We aimed for Oskil but it was only Zherebets, June 26, 2026

A mood picture from a previous RU attempt at Siversky Donets and not from this year.

So standing outdoors in bright sunshine all day monitoring a geotech with SPT and drilling – sunburn like a fried lobster roughly and gulping bottled water like a midsummer binge, hence the silence.

Last week there were meetings ahead of contract signing with the Chinese marine contractor and I have seen something new. The client is an Italian company so they start at 09:00 plus or minus half an hour and push on until 19:00 plus or minus an hour with some short breaks, then straight out for dinner until 22:00 – repeat for five days.

No structure, no program and often everyone just sits and shouts over each other only to then dive into individual discussions in Italian and Chinese – when you think everything is lost “yes we agree to that”.

Since we are not basing on FIDIC or any other framework it becomes “sky is the limit”, I sat quietly for a whole week just studying the chaos. The lunches were divine, Italian finger food lunch, and the dinners Spanish “steakhouse” where you get a few kilos of imported Spanish beef to stuff yourself per person so my diet is ruined.

An experience. Older Italian managers who have flown in are quite sophisticated and interesting to talk to – a class you rarely see nowadays, old school.

I thought about starting with Iran but I can’t be bothered, a cycle of disinformation and constantly new messages. I honestly feel sorry for the Iranian citizens who were thrown under the bus by Trump. Supported a regime change, do not support this at all. Israel has brought on a significantly worsened security situation but the laws of war also apply to them now that they chose full war with Iran.

3rd AC is responsible for the area north of Lyman which is among the tougher front sections, plus they are undermanned as all reserves were taken for Kupiansk.

Despite that they have managed to reach Zherebets NE of the town of Lyman and are trying to attack further north to cut off the Russian attack vector towards Sviatlohirsk and the town of Oskil (not the watercourse).

They are probing Yampolivka and from the NW the 3rd Assault brigade is attacking towards SE.

What I think we have seen in recent weeks are RU infiltration attempts into Lyman through the forest area east of the town but they die drone deaths.

Now the Russians have shown themselves to be experts at slipping out of encirclements but Putin is behind in the chain of events here, we guessed that and now we have proof of it.

Recently we received the two maps below from Stepnohirsk and they are grossly misleading, the Russian one thinks things are going much better than they are and is a staff map.

During a recent front visit by one of Putin’s clones, enthusiastic soldiers answered that they were attacking everywhere.

Since bad news is punished with dismissal or underwear jumps from windows, the selection of bad news up the tree is guaranteed to be tough because no one wants to get a wedgie before tumbling down from the tenth floor straight onto the asphalt. That punishment now seems to be meted out for a bit of everything so the will to survive probably makes people fudge the truth as much as they can.

Moreover, Russian army commanders still have orders for offensive and to start retreating from entire front sections is very un-Russian, you don’t live long doing that.

If 3rd AC reaches Akiivka and the southern part of the pincer works its way up towards Ivanivka, which is a few km for both, without orders for RU retreat given, it can get tight over the few bridges left when the Russian retreat (panic flight) begins.

Ukraine then knows exactly where on the map traffic jams will occur in the drone-saturated battlefield of 2026.

RU has about 12 units in the area, not all regiments, so it would cause serious negative publicity if they were shot off on the highway and a beautiful drone flyover post-massacre was done.

Not to mention what a deep hole would open in the Russian front in northern Luhansk if that plays out.

Northern Luhansk is low priority for RU and there are not many task forces behind the fronts – those units have been used first when the whip has been on for RU’s own spring offensive Putin has given clear orders about.

Just one of many dangerous situations for RU along the fronts now – good good.

It’s probably up to Sirsky if he wants to add anything from the strategic offensive reserve but 3rd AC is quite known for pushing on with what they have and making the impossible possible. They always seem to fight at a 1:5 numerical disadvantage during their own offensive operations and have clawed their way to their own excellent drone weapon.

Ukraine already smells Russian hepatitis blood in the water – very unlike them to miss something like this.

For those of you who immediately start dreaming of a greater Luhansk, this area is closest to Russia and reinforcements from the north but forcing RU back over Zherebets is already underway.

If Sirsky decides to release resources from the strategic offensive reserve and add drone capability, anything can happen.

In this context, I can really only see positive angles to getting Russia into the Baltics for Ukraine. It would relieve the pressure on them. Right now it’s the opposite – the Belarusian threat means UA has to pull units from the northern front to cover over there and you know what RU can do then – free up units for the Baltics.

Slovyansk/Kramatorsk is the target for this year’s Russian attack vectors and they are working their way forward, a bit like a flytrap and Bakhmut over that area, I guess they’ll keep at it?

Since it is a focus point, FAB bombs are raining down and it is not a fun area at all to try to defend for UA.

