Leningrad Military District, 16 June 2026

There are 55,000 women in the Ukrainian Armed Forces spread everywhere – including combat elite units.

Yesterday we summarized the fronts and it is my opinion that we have reached the beginning of the end. This period will have two pillars – one where Ukraine continuously advances and we are showered with good news, then a second where Putin presumably has no intention of crawling back into his hole and crying quietly. I see escalation as a given.

I recently deep-dived into the Leningrad military district because I believe that this old-new military district would be tasked with entering the Baltics – if it happens.

In 2024, the Western MD was scrapped and became the Moscow and Leningrad military districts instead.

There was something about this reshuffle that has been bothering me – they were supposed to set up new divisions, for example, and then they split the spearhead aimed at us in Europe into two.

Moscow’s military district roughly covers from the Belarus border down along Ukraine’s northern border – so Leningrad’s military district is from the Belarus border and northward, simplified.

Unfortunately, almost everything discussed about the new military district concerns what they are doing along the Finnish border, but they have built the same bases, depots, and barracks toward the Baltics in the Pskov area. In addition, train stations, tracks, and roads have been improved and newly built parallel to these new bases and depots.

For a couple of years, the Baltics have warned that they covered the train station in Pskov with camouflage nets and that artillery units passing through the town then do not appear in Ukraine. We are thus +2 years into an active preparation phase.

Since we in Europe after the Cold War understood that the Russians had parked all heavy equipment in barns and other buildings along the border so that the warning we thought we would get instead would have been much shorter, it is not unreasonable to believe that RU is trying to do it again.

In the past year, I haven’t really heard anything – my sources in the Kremlin were probably oversold as I didn’t get enough paid subscriptions here and couldn’t pay them.

To begin with, the entire cluster of units belonging to Leningrad MD is along the northern front against Ukraine except for the 14th AC which is down in northern Luhansk – but the 71st MRD included in it is at the northern front.

Then we have the 76th GAAD of course which fought at Pokrovsk but they are no longer at the front dying down there.

For everyone looking at the unit maps, you can see that RU has a lot of capability along the northern front, significantly more than the buffer zone they intend to seize.

My thought has been that Ukraine with its 6 ACs in the area is preparing something fun that RU is watching, but of course there is the possibility that RU units are there to mask their buildup toward the Baltics – that would be smart and has demonstrably worked if so.

The units belonging to Leningrad MD –

With this, I just want to shout out that absolutely everyone is completely wrong when they say “Russia has not built up any capability against the Baltics.”

1st CAA and 3 ACs are exactly 9 hours driving time by road from the eastern border of the Baltics. They are fully mobilized, trained, have combat experience, and have been in some kind of half-rest since around 2025 when it calmed down at the northern front, I don’t know exact dates and am too lazy to google it.

The command structure is fully staffed up to the MD commander.

The commander of Leningrad MD, Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov, is an old fox who started already in 2014 when they attacked Ukraine, has led the operation in Syria and most recently survived all purges of senior officers in Ukraine since 2022. Career in VDV where he commanded battalions and regiments.

He is probably considered competent by Russian standards, previously it was Lapin who is Ukraine’s best friend but since the turn of 2025/2026 this gentleman took over.

Besides the units we have listed, RU will latch onto the drone weapon from Rubicon whatever might be needed for a “special operation” which absolutely should not be confused with a war.

A bit about the units,

6th CAA.

Has fought in Ukraine since 2022 and actually has a Ukrainian as commander, Lieutenant General Sergei Storozhenko.

Built around two motorized divisions with army artillery.

44th AC

Built around a motorized division and corps artillery. The unit took heavy losses in the UA Kharkiv offensive 2022.

Newly established AC with a newly established motorized division and a commander who previously had a military base in Dagestan and then Ossetia – Major General Roman Vyazovsky.

Does not give a competent impression at all and the bar is set very low.

11th AC

Based in Kaliningrad and presumably a prioritized unit. Competent corps commander Lieutenant General Renat Chaliko.

14th AC

Built around their Arctic motorized regiments and presumably competent.

The commander is Major General Boris Fomichev and it is hard to find good information on him but he has previously led the Arctic brigades.

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Since there are more units at the northern front than Leningrad MD, and also the North Koreans’ 11th AC which has now been heavily reinforced as secretly as RU could, you can probably pull units from the northern front without it collapsing.

Seems like there is a bit more connected to Leningrad in case of conflict – the 336th marine infantry has become the 120th marine division and is gone at Donetsk.

Marine Spetsnaz and combat divers at the Baltic Fleet, Northern Fleet, and Kaliningrad – don’t know where they are stationed.

Besides that, as previously said, there is a variety of special units for FSB, GRU, and SVR which fall under the early infiltration group and can be deployed if needed.

For example SOF Zenesh (which seems to belong to Leningrad MD) and Kubinka-2 at the northern front which falls under Russian SSO modeled after the West with operators.

2nd Spetsnaz brigade belongs to Leningrad MD, but the 45th Spetsnaz brigade is also at the northern front.

Going through the fronts, RU has pooled VDV, marines, reconnaissance, and Spetsnaz at focal points. The northern front should not be a focal point but has quite a lot of special units in the broader area.

Releasing units of course assumes that Ukraine is not putting everything on one card against Moscow at the same time which by definition makes E3’s desire for a ceasefire absolutely high risk.

