ComBat Vision – battle management without Starlink. How does it work?!
Combat Vision is a serverless tactical navigation ecosystem for special forces that uses radio communication to display the positions of allied forces and drones to minimize friendly fire.
Speaker 1
We are developing the Combat Vision product ecosystem – it is a tactical navigator for special forces soldiers, which is needed to minimize friendly fire by displaying the mutual positions of allied forces, as well as the display of drones. The system consists of several components – there is the commander-navigator application, which is either a phone, like the one in my hand, or a tablet, on which the soldier sees their own location, other forces, and so on. There is a specialized application for various types of drones – for DJI, Rotel, Parad, and other various types. And there is a specialized application for ground robotic platforms, as well as the so-called C4Node – as we call it – which is a mini-server that acts as a communication relay between subscribers. Effectively, our system is serverless, has no central node, and does not require the internet. Its main difference is that it works via radio communication. And all you need is some form of communication, some radio stations, phones or tablets, and drone controllers combined into a single ecosystem with each other. Radio stations usually have various connection interfaces. For example, the Chimera simply has Bluetooth. Such radio stations have a Wi-Fi module attached to my side, and there is sometimes an Ethernet input. And you connect the end device via Wi-Fi, Ethernet, or Bluetooth. Then, the radio stations connect to each other via their own reliable secure communication. And, accordingly, subscribers and connections from different sides to the radio station see each other through this radio communication. Usually, the system is not deployed on the fly in combat conditions. It is deployed before moving into the area. You first connect the first ten people, for example, via tactical-level radio stations like Chimera. Another ten people are connected. Then, between squad commanders, another, higher-level, higher-speed communication is established. And the commander has two radio stations. One for communication with the command post, and another with subordinates. Further up the hierarchy, these channels are connected to each other, and such a vertical is formed to the required level. And at the third level, the command post is connected to Strelint. That is, they have radios, they continue to communicate with each other, and we see the location of each of them. Some of these soldiers may have end devices connected via Bluetooth to these radios, and some may not. The presence of these devices allows the commander to see neighboring radios, neighboring commanders, receive orders, receive tactical messages, see allied drones, and so on. Then the squad commander has some other radio that is capable of passing more information, including video streams from drones and so on, which is also connected to his end device, and the commander definitely has either a tablet or a phone. The end device acts as a router between one type of communication and another type of communication. The application is designed for the tactical level, which is generally the level below company, company, platoon, squad, soldier. The maximum level at which we recommend using it is one application per battalion, which displays the overall situation, but not for the management of the battalion. This is the UGV "Rotel-M". At the moment, this is the only UGV sample that we were able to utilize as a full-fledged sensor with an external compass and a normal GPS antenna. We click in the list, this drone appears, like now, that 1080, we enter it and accordingly receive video and its location from it, and we can drive. What did I do? Here in the menu I requested control, the "request control" option, and these joysticks appeared, and now I can drive using these joysticks. And you can see, I have an image, the markers on the screen change. See, I am turning back, and I see the landmark markers, I know in which direction to drive. This is for cases when you don't need to coordinate a general military operation, but when you need to have your own, locally controlled, internet-independent, Starlink-independent means. That is, I am controlling it now via radio communication; nothing else is needed for this. I can turn on drawing and with my finger like this, now it's green, here, draw a line for myself where to go. And when I drive, this is a segment of the road I've roughly drawn for myself along which I want to drive. We can turn on the compass if necessary and check the Azimuth. We can draw a line from the headquarters like this with a finger. We can navigate along this line. We can set waypoints and go from waypoint to waypoint, like in computer racing games between such frames. That is, point number one, point number two, point number three. And we go from point to point, even if we are driving in a forest and it's completely unclear in which direction. We can see the EW zone. For example, if I apply it here now, do you see this cylinder? This is effectively us seeing a jamming zone ahead of us that we should not enter. That is, I see that this EW zone is in front of me. And it needs to be bypassed. We see the location of our UGV, we see the location of our supporting forces. One of them is marked as "us," and others are the soldiers who are currently with us. We see the battlefield with the situation ahead of us, and we see it on our video. When the vehicle drives, these markers will rotate, and we can always drive to a certain landmark that we need. The SIRPE-antenna, filtering out various interferences, transmits the signal to the autopilot, and the autopilot says with standardized messages that the drone is here. Accordingly, if I move, this marker will start to move. If I turn, the red zone in front of us will rotate in the corresponding direction. The drone transmits coordinates to us. We know where this drone is in virtual space. We build the virtual terrain and overlay it on the video. And we project objects relative to each other. What does this give us? Not only do I, as the operator, see this. Our command posts now see where the vehicle is. The headquarters sees it. And not only do we see the drone, but everyone else sees where it is looking. We can ask, "turn more to the left, look at the enemy in such-and-such a sector." We used this on the current