Something I missed when Ukraine gained fire control over all access roads to Dnepr and Crimea was that fuel shortage is more important than the water shortage which was what I highlighted.

Apparently almost all brigades get all their electricity supply from generators and if they have no fuel calm settles – no communication, no drones, no mobiles and finally no vehicles that can drive. Stril simply goes silent and indirect capabilities have no targets.

My chain was no trucks – no water – camel thirst. But gasoline and diesel might be more important anyway.

If you look at RU offensive operations posted daily on johanno1.se it looks like they have already peaked.

Zelensky has recently gone hard against Belarus who immediately backed down.

After he “destroyed” Moscow which the Russians did not like at all – they have started claiming they are fighting against the entire NATO now to soften that blow.

We are probably close to the point where Russia must act outwards and escalate, they are seriously on the defensive in Ukraine and have started importing fuel from China.

I guess escalation will come before collapse in the country so now it’s probably high risk for the Baltics in the coming months.

Hegseth has just fired the top European chief, Donahue, he probably protested all the cutbacks. He is kind of the US Rommel – an absolute legend who has been everywhere there has been fighting the last 20-25 years. The right man in the right place he absolutely was so easy to see why he was made to retire.

There is one heavy American unit left in the Baltics, a battalion in SE Estonia – if it disappears we can probably assume things will get lively so I’m keeping an eye on it.

That thing about “Russian buildup does not exist” – everything is always relative, right, and if a lot of heavy units leave the Baltics, RU needs less until those gaps are filled.

Ukraine seems to have plans for Belarus and if there is unrest in that country, there is a chance RU will have to use its strategic offensive reserve for that instead – which would be very good.

This year the risk of Russian escalation against Europe is at its highest, especially before the rainy season sometime in October.

In Ukraine, the situation is at least precarious for RU and before October Crimea is probably lost. Already now the bridge is packed with civilians leaving – the rumor is spreading like wildfire.

Don’t know if the picture is genuine, had a verified video but lost it carelessly…

This video is interesting, there is no structure at all just a flowing movement but I feel they have total control over the situation. We never reached this level in the military service, not even close. We fought according to doctrine and the unknown was the attack target, either we ran over it or died on the way.

This fight is constantly adapting to the threat in a quite interesting way – probably their suppressive fire is so accurate that it does all the work instead of, like when we just fired in the enemy’s direction with bursts and alternated advances.

They are standing right in the middle of a field in front of a Russian fortification system, a single group, and take the attack target without own losses – you hardly believe it’s true.

Rumor has it that a couple of different European countries are starting to get worried about UA’s strength and what they will do when they have beaten Russia in a fair war.

Europe never ceases to disappoint us, never fails.

The only thing we should fear is if UA loses the war or is forced to peace – then the million soldiers will take what they consider their right in Europe’s underworld.

As it looks now, they are just Europe’s most important ally whom we must get into the EU as fast as possible before they change their minds.

I usually sulk over old sins but now it’s hard to manage to stay interested when we have now reached the beginning of the end. Already in 2023 Ukraine tried this combat against oil infrastructure, then the USA and Europe slowed them down in rounds by cutting support as soon as they went too far.

They actually had everything in the toolbox already then and RU considerably less LV so the result would probably have been the same anyway, operators on the ground or one of the liberation fronts inside Russia handled it from afar.

Many dead three years later Ukraine now has sufficient own production giving them the possibility to completely ignore our good advice and honorable intentions.

One should perhaps remember that now when we cheer all successes that Ukraine probably does not forget the first four years in the near term. We owe them everything really and a bit more for all our sabotage – post-war we really must treat them well and not revert to our condescending attitude.

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3 thoughts on “We aimed for Oskil but it was only Zherebets, June 26, 2026”

  1. Russian losses in Ukraine 2026-06-26

    • 1310 KWIA
    • 2 Tanks
    • 5 AFVs
    • 68 Artillery systems
    • 3 MLRS
    • 4 Air defense systems
    • 1778 UAVs
    • 1 UGVs
    • 439 Vehicles and Fuel tanks
    • 9 Special equipment

    SLAVA UKRAINI

  2. Russian pressure has increased somewhat over large parts of the front. The Ukrainian pressure remains on the high plateau of at least 100 attacks per day,

    N Slobozhansky 4↘️, S Slobozhansky 8↘️, Kupyansk 5↗️, Lyman 17💥, Slovyansk 23💥↗️, Kramatorsk 1, Kostyantynivka 23💥↗️, Pokrovsk 31💥💥↗️, Oleksandrivskij 5↗️, Huliaipole 27💥💥↗️, Orikhivsk 4↗️, Prydniprovskij 0,

    Localized 148↗️, Unlocalized 109, Total 257↗️, Ratio unl/loc 0.7↘️.

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