Southern Front – Broken Arrow, June 5, 2026

It probably won’t take very long before we hear a Russian screaming “broken arrow” (in Russian) at the Southern front or the Dnieper front.

I will cover the fronts in the next post, a lot is happening and now that UA has taken the initiative, the gray zone should be read as where UA is instead of RU – if you haven’t made that correction on your own maps, do so.

My old idol David D, who became that because he had an enormous wall map he moved brigades around on early in the war before all the digital maps came, is perhaps a notch above me in optimism but he also has a good grasp of the situation at the fronts – for example, he has been persistent about the 90th TD and the situation for the VDV at the southern front.

The situation is basically the same as it was in 2022 when the USA and Europe had to jump in and stop the party so that Putin wouldn’t be humiliated and become dangerous (they thought so or at least blamed it on that).

2022 was an absolute low point for Russia before RU mobilized in panic. With the help of HIMARS and American target acquisition, UA began hunting corps staffs that were wiped out when they had staff meetings for a few hours in one place in constant movement. That center in Poland or Germany (the rumor was Lviv at the time) probably had excellent intelligence.

Ammunition depots were targeted, soldiers drank from puddles, you surely remember Kherson airport which became a fireball about once a month.

There and then the war should have ended but history goes that Putin threatened the USA with nuclear weapons so to preserve peace they reshuffled a bit and allowed the VDV to retreat over the Dnieper so they wouldn’t have to surrender.

2023 was a study in megalomania – after a successful 2022, Ukraine was determined to try to reclaim their country by force, so Europe and the USA basically demanded the following, where some even hinted that if they just burned a little energy maybe they would be ready to negotiate later –

– Ukraine would first send newly formed army corps with inexperienced brigade commanders because they were not tainted by the old corps spirit but instead trained by us in Europe and the USA – if you want to be a winner, you do that.

– The requirement was that they would attack at the best fortified area on all fronts after Surovikin had built a 10 km deep minefield. We absolutely screamed when it happened on the northern front but they were not allowed to because it could be seen as unnecessary escalation.

– NATO doctrine naturally applied even though Ukraine did not have air superiority, so RU ground attacks with alligators and SU27s flew like clouds of gnats.

Despite that, they did not give up and quite quickly experienced units like the marine corps and airborne took over the spearhead and fought until sometime in the autumn when they ran out of gas.

After that and until today, Russia has had the initiative where they have conducted a new type of low-intensity offensive warfare that suits them well except for the Kursk offensive which was supposed to help UA in negotiations. The USA refused to mention it by name.

It took Ukraine three years to lift themselves out of the hole we dug for them and beyond that, the USA has actively undermined them politically and cut support at critical times to help Putin.

(note that I write USA where it should first have been Biden and then Trump).

After the Kursk offensive in summer 2024, the artillery barrels went completely silent for a while due to acute ammunition shortage, UA did not get much advanced aircraft so FAB bombs could replace artillery for the Russians and now finally we are holding back defense against missiles which is probably the only thing Ukraine cannot yet manufacture themselves on a large scale. It is important that it does not go too well, that seems to have been the shameless common thread.

We who guessed that Sweden tried to give Ukraine Gripen a few years ago but was stopped by the USA, where we were then shot down by all sorts of people for our conspiracy theories – do you think we were right or wrong?

This requires its man, no one wants Ukraine as an enemy directly. The number of occasions where it simply would have been the logical easy way to give up ground and join the EU is countless but they refused to give up – you don’t see that very often.

The combination Zelensky – Budanov is probably what has won the war together with the Ukrainian people’s spirit. Everyone is afraid of a trigger-happy security service that chose the right side immediately. Zelensky was not exactly tipped as our time’s Churchill, he has probably with the help of his acting experience found an image that has worked outwardly. When he won the presidential election he was quite skinny so many hours at the gym with supplements to fit the role as a leader in war. But he has also managed to balance an entire war on a very thin line where setbacks have been significantly more than successes so the occasions to resign equally many.

The number of assassination attempts, political attacks, hostile takeovers and other from the Russians with Europe’s help for a good while and the whole war with the USA’s help is staggering. Budanov has been targeted by RU assassination attempts more than 10 times. The assassination attempts were of course carried out by the Russians, FSB, GRU, SVR and someone else all doing the same activities around the world instead of sticking to their job descriptions. It’s probably too lucrative to manage to stay away.

I will return to that in another post but did you know that we gave +450,000 Russians Schengen visas during 2025?

Full war in Ukraine but we in Europe with few exceptions apparently try to have a normal relationship. Even Poland has recently asked Ukraine to stop lingering in the Baltic Sea area so as not to “make our situation unsafe”.