moment of the "Trellis Veer" 750 radio station. And the same radio station is installed on the machine. I am connected via Wi-Fi to one radio station. The drone is connected by an Ethernet cable to another radio station. And in this way, we can connect one, two, three, five, as many machines as we need into a single ecosystem. It will be like "Uber" for the military. That is, you will say, I need such-and-such ammunition over here. A machine will be found; it will be there in 15 minutes. And you will see where it is, when it arrives, whether it made it or not. For example, if the wheels were torn off and it cannot move, you will always know its last coordinates. Not only at the dispatch point where you manage it, but actually at the position for which it is traveling. The main problem is range. The robot travels on the ground and it travels in the forest. Accordingly, traveling in a straight line, using a compatible means of communication, no matter the cost, it will not go further than a few kilometers. Like two, three, but it needs to go 15. It is necessary to organize relaying of this communication. And we need to either launch a geozone with another such radio station, or have a "wing" that accompanies the drone. Aerial drones have optical navigation. Therefore, either a reinforced GPS antenna must be installed on it, or it must be navigated by an aerial drone. That is, an aerial drone sees the ground drone via optical tracking, transmits its coordinates to the controller instead of GPS, and you see the entire surrounding situation from the place where the aerial drone has moved you. We have successful experience integrating "termites", but the issue of spatial orientation has not yet been resolved there. The problem is not that this machine is unique in terms of only it being able to be connected. Only it is delivered from the factory in a state where you simply arrive and connect it immediately, as I did. The whole idea is that the UGV must be equipped with a board that is necessarily mounted on a plastic extension, not on metal. It has an autopilot inside, the same as in aircraft and the like. Drones are simply controlled. They have a radio receiver module that gives a signal directly to the motors when you apply throttle from the remote. But it does not return the state, such as how much throttle is applied, how much battery you have, what your coordinates are, or in which direction you are traveling. Without an autopilot, it is impossible to read the indicators. Technically, you can take any UGV, install an autopilot, an external compass, and an additional GPS for that autopilot, and accordingly, the machine will move. Our system can be used not only in war; it is for the coordination of foreign forces using drones in cases of absence of stationary communication. These could be massive fires, elimination of the consequences of floods and earthquakes, searching for lost people at ski resorts or in the forest. For such DSNS operations, given the presence of GPS, everything works with maximum precision, since the accuracy of civilian GPS is about 5-6 meters. With such precision, it will show the location of all fighters and equipment. The necessary means must be available. And this is, currently, one of the main problems of scaling. Not many units have military-grade radio communication equipment in their arsenal that is capable of transmitting data in adequate volumes. The standard means of communication in the troops is Motorola, which is not military communication. And it is technically not linked to any system and cannot be used for tactical interaction. In addition to the fact that we need a device and a radio station, we need a commutation kit for the fighter. Currently, we are connected in an economy version via Wi-Fi, but this is not an option for combat application. For combat application, there must be a cable. And this is now the second, so to speak, blocker of scaling. The mandatory equipment kit must include… This is called a data transmission distribution and power supply system. There are several different manufacturers. They are usually combined with a PTT button and a headset. And a power bank. And for this system to work effectively, the fighter must never shut down the radio station and the phone. He should only exchange the power banks in his equipment at the Company's CSP. Accordingly, the only way to distribute communication to the last mile, so that the fighter does not carry a link on himself, so that he is free to move, is to give him a tactical radio station, but ensure reliable communication with it. For this, a repeater must be launched into the air. Usually, either the same radio station is switched to repeater mode, or a special repeater is placed on some height and provides commutation. It is best to lift repeaters on a drone; then they provide