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Anatomy of ballistic flight: from engine flash in space to interception!

Anzhelika Kalchenko explains the multi-phase detection and interception of ballistic missiles, highlighting the critical role of satellite intelligence and ground-based radars.


In October, Kyiv repeatedly suffered ballistic strikes, but the most alarming thing in these attacks is that the missile danger announcement sounded only after the first hits on civilian infrastructure. How is this possible? The thing is that the ground-based radars that Ukraine has can detect a missile only when it enters their line of sight. And a ballistic missile covers the distance to the target in a matter of minutes. President Zelenskyy stated that Ukraine did not receive timely warning of the ballistic threat from partners.

Such data can only come from satellites, which detect infrared radiation from the operation of rocket engines during launch. Therefore, the ballistic threat warning system simply cannot depend exclusively on the air forces of Ukraine. Today we will analyze the entire path of a ballistic threat. From the detection of the launch to the interception of the missile.

And we will try to find out what is currently happening with satellite intelligence, on which the time to save thousands of people may depend. My name is Anzhelika Kalchenko, this is a military report. Let's begin.

During flight, a ballistic missile goes through three phases. And at each, it is detected differently. The first is the boost phase. Immediately after start, the missile gains speed and altitude while its engines are working. This phase, depending on the type of missile, lasts from one to five minutes. Hot exhaust gases create powerful infrared radiation. This is detected by satellites with infrared sensors. The second is the midcourse phase. The engines are no longer working, and the missile or its warheads move along a ballistic or quasi-ballistic trajectory. The exhaust plume disappears, making it harder for satellites to track the target.

Further, the missile is tracked by air, ground, and sea-based radars. They refine its trajectory and transmit data to anti-missile defense systems. X-band radars can also help distinguish between warheads and decoys. The third phase is the terminal phase. The warhead enters the denser layers of the atmosphere, experiences intense aerodynamic heating, and air resistance affects its speed and trajectory. AMD radars continue tracking and transmit data for interception. Therefore, one sensor is not enough. Satellites detect the launch, radars track the flight, and command systems combine this data into a single picture of the threat.

The space echelon is the first line of warning. The USA, Russia, and China already have their own systems. The sooner a satellite detects a launch and transmits data to Earth, the more time will remain for reaction. The USA uses the SBIRS system, which combines geostationary satellites and satellites in highly elliptical orbits with infrared sensors. Its successor is to be NextGen OPIR, designed to improve the detection of missile launches. China is also building its own space systems, which analysts associate with early warning of missile launches.

In particular, this refers to the TJS series satellites; however, Beijing does not disclose their exact purpose. Russia has its own early warning system, X-Kupol, with Tundra series satellites. They operate in highly elliptical orbits and allow for the monitoring of significant territories. So, currently, only three countries have their own eyes in space.

However, as of 2026, Europe relies heavily on American means. But Europe is not standing still either. Germany and France have already tested such satellites, but with different results.

In July 2025, the German experimental satellite Ernst, using an infrared camera, detected and tracked a Falcon 9 launch. For almost three minutes, it tracked the missile, demonstrating technologies that could become the basis of a future space warning system.

However, one satellite is not enough for constant observation of large territories.

The French Spiral system took a different path. In February 2009, France put two demonstrators with infrared cameras into orbit to collect images from a single background. The experiment gave positive results, but a full-fledged operational complex was never created. The mission was completed in 2011.

Now France and Germany are trying to turn separate experiments into a joint system and have already determined when it should become operational.

In October 2025, France and Germany launched the Jevel initiative to create a joint space echelon for early warning. The plan provides for geostationary satellites with infrared sensors and shared data between the countries. Initial operational capability of the system is expected in the early 2030s.

In parallel, the European program Odince I2 is developing technologies for a future warning system. France also plans to develop its own means. By 2030 – the over-the-horizon radar "Nostradamus", and by 2035 – an infrared detection satellite.

Thus, a full-fledged European space warning system is still a matter of the future. And right now, ground-based radars play an important role. A satellite detects the launch, and then the missile must be detected and tracked by a radar.

One of the key elements of the European early warning system is the British station RAF Fylingdales. The radar detects the target by reflected radio signals. It determines the position of the missile, measures the speed and direction of movement, and refines the trajectory. Tracking begins when the missile rises above the radio horizon and enters the field of view. Then data is sent to command centers, where the threat is assessed and anti-missile defense is planned.

An important component of NATO missile defense is the European phased adaptive approach, which the USA initiated back in 2009. Its radar facilities include, in particular, the AN/TPY-2 in Turkey.

RAF Fylingdales in North Yorkshire continuously warns the UK and the USA about ballistic threats. The station also tracks satellites, space debris, and other objects in orbit. And according to the Royal Air Force, they see them at a distance of up to 4,800 kilometers.

This is a solid-state phased array antenna in the shape of a triangular pyramid. Three stationary faces cover approximately 120 degrees each. Together, this is a 360-degree circular view without mechanical rotation.

It is important to understand that the detection range of space objects is not equal to

detection range of missile launches. Warning time depends on the launch site, the missile's trajectory, and the moment it is detected. Let's assume a missile has been detected, so what can be used to shoot it down now? Different anti-missile systems operate at different phases of ballistic flight, and none cover them all. Aegis BMD with SM-3 anti-missiles intercepts ballistic missiles in the second phase, specifically outside the atmosphere.

Within EPAA, these are Aegis ships and Aegis Ashore ground complexes in Romania and Poland. THAAD operates in the third phase of flight both inside the atmosphere and immediately outside of it. Patriot with PAC-3 and PAC-2 covers the lower echelon in the third phase. Some NATO countries additionally use Patriot with SAMP/T for the protection of designated territories and objects. By the way, a review video of these systems is already on our channel.

So subscribe if you haven't already, and after watching this video, be sure to watch them. Such multi-layered defense, under certain conditions, allows for several interception attempts. However, each system has its own limitations regarding range, interception altitude, target speed, and missile types.

And when the enemy launches several missiles simultaneously, adds decoy targets or means of overcoming air defenses, the load on sensors and command centers increases, and the expenditure of anti-missiles may increase. Thus, the effectiveness of the defense depends not only on an individual system, but on how quickly the entire system exchanges data and whether there are gaps in this chain.

As for Ukraine, external intelligence data plays a key role in countering ballistic threats. Ukrainian ground radars detect a ballistic missile only after it enters their field of view. Therefore, from partners, it is not just access to satellite data that is important, but three things: the timely transmission of warnings about launches, the exchange of information on target trajectories, and coordination with air defense systems. Having received the notification in time, the military have additional time to prepare to repel the attack, and the authorities can notify citizens and workers of critical infrastructure.

Europe, although it does not have its own satellite system of this class, can facilitate the exchange of radar data and the development of secure communication channels. The combination of sources provides a more complete picture of the air situation. This is exactly what the events of October 12, 13, and 19 showed. After the Russian ballistic strike on Kyiv, Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that partners did not warn Ukraine about the missile attack. Because of this, the air raid siren was not announced in time.

We have analyzed the path of a ballistic missile from the detection of the launch to the interception attempt. And you can find out more about the Russian Iskander – one of the main ballistic threats to Ukraine – in this video. That's all from me. Thank you for watching Militarnyi. See you.


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Originaltitel: Анатомія польоту балістики: від спалаху двигуна в космосі до перехоплення!

Längd: 8:42

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