There are many important pieces of information in the text above,

Since the Russian army has conducted its version of offensive operations since autumn 2023, it has now for three years been permeated by that type of warfare. The corps commander gives orders on paper which the brigades then solve in the same way they have done throughout the war but now slower forward so even more comfortable. No one needs to make split-second decisions and there is no decision cycle to get inside. All higher commanders sit in their air-conditioned bunkers with gourmet food and a lot of running around by non-soldiers at night. Apparently female doctors and nurses have been forced into other types of full-time jobs so no one wants to work in the war zone anymore.

Since mechanized combat led to acute losses, they reshuffled doctrine to swarm forward with dispersed infantry instead.

Ukraine has gradually increased its drone zone so changes had to be made there as well, artillery went down from 60,000 shells/day to today 4,000-5,000. FAB bombs delivered by air had to replace artillery together with the drone weapon.

We have discussed the FAB plague many times but it is so acute that Zelensky in his thank you speech to Sweden for our Gripen planes mentioned that now they can finally reduce FAB usage. Easy to understand since a FAB bomb buries everyone in the bunker, no survivors.

The new Russian doctrine was to use infantry as ammunition to spot positions where drones can operate and place FABs, and once they were eliminated, to work their way forward to the next defensive position.

It worked so well that UA now only has a sparse line of infantry in trenches on the front lines under strong drone protection.

The Russian armed forces have comfortably parked themselves in some kind of World War I environment, completely without historical awareness but very Russian.

The brigades at the fronts lack heavy vehicles, indirect fire comes from drone groups and strike aircraft, they have gotten used to grinding forward about a kilometer a week, and have absolutely not prepared for defensive warfare.

We already know that they have not expanded the fieldworks to the new areas they have conquered – Clement Molin confirmed this recently but we have suspected it for a long time.

The logistics are all stocked beyond the 50km line where the brigades have what they have in their fortifications, deliveries by drones are quite common for them as well.

Larger depots are surely beyond the old HIMARS range of +100km. At a safe distance, they run it very Russian – huge gigantic depots.

Yes, Ukraine has used drones quite a bit but not with the intensity that triggers a full behavioral change yet inside occupied Donetsk or beyond.

On the Russian side of the border, they certainly still have those large bases Ukraine was never allowed to touch before they had their own long-range weapons – 10 to 15 army bases where everything is neatly lined up, about a dozen air bases, and then their 45 to 50 Iskander platforms.

As the US and Europe kept doing and destroying – geographical restrictions on various weapons, the US had to approve every target and if it was too high-value, they leaked it to the Russians and delayed approval.

Ukraine followed the rules all the time, which were constantly changed if, against expectations, things went too well anyway.

Russia is a creature of habit that has adapted to moving forward slowly with infantry and does not expect any direct counteroffensives because none have come since summer 2023 on all fronts in Ukraine.

The Russian staff has also prepared their own spring and summer offensive which we see playing out in parallel with Ukraine increasing the temperature.

Our guess has been the following – orders have been given for attack objectives to the CAA commanders who probably cooperate intermittently but largely have a siloed organization.

They have then distributed the task to the divisions which use the brigades as expendable goods.

The chain of command is slow and absolutely no one likes to convey bad news up the chain. Throughout the war, they have only said “more, more, more” as medicine against every setback.

This year’s focus points are –

– a buffer zone along the northern front.

– Slovyansk/Kramatorsk.

– an offensive on the southern front towards Dnipro and at Huliapole where after Pokrovsk they have dominating terrain. All roads lead to Dnipro so it is easy to see that Putin intends to take the Dnipro area and up to Pavlohrad and then stand behind dominating terrain in the form of rivers.

– a sideshow was to reach Oskil up in northern Luhansk.

Pokrovsk was for a long time the focus and they have had a high ambition level this year as the VDV has been fully expended, at Pokrovsk it was the 76th GAAD and Stepnohirsk 104th AAD + 7th MAAD.

The idea is probably to try to reach Oskil in the north and then the Dnipro – Pavlohrad area. In the middle they stand in Kramatorsk – Slovyansk and now have a sufficiently attractive position to propose a ceasefire and negotiations. Then in a few years, they will run round two to try to conquer the entire area east of Kiev.

Things are shifting in Europe, Ukraine is fighting back, Russia is being mocked – no one higher up in the chain likes it so “more, more, more” probably echoes between the walls at staff meetings.

The CAA commanders sit in their bunkers and use the brigades as expendable ammunition where they rather sacrifice them than be forced into humiliating farewells – they try until it no longer works, then try a little more just to be on the safe side.

