vyrva; she is a Hero of Ukraine. She presented her book of poetry; unfortunately, I didn't make it to the presentation, but this is an example of how a person fights and a person writes their own history. In other words, even her poetry, her creative reflections, are the history of the country. Therefore, it seems to me that talking about these prominent women, which Ms. Marta made fashionable and academic, is not just friendly conversation about oneself. It is an assessment of the contribution of previous generations of women, who, under very difficult conditions, pushed through the masculine, male…

Speaker 2

Even more masculine,

Speaker 1

more patriarchal… And they took positions, and I quoted this phrase—not a phrase, but this story—at the meeting, and she confirmed that yes, indeed, I remembered correctly. When she was graduating from an American university, in the 60s, and at the final interviews, she said that she wanted to stay and work in the department, to be a scientist.

Speaker 2

Not as a teacher somewhere in a school, as

Speaker 1

certain

Speaker 2

the majority also considered the moment.

Speaker 1

After an American university, they don't go to school; they wove as part of this, but just to become. And the professor said that nothing would work out for you, you'll get married, you won't have children, but Ms. Marta never hesitated to speak her mind. And she said, Professor, I see that you have a wedding ring on your finger, she says, and a family, I say, and a family, and children, and children. Well, you managed somehow, and I will be able to, don't worry. They were in shock, it wasn't accepted to be like that, so bluntly, to speak so honestly, "what are you doing." That is, do not take away our right. I want to, I will. And this is the opportunity and capability of Ukrainian women then in America, now in Ukraine, to build without our approval; they certainly do not need it. But as for our responsibilities, we often talk about them, because starting from the BZVP, from our records, in every course, in every lecture, there is necessarily mention of women who played a prominent role in the history of Ukraine. And since our training course mostly revolves around the 20th century, then from the era of the USS, from the women who were in the Sich Riflemen, to the women in the army of the UNR, to the women in the OUN underground and in the ranks of the OPA, to the women in the Resistance Movement of the 60s-80s, such as Alagorska, or Atana Pashko, or Raisa Rudenko, or Oksana Meshko. We tell about them and say that these are our prominent female fighters, our prominent female citizens, who should be known and respected. And then, perhaps, some of the kids feel a bit uncomfortable that they hesitated or resisted when the draft notice arrived, or when they were patted on the shoulder and told, friend, it's your turn to come and stand. After all, not everyone is waiting, the absolute majority do not go straight into the tree line. People are needed everywhere, drivers are needed, cooks, translators, repairmen. People

Speaker 2

it is often not understood how huge a number of service members stand behind, for example, the infantry, which completely

Speaker 1

provided. I recently saw such a scenario, I was in one of the units, and I hear a conversation, they are saying something about cookies, and they discuss for quite a long time how much one can talk about cookies. It turns out the guys who have been at the position for several months asked for cookies, and they, well, the guys say, "here, take it," they say that we have already conducted an experiment: the NRC, when it drives over these bumps, mounds, and so on, it breaks, the cookies arrive like flour, essentially, and they sent someone to the shops and bought such, well, such cookies that do not break, because at that moment they were thinking about a guy who, in order to effectively destroy the enemy, only lacks oat cookies.

Speaker 2

Yes, yes, and this needs to be thought about. Women of the liberation movement often appear in the archives, there, let's say, as a courier, for example, there, a wife, an assistant. And what lies behind these terms? Well, it's not just that, these roles are probably something more hidden.

Speaker 1

I won't reveal a military secret, but even now many service members, men and women, call themselves one thing but do another. A person might write, for instance, head of a bathhouse facility, or telegraph operator, while in reality, they are someone else. And such were the times—again, I refer back to this conversation about a woman in the liberation struggle, when women who, even then, say, 107 or 106 years ago, performed combat missions, were still recorded as sisters of mercy, meaning medical assistants.

Speaker 2

That is

Speaker 1

They were not even medics, but assistants.

Speaker 2

Across the state, there was none for them

Speaker 1

positions. And there were no positions, and therefore it is all the more valuable that some women, such as Olena Stepaniv in the Ukrainian Sich service, or Khrystyna Sushkova in the voiner army, strove and became officers. That is, they built their own career. The main thing was that they occupied the position that corresponded to their real contribution to the liberation struggle. And so it must be understood that the advancement of these people up the career ladder was not simple at all back then. And now, when we do not highlight, do not tell about them, it means, as if, it seems to us that these ranks of theirs are not important. Well, but I will also say, women's history is one of a dozen and a half other directions of this cluster. And we tried to show the diversity of views. It doesn't always work out in the discourse. Because sometimes the historians we invite look at it more inter-similarly.

Speaker 2

Yes,

Speaker 1

Yes. We have already formed such a united national consensus. And a scandal for the sake of a scandal – that was not the goal. Of course, it is possible. It attracts attention, but begs the question as to why. That is to say, there are things where we don't have to return to the situation of "let's discuss whether the Ukrainian language is needed or not." Of course, one can find some Ukrainophobe or vatnik.

Speaker 2

I think that now, in times of full-scale invasion and in the fifth year of the war, we must think more than ever about how to unite. Including all of us—you discuss these debatable topics not in order to argue afterward, but precisely to unite, to reach some common ground.