tens of kilometers. Drones of the type Skyton, Reber 3, or those that fly out. And in fact, without implementing this coverage, we run into a range of 3-6 kilometers, which is always unsatisfactory for the end users. And one of the factors I mentioned is the need to train personnel, starting with the SVP. You cannot come to a unit, issue tablets, read which button does what, and expect them to be able to understand what to do with them next. That is, we need to work through wargaming, which we will work through today, so that people understand at what moment they do what in the system and why they need it. In 2008-2013, I was the founder of a Military-Patriotic Youth Training Organization that conducted training over large areas for a large number of personnel. And when we conducted these missions, I, as the commander of one of such reduced battalions, faced the problem of where all my personnel were. And then the decision came that we needed to develop our own product. In 2012, we developed the first version of "Kombat"; it was called MAP-21 then, it just had another name, but the essence was the same. In order to simply see one's own forces, and I felt the advantages myself when you see clearly where your units are, you don't have to spend time giving an order; you just see, or rather, you see that one of the units has found the enemy. I tried to offer our solution to hundreds of Territorial Defense of the Maidan. This topic didn't take off, but it started very well in the post-revolutionary times. I was able to literally in a few weeks reach the general
to the staff, to Viktor Muzhenko, and we came to him with a proposal that we have such a system. We showed them that the markers move and so on, and we were given the green light, to the extent that we tried it not in fighters, but on artillery. We launched SU-25s, MiG-29s, coordinated aircraft, performed targeting for special forces on targets; first, we gained access to Harris radios in 2015, when the first batches arrived, and we essentially trained the Special Operations Forces to transmit data via these Harrises. That is, somewhere in the period of 15-18 years, all Special Operations Forces units 8, 5, 3, 140, 73, 142, they used Combat as a means of transmitting tactical information via radio stations. We actively implemented this in the Special Operations Forces, then 6 units of Alpha, Omega and all special units of various law enforcement agencies joined. Because it so happens that the equipment suitable for deployment and the concentration of people who have the skills are only there, plus partially in the ASU. Then in 2015, aerial reconnaissance, which was still a volunteer group at the time, approached us with a proposal to write an add-on for our system that would work with their cameras, which they were deploying at the front. And we wrote it then, it was called Combat-terminal, a monitoring interface for visual observation by cameras on the line of demarcation. And so from about 2015-2017, we had two reconnaissance battalions that collected this information about video streams along the line of demarcation to sector headquarters and to the NSDC, could coordinate artillery 5 kilometers deep thanks to triangulation by two cameras, and so on. In 2022, when the escalation began, we made several attempts to deploy our old system because Novashchyna was ready for operation in several TDF units in Kyiv. We realized that the TDF was not ready for this, even having, for example, mobile communication, simply the personnel were not ready to act like Special Operations Forces. We rebuilt the system from scratch, basing it on three-dimensional communication with augmented reality. Now we are developing the ability to load fully 3D landscapes of scanned territory from drones, and so on. And put it on a distributed architecture. Our system is not very effective in defensive combat. Maneuver actions are needed. These could be either actions of special units that do something detached from the main forces, for example, landing on boyka towers, destroying some bomber at the Olenya airfield, or something like that. Or these are raid operations, like those at this time. There is the Kursk or Kherson counter-offensive, when there is an intensive change of position. And it is necessary to understand what is immediately before us. Currently, fewer and fewer such operations are taking place. And those operations that do take place, take place without preparation. The system shows maximum efficiency where it is necessary to find out the coordinates of objects in real time and understand the disposition of forces, when it is a non-stationary war. Our focus now is to convince the military leadership that one must prepare skis in the summer. We need to have at least one battalion capable of performing mobile operations and train it in advance on wargaming to do this. Now we focus on units that come to us and say that we are ready, what is needed, how much time is needed. And one such unit is the international line "Gongur," with which we have been for two and a half years, intensively, including all training at training grounds, all rotations, and only by the third such rotation did we deploy in such a way that it already started running on its own. If we set aside part of the functionality, understanding where a wounded soldier remained in this local assault is already a big plus, because then you don't need a medevac group to search a 2×2 kilometer minefield for where the soldier is. But this does not work in all conditions. It mainly works only in forested or some uneven terrain, where GPS works more or less on the ground. The efficiency of preserving own drones. That is, if