This is what it looks like on the Russian side, broadly painted but important points to take with you –

– they have gotten used to low-intensity grinding

– orders for spring/summer offensive are given

– the command chain is, if possible, even slower, the big shots are under great pressure to maintain their image

– maintenance is at a great distance

– units in the combat area have no vehicles

– the task forces are already expended to varying degrees at the fronts.

This is actually fact but no one dares to believe the situation is this bad. Ukraine knows very well how things stand.

Ukraine has worked a bit differently but suffered greatly from the West’s constant betrayals until we reached 2026 when the stars began to align in the right constellation.

They have bridged all material shortages through domestic production except interceptors against Russian missiles.

For a long time Sirsky ran around micromanaging down to battalion level which did not help at all. He is probably most harmful as Chief of Defense but with the introduction of corps, competent troop commanders have gained enough freedom of action for it to show.

Personnel shortages were at one point acute and brigades were down to 300 at worst because they received no replacement personnel. The 72nd fighting at Vuhledar broke down in October 2024 and defended themselves on social media – that was the first time we got it confirmed from a first-hand source.

Frontline service was a death sentence as 80% of the wounded returned to service – the number of personnel who found reasons not to be at the fronts far exceeded those who sat in the trenches at the spearhead. The armed forces swelled to +1.2 million but brigades in defense had an area dimensioned for 5,000 but down to 300.

At Bakhmut we saw the 3rd assault brigade fight excellently, the marines took the spearhead of the spring offensive 2024 and all special forces seemed to run their own race but there were many units in radio shadow that were low priority.

Early 2025 Ukraine began introducing the corps and the foremost troop commanders managed to grab a corps and immediately started clawing for the best brigades.

Since then, the army, territorial defense, and national guard have acted in parallel throughout the war where the army has had the former volunteer brigades, army brigades, airborne, and marines.

Some units like the Skala regiment are now about the size of a division and have been a prioritized unit.

Besides that, Ukraine has had a strategic offensive reserve of elite units that are deployed where needed, we first saw them at Pokrovsk a bit too early before it became critical in autumn 2025 and then everything changed – critical areas were just that until the reserve rushed in. I sat and counted it to maybe 60,000 strong at some point but they exist partly in reserve and then spread out among various ACs.

What I believe the reorganization into corps has done is that they now have a decentralized chain of command where corps commanders have great freedom of action and cooperate with each other + a direct line to the strategic offensive reserve to present their proposals on where it is needed most in various operations.

Sirksy has less to say and everything is going much better.

On the southern front, the 17th AC has several elite units subordinated, for example, and the Skala regiment is apparently Sirksy’s go-to unit for firefighting.

The series of small counteroffensives we now see are corps commanders acting on their mandates within their respective areas,

The 1st Azov corps apparently all wanted to participate because they only have elite units, and the 12th AC is like a larger European defense force.

Apparently, the 3rd AC, which was built around the 3rd Assault, asked to have its area expanded and also took responsibility for a problem area – easy to see that they wanted maximum freedom of action within the framework of the orders given.

This is what they themselves say about the restructuring –

“A very accurate article «We are fighting against Russia and know why they will lose» by the commander of the 1st Corps in the NSU «Azov», Brigadier General Denis Prokopenko. I recommend reading it in full, but want to highlight some key theses.

Prokopenko starts with the most important — the fundamental mistake the West made in 2022:

«On the threshold of the full-scale invasion in 2022, Western analytical centers and intelligence communities made a fundamental mistake in assessing Russia’s military strength. Their forecasts, which predicted Kyiv’s fall within a few days, were based on quantitative indicators: an army of millions, thousands of aircraft, tanks, and artillery systems. This approach scared ordinary readers but ignored intangible yet crucial factors: command culture, morale, social cohesion, and adaptability.»

«This analytical blindness partly remains today. Many in the West continue to view this conflict solely through the prism of a war of attrition, where victory is determined exclusively by resource volume and the ability to mobilize more people. This is a dangerous mistake.»

This is a fundamentally important point. The West still thinks in 20th-century categories — tanks, guns, troop size. But the war is already different. And precisely for this reason, Western analysts could not foresee either our resilience in 2022, or our technological breakthroughs in 2024–2026, or the failure of the Russian military machine.

«This war is not just a collision between armies but the ultimate test of two diametrically opposed systems that arose in the post-Soviet space. One system, the Ukrainian, is a network model built on trust, which unleashes human potential. Much of the changes have been initiated and developed here by ordinary citizens, soldiers, sergeants, and junior officers.»