Speaker 1

Once Comrade Lenin said such a phrase, that before uniting, one must finally and decisively demarcate oneself. Well, obviously, such a thing can also be for clarifying a precise position. But we had, perhaps, so to speak, one, perhaps, such a discussion where sparks were literally flying. This is a discussion between historians Volodymyr Vetrovych and Grzegorz Motyka. He is a Polish professor, the author of many books about the nationalist movement in Ukraine and its struggle with the Polish nationalist national movement. And, specifically, the events in Volhynia in the year 49. And this discussion showed that our positions, that is, the two stereographies, historical schools, let's say, are fundamentally different. We speak with different optics. We, well, as I would put it, Vetrovych represented himself, but in fact, a significant part of the historians who study this movement and this time are in solidarity with him; we present this as a national tragedy of two peoples who inevitably entered into a clash. That is, the main dispute was, well, truly, from the Polish position, that there was such an intention to destroy all Poles. In reality, Ukrainians say, no, there was no such intention. But there was an intention to protect this territory. If there are Ukrainians here, then there will be a Ukrainian state here. If there are Poles here, well, there will be a Polish state here. That is, and the question of whether it is Volhynia or Galicia, this is not a question of ethnicity. It is a question of the flag that would then arise, would be placed after the Second World War. Moreover, as we saw the results of the Second World War, this was done neither by Ukrainians nor by Poles. These flags and maps were drawn by the victors. Stalin, Churchill, Roosevelt.

Speaker 2

And regardless of what anyone wanted, because there was no way it would come from them.

Speaker 1

Yes, yes, Ukrainians really wanted, for example, Przemyśl to be in Ukraine. And the Poles really wanted, I don't know, Lviv to be Polish. But the great powers decided as they decided. And they cut off Kholm, a Ukrainian city where Mykhailo Hrushevsky was born. And the city of Yaroslav, named after a Czech prince. They ended up in Poland. And at the same time, certain parts of history that Poles considered their own ended up as part of Soviet Ukraine. Therefore, this discussion was very turbulent. But what is also very interesting. Several Poles came there who do not support the position of Professor Motyka. And one of them, Professor of Warsaw University Kazimierz Szweciński, even more sharply than many Ukrainians, told his fellow citizen Motyka that he actually holds an extreme right-wing position, in which politics and ideologies are more than science. That is, we were witnesses to even such an intra-political discussion. It would be a great simplification to say that all

Speaker 2

Poles.

Speaker 1

Like this

Speaker 2

enemies want us to perceive everything

Speaker 1

Frankly. No, we started with this. We are extremely honest with ourselves. We understand that we are having a war, a historical war of such great narratives. And the question of whose Lviv is, or what happened in Novolyne. These are only local questions, even if it might seem strange to some. But our question is key. Does the Ukrainian nation have the right to be a subject on its own land? And why did it not become one, for example, 100 years ago? For specifically, on this land, here in the center of Lviv, there was Ukrainian power with a Ukrainian flag, a Ukrainian coat of arms, and so on. But it was destroyed by Polish armed force, by the newly established or reborn Polish state. The same across the Zbruch. The Ukrainian People's Republic lost the war for its independence to the Russians. And then the consequences here—Polonization, prisons, camps, pacification. Ultimately, OUN terror as a reaction. The desire was to revive the state or reduce the power of the Polish state. And in the east, the Holodomor—the Second World War, in which the situation was one of total destruction of everything. Ukraine was a battlefield. Kharkiv itself, where we serve and where we live. It changed hands three times, which meant the destruction of everything, both living and non-living. Therefore, it seems to me that all these discussions immerse people in the fact that, first of all, we are not the first to endure these trials. And, second, it is easier for us than for our predecessors. Anyone who reads the history of the OUN and identifies themselves as a soldier in the UPA's land, and sees how we live, whether we are in Kharkiv, Sumy, or Zaporizhzhia. Yes, we are not at a resort, this is war.

Speaker 2

Unlike resorts, we already have a state, already unlike the heroes.

Speaker 1

And we don't need to take the boots off a dead enemy to continue fighting.

Speaker 2

I wanted to ask one last thing—which question about Ukrainian history you wanted to leave the listener with—but I think you've already answered it. Specifically, the question about identity, about the right, whether Ukraine has the right. We can say, of course, yes.

Speaker 1

We are not asking, we are simply asserting: some with weapons in their hands, some with a book in their hands. There are plenty of writers here, both those who write non-fiction and those who write fiction, who, in my view, are also combatants in their own fields; they cannot be compared. Well, in no case. And that would be wrong.

Speaker 2

But this is in the next part.

Speaker 1

Part of the resistance, which creates the understanding that our war will continue as long as we realize that we are Ukrainians. Because the Russians, actually, their main objective—they wouldn't even physically want to kill us all. If we become Russians, we will live. But we will live in Russia, and we will fight in the Russian army for Russian interests. And then a Ukrainian soldier in a Russian uniform will be knocking on the doors of Poland, Lithuania, Romania, and other nations, in the Caucasus or in Asia.

Speaker 2

I think we can end the conversation here. Thank you.

Speaker 1

Thank you for the invitation.

Speaker 2

We were joined by Vakhtang Kipian, a historian and an officer of the burial service of the 2nd Army Corps Hartiya. We spoke about the historical cluster at the Book Forum, about painful themes and pages in the history of Ukraine, and about perspective, including women's perspective in history. So stay with us. All the best.