Moving away the special units all else equal works perfectly fine already now.

If NK 11th AC has been reinforced now, you can also move away the equivalent of their numbers without the total decreasing. It is their “special forces corps” and the Ukrainians respect them even if I made it a thing to mock the tape worms.

Then UA has other focus areas and may pull away units needed for offensive operations elsewhere, it can become critical or there can be violent breakthroughs – who knows?

RU can also place training of new units in the area to be able to pull away others – we thought Ukraine would do that at the border with Belarus and have Europe’s armed forces as instructors but no one bit.

Ukraine absolutely must move capabilities over to Belarus to meet the threat that is not a threat but one never takes chances.

Overall, there are units under Leningrad MD that today can travel 9 hours under their own power up to the border with the Baltics without creating a vacuum.

We can assume that the chain of command has reconnoitered the terrain.

Ukraine is not all-seeing; if they see units being supplied with vehicles or starting to move at the northern front, it could be preparation for an attack southwards, movement down into Ukraine, Belarus, or towards the Baltics. If Russia keeps it somewhat secret, Ukraine can basically only say “a movement is underway.”

Europe will not start jumping up and down over troop movements at the northern front until we see them on the road passing Smolensk or Vitebsk – only then is it indisputable where they are heading a few hours before they reach the border with the Baltics.

I think this is very important and still do not understand how the common perception can still be that Russia has not built up any threat against the Baltics. I almost get the feeling that we believe we will get a week’s warning or longer, preferably the same as in 2022 where everything is staged for months, so that we can be reactive in the way we have prepared for.

Considering how well Russia has managed to sneak in the capabilities they have brought into the overall Pskov area today, and the reinforcement of NK 11th AC, I don’t think there will be more warning than the Balts starting to scream about little green men and simultaneously the units from the northern front are on the move the same day or the day after.

Whether we manage to reinforce the Baltics before they have dug in along the Daugava remains to be seen. The Poles and Germans will have to get through a drone-saturated battlefield from Suwalki and northwards after they have mobilized.

They will have refugee flows, roads mined at distance, and clouds of drones to work through before finally trying to cross the Daugava. There will be no 9-hour driving time there when they have mobilized late.

If this now plays out, where the risk is probably over this fall when the mud season begins, I think the decision Europe’s leaders then need to handle is to retake all terrain north of the Daugava up to Tallinn but you know that from previous posts on the subject.

It could very well happen that the Poles simply roll over Kaliningrad and that our heavy attack quickly deals with the Baltic Fleet, but that does not change the fact that we still have to retake the area by force – Putin has shown great willingness to sacrifice lives and not give up terrain except when he loses it in a fair war so far.

How would such a war of aggression affect Putin – if he gets a good start it would absolutely be positive for him and take focus away from his upcoming crushing defeat in Ukraine.

Ukraine is lost to him anyway and his alternatives are escalation elsewhere or to leave Ukraine and take the full consequences of a crushing defeat without being able to dangle a single victory anywhere.

I know I keep drifting back to the Baltics but it is only because we are not preparing for peace.

Now the US is going to pull even more capability out of Europe. The total numbers are irrelevant because they are removing the spearhead and having thousands in the logistics tail left does not win any wars.

I don’t know exactly what the markers are here but if the American battalion from Estonia disappears without replacements showing up, it’s probably a serious situation.

Russia has apparently started bringing in capabilities into Belarus again.

https://tsn.ua/en/ukrayina/moscow-deploys-military-helicopters-to-belarus-what-it-means-for-kyiv-3104774.html

If Russia can force Ukraine to stretch its defense out to the Belarus border, it naturally becomes easier for them to pull units from the northern front – everything is always relative.

The most relative thing is a paid subscription on Substack – don’t miss this great offer.

That Sweden has now, belatedly, spoken out is hailed as a great success – what we are actually doing is finishing a report this fall.

https://www.svt.se/nyheter/utrikes/avslojar-har-upprustar-ryssland-bara-kilometer-fran-natos-grans

If the Russians have not already dug in north of the Daugava, this has value; otherwise, it’s just a world record in paper shuffling.

There are occasions when The Phantom walks the city streets as an ordinary man, right?

The ONLY thing of value right now is to reinforce the Baltics so the Russian analysis group stamps a bright red no on the battle plan out of pure self-preservation.

That Putin will quietly accept total humiliation in Ukraine, which has now reached the beginning of the end, is incredible. Europe must prepare for the death throes; anything else is irresponsible and incompetent.

You know very well what I think about our elected officials, employees in key positions, and experts after 4.5 years, but right now it is a critical situation so we no longer have time on our side; Ukraine cannot buy us more time with its rivers of children’s blood.

Probably 2026 is the most important year for Europe after 2022; wrong decisions could have consequences for us for the next 70 years – good or bad.

The biggest threat right now – G7 where Russian media eagerly discuss that Trump will try to get Zelensky and Europe to agree to a ceasefire.

I want to argue that a preschool class just before lunch would easily come to the conclusion that a ceasefire in Ukraine catapults the probability of direct conflict with Russia in the near term to almost 1.

Even without a ceasefire, Russia has redundancy to open a conflict front against us, but it would naturally help if Ukraine were forced to sit on its hands when they start.