«Ukraine’s defense forces, especially units that emerged from the volunteer movement, such as “Azov”, have cultivated a command philosophy based on the principles of decentralization and extended authority. This model is a modern interpretation of the German concept Auftragstaktik (Mission Command), developed to conduct combat on a dynamic, non-linear battlefield.»

Auftragstaktik is a doctrine that gave the Wehrmacht an advantage in World War II over all opponents. Its essence is simple: the commander sets the task and explains the purpose, and the executor on site decides how to carry it out. This fundamentally differs from the Soviet-Russian model, where every step is detailed from above and initiative is punished.

The Ukrainian army, which grew out of the volunteer movement, naturally built a system that German general staffs in the 1800s developed over decades. And precisely because of this, we defeat an enemy that numerically surpasses us.

«The Russian system of troop control is the exact opposite. It is a rigid, vertically integrated hierarchy of the Soviet model, where every step is regulated from above. This system was not created for maximum combat effectiveness but to ensure political control over the army, where loyalty to the regime has always been more important than competence.»

«A key situation for this system failure is the chronic underdevelopment of the junior command staff and the madness of senior officers, who are ready to sacrifice an enormous amount of personnel (all the way to the last soldier), to please leadership, without deviating an inch from the higher commander’s intent, even if it was doomed to fail from the start.»

The Russian system is not built for victory but for generals to steal undisturbed. This is a systemic feature of the empire — loyalty is more important than competence. And this very feature is destroying the Russian army from within today, slowly but inevitably.

While the West looks at the numbers, the real war is won by the minds of younger officers and sergeants who make decisions on site. This is our main advantage, and it must be preserved at all costs.

Moreover, I personally am pleased by the thesis that:

«Western partners learn from us and gladly adopt combat experience.»

I hope this is true. Because the Ukrainian army is today the world’s best school in modern warfare. The Azov corps, SSO, SBS, GUR, SBU — each unit independently surpasses most NATO armies in real combat capability. This is a fact we see every day in the results from the battlefield.”

—

We know that RU uses around 10,000 FPV drones per day in the daily summary on johanno1.se that MXT provides us.

What doesn’t quite fill social media is that Ukraine uses the same or even more drones than RU; Russian soldiers often describe how 7 to 10 drones per Russian soldier is their everyday reality.

Ukraine has gained FPV drone superiority partly through its EW, own drones, anti-drone measures, but also through a persistent fight against Russian drone groups. I don’t know exactly when this was in time.

Yes, different at different fronts, but where UA decides on offensive operations, they can both fight mechanized under their own protection and also have drone dominance to deny movement and conduct pre-emptive strikes.

Drones are tricky because they get into every opening, big or small.

For a long time, Ukraine has been using drones to eliminate high-value targets in the strategic drone war best described as a backlash.

At times they have been banned from this, and during 2025 the USA held them back, but since August 2025 the intensity has been high and has also started to include more and more target types.

It is indisputable that Ukraine has already won the strategic drone/missile war as their air defense manages to combat 90% of targets on average, on good days nearly 100%.

They have developed EW against the Zircon missiles, which are supposed to be the hardest to counter, and have already shot down 28 during approach.

Russia manages to counter very few, not even in Moscow where they have gathered hundreds of air defense platforms of all types, they remain vulnerable.

For a couple of months now, Ukraine has started with the “mid-range,” which seems to be from 50 km depth, as FPV drones manage up to 250 km.

This is HIMARS all over again; Russian logistics have adapted, and suddenly Ukraine rolls out a new no-go zone over which they have full fire control.

Social media likes this kind of thing, so you probably haven’t missed it.

Different army corps are actively working to claw in the capability under their umbrellas and compete to reach the furthest right now, besides the pure drone units where Robert Brovdi certainly stands out somewhat.

First came fire control over the access roads to the Southern front and Crimea from Taganrog/Rostov. Vehicles are burning all the way on the Russian side.

It is summer and the soldiers need to drink water.

A brigade needs something like a hundred vehicles per day to manage in combat, I believe we calculated this in 2022 when this was last discussed.

Ukraine has in recent days had over 500 vehicles knocked out per day – posted by MXT on johanno1.se.

This causes direct cascade effects, first lost deliveries, then disruptions, fear, transport stops – all resulting in the spearhead at the Dnipro and Southern front not getting their ammunition, food, fuel for generators, water, and other necessities.

Remember the post about the Azov push on May 22, this fire control also applies when the special forces try to advance to the breakthroughs.

And during the Russian retreat.

Already in 2023, the special forces suffered enormous losses when they tried to move forward and plug the gaps, you can probably guess how it will look this year.