our own drones are connected to our system during this assault, then our special forces or our assault groups will at least understand which of these drones are guaranteed to be ours. But we are now moving toward bringing more equipment into a single ecosystem and providing the ability not to lose own drones. Protection against Friendly Fire usually works when you have several reconnaissance groups, you move calmly along the path and you see some movement over there. And so as not to find out via radio who it is, you can open the tablet, look, aha, this is group BRAVO, close it. From the point of view of readiness, the software component of the system is ready. But as a comprehensive solution consisting of specific types of recommended radio stations, repeaters, wires, etc., which are needed to launch this software solution, it is still not ready because we have recommended equipment sets, but we cannot, or rather, we are limited by what you have. That is, if the Armed Forces provide commanders, as in Western countries, with a standard kit—headset, this PTT button, a phone mount, and a radio station—then we can deploy to these units without limit. Technically, since the system is distributed, it has no concept of limitation on clients at all, because all clients are not connected to each other as a single whole. You can scale it to any volume; the only thing is that the volume of information moving from the bottom up needs to be filtered. At the General Staff level, you don't need to know where every soldier is, and then there is no need to generate traffic about the movement of every fighter, about where some unit's toilet is, or something else. We can say with certainty that one channel supports up to 30 subscribers on the means of communication that we recommend. And more is not needed, because battalion brigades do not need to be connected in one communication channel.
Unknown speaker
Rest
Speaker 1
So, there are 3 levels of protection, even 4. One is the level of access to the device. The device is always protected by built-in PIN code systems and similar features in the operating system. And device management systems, so-called MDMs, set requirements that you cannot use the application without this PIN code. Since the system is distributed, data is stored partially on each device, but it is encrypted there with a key which, according to certain current modern methodologies, is encrypted by your private key, which you generate when entering the system. The exchange protocol between devices is also protected by session S-2006 keys, which are distributed via QR codes before deploying to the site. And thus, they cannot be intercepted. And unlike some systems, the user does not know the channel password, meaning it is impossible to read and pass the password to someone. And the fourth level is the radio stations themselves. Usually, military radios have their own level of channel encryption, and accordingly, even if they enable that encryption in the program, the risk of intercepting data exists only if someone captures the radio or breaks into the airwaves. Against this type of attack, an administrative system of certain agreements should work, where if you do not confirm a call sign or something similar over the air once every half hour, your device is blocked. And devices can be blocked in two ways. Either block it centrally in the mobile device administrator console, or quickly block the channel key for a specific user without involving the centralized administration, and then they will stop receiving updates from us, but they will retain the data they had at the moment the device was captured. We already have integration with Delta and Krapiva via files, meaning we support Krapiva tactics, Krapiva scenes, nato-vector-graphics files, which can be imported and exported from there into Delta, and cursor-and-target files, which can be imported and exported into ATAK. We are the only system that opens all maps and elevation sources from all systems. That is, we can open not only tactics, we can open maps and elevations from Delta, Krapiva, PineQuest, Ukrop, and all other any products. And import from one system and export to another. We are currently working on creating online integration, but unfortunately only with Delta and ATAK, because the issue of interaction with the developers of KPVV integration is currently becoming complicated. It can now be codified; certain changes have now been introduced, certain resolutions and orders of the Ministry of Defense that allow software to be codified. And we are now moving in this direction, unlike the last 13 years, where it was simply impossible. But why is it not being used? Because the nature of the combat operations is defensive. Therefore, as long as we are not planning further counter-offensives and the recapturing of Kherson or an advance into enemy territory, it does not manifest itself. But it's a pity that when we plan such things, we will again be running around and asking why our coordination is so poor, where the communication is, and so on. From my experience, for all this to become routine, three rotations of several months each are needed. But time must be allocated—not one or two weeks—you need several weeks of time at the training ground to practice missions like the ones we practiced today with the unit. Until we begin to form units that will know how to conduct maneuver offensives and reclaim territories, we will only slowly lose, because so far not a single experimental unit has been allocated on which this could be demonstrated, as we demonstrated today.
Unknown speaker
Thank you! Thank you!
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