What you see is thus pre-battle preparation ahead of the Ukrainian offensive at the Dnipro and Southern front.

But the fire control has now extended all the way to the DPR and LPR core areas in Donetsk and Luhansk.

Medium-range drones hunting everything moving on the roads.

Already in 2022, they easily found ammunition depots by simply following the trucks in – this year they have so many eyes from the air, had time to log all targets, and Atesh that very little remains hidden.

The number of drones Ukraine manufactures is in the millions per year in all different versions – still an upward curve on this pre-battle preparation.

They started softly but now the fire control over the roads to the southern front has reached hurricane strength and they are likely following up with northern Luhansk, northern front, LPR, and DPR.

The same with the FPV swarm at the fronts – waiting for it to reach storm strength at the Dnipro.

Now that we were right about the strategic offensive reserve we discussed early 2025 that joined the chat in autumn 2025, we have the next big reveal.

The amount of hard vehicles, mine-clearing equipment, amphibious combat vehicles, artillery, and tanks that Ukraine has received is extremely high since 2025.

Here you have what Bulgaria has provided.

Almost nothing is used at the fronts, Ukraine has shown it can get wrecks running, REMO where weapon stations have been replaced is standard, and half of Europe has workshops for UA equipment.

It is highly likely that there is a substantial armored fist of army brigades fully equipped with all traditional capabilities we have not yet seen.

How large, I do not know, but it is many thousands of hard vehicles delivered that we barely see.

Since Ukraine can fight mechanized under the protection of its own drone umbrella, it is this group that will decide the war (soon).

The offensive strategic reserve is currently used at critical points and to break up stalemates so the army corps can continue on their own.

In autumn 2025, they went in and cleared lost territory and then the brigade responsible for the area went in to take over and continue enduring the FAB rain. They came and went.

Since they are light-footed and just want to fight, they do the job for five or so, they move around different fronts and multiply their own strength fivefold.

At some point there will be a breakthrough which higher staffs have different plans for and want to exploit – then this second armored fist in reserve still exists.

Russian entrenched infantry softened by FPV drones and not receiving maintenance.

When the attacks start, there will be direct fire and artillery on top of the drone weapon, and Ukraine has already shown that they master mine clearance and fortification clearing like gods.

At breakthroughs, they have light mobile units and heavy mechanized brigades that can exploit them.

You will see this this year – these “medium-range drones” that UA has unleashed are a technological advantage that Russia will be able to counter within half a year.

Then there is the presumed Russian mobilization this autumn.

The opportunity is now this summer – the ground holds, fire control is fought for, reserves are fully equipped, and Ukraine has all capabilities.

I would not be surprised if Gripen flies already this summer.

Waiting only gives Russia time, and with China’s help, they will eventually also have an anti-drone weapon worth the name.

Or even worse – build a new Surovikin line.

Since the flow of information upward in the chain is manipulated, bad news comes with delay but sooner or later reaches the decision makers.

Window and opportunity, as they say, is now this year.

I have another post where I reason about what the USA, Europe, Russia, and China will try to do to counter this even though Europe has now, belatedly, started to get it right.

Then a review of the fronts this week, up in Lyman the Russians have now retreated behind Zherebets so their offensive is going backward instead of forward.

The big question – how much freedom of action do the corps commanders have?

The broad strokes are easy to see but, for example, will 3rd AC be allowed to take all terrain to the UA eastern border if they can?

Will 2nd AC be allowed to take Belgorod?

When UA attacked at Stepnohirsk, it was only known by a few dozen within the organization, they kept total silence.

They have kept completely quiet about various offensive operations so far, everything started with Russian accounts that our OSINT analysts jumped on, and Deepstate has been far behind.

I myself hope they take the opportunity to topple Russia so it is divided into maybe a dozen new countries, Belarus gains its freedom, and Kaliningrad is demilitarized.

Only then will the centuries-old Russian threat be over but Europe will surely slow down, the USA and China will definitely slow down, and the country’s population will choose a Finnish continuation war instead of peace after 4.5 years of war.

We shall see – that they fully intend to retake their entire country by force and will succeed in doing so is now beyond all reasonable doubt. When the Southern front is rolled up, Taganrog, Krasnodar, and Rostov are exposed where Putin has zero defense. If he tries to reinforce down there, Ukraine already has fire control over all access roads from the north, and he must take troops from somewhere else.

Putin’s last play is tactical nuclear weapons, meltdown in Enerhodar, and an offer of ceasefire during the day – nothing changes the war in Ukraine.

We have reached the beginning of the end.

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