Part two of my closing remarks on the Baltics, after this we return to Ukraine’s smashing victory which only looks better and better. Now, however, everyone jumped on the Stepnohirsk train, everyone is using the same maps and then someone starts drawing an arrow further south and the flock runs along – a bit of wishful thinking right now but the verifiable facts I included in the post about the Azov push the other day are correct.
It was also true that RU is behind on the curve in that area, someone got hold of a RU staff map and it shows RU positions further north than our maps – very good that Ukraine is inside their decision circle and jumping.
Then Sweden has now decided to give Gripen aircraft to Ukraine, they will first get 16 and then purchase more – Ukraine has already said the magic words “no more FAB”.
I say it again – in the previous post and this one my assumption is that the USA is conceding. If they bring their 11 CAGs into the Baltic Sea the situation is completely different.
The two posts should also be read together.
Now came a piece of information which admittedly is some way off before it is in place but when it arrives Europe will have a 60,000-strong rapid reaction force sent to the Baltics “within hours” where the entire decision chain has been reviewed – when it is in place in a year or two it will be game over for Putin’s plans this time.
This further strengthens my assumption from autumn 2025 that Putin has a window and it is now.
So what does Europe have to counter a drone-saturated battlefield in 2026, and what exactly is a drone-saturated battlefield – has Johan No.1 made up that word?
Ukraine has confirmed that instead of RU losses caused by 12% snipers and 75% artillery, losses are now caused by over 80% from drone weapons alone.
Russia loses somewhere around 30,000 verifiable soldiers per month, 0.8X30k = 24,000 Russians who partly have their own drone weapons and anti-drone defense for close protection but also experience trying to hide from drones (personal skill through practical experience).
When they try to attack mechanized and expose themselves it becomes a veritable drone massacre every time. So much so that RU has completely changed its doctrine and tries to swarm with dispersed shooting instead.
Lithuania recently had a simulated exercise to defend against a full Russian invasion – at first it did not go well but when they added a drone weapon in the form of drone swarms in the exercise they won.
This also applies the other way around, right, and right now it is Russia that has the drone swarms and Europe does not have the drone swarms.
In addition, Russia has increased the use of FAB to 250-300 per day (and wants to increase significantly) which proved absolutely devastating for UA units in defense. The USA assisted by delaying precision aircraft to Ukraine so they cannot practically prevent these today. They can also release these at significantly longer distances than 60 km today, up to 100 km has been suggested but take that with a grain of salt.
The drone weapon as it has developed today and can be used is comparable to the Germans’ blitzkrieg doctrine during WW2 – if you haven’t kept up with the development it is a major negative.
Now the blitzkrieg doctrine was paired with a decentralized decision chain and great room for initiative from lower commands so it is wrong to say it was only a technical advantage – I will return to that next week because Ukraine has stolen some pages from that handbook now with its transition to corps.
Russia learned the hard way that their air defense developed throughout the Cold War against hostile missiles and aircraft cannot handle drone swarms – they are still trying to find countermeasures.
Ukraine today has the world’s best air defense and on a good day can shoot down 90% (100% in exceptional cases) of incoming strategic drone threats.
FPV drones I do not know, have not seen any figures but RU uses 10,000 per day.
UA has acute problems with missiles where RU (previously) managed to launch 100 because Trump delayed deliveries of Patriot missiles to Ukraine even though they now seem to have their own systems that work – Zircon should also be able to be jammed with advanced EW systems (28 in total have been forced to crash) and they have a brand new battlefield laser.
Ukraine has also developed interceptor drones which have proven effective but in MENA they quickly saw that giving them a complete system after some training caused chaos – it is an integrated system where the operators must understand the whole, which a quick introduction was not enough for. We covered that yesterday.
Countermeasures are thus definitely increasing but you must have enough, be able to handle the package and then understand the whole chain.
When the Houthis had their firing spree in the Red Sea they attacked over 300 ships in total including several surface combatants – some countries in Europe were forced to leave because the close protection systems on their surface combatants were inadequate.
In the Iran war they have certainly hit several US ships as the US has moved around its naval resources, and Trump is also trying to get Europe to take over the monitoring of Hormuz which he caused to be closed.
Besides that Israel has had problems with its Iron Dome against drone swarms mixed with missiles where quite a few got through.
The drone weapon is thus fully tested in two wars and is a threat to all traditional capabilities including surface combatants for the simple reason that close protection has not yet kept up with the development – it is underway but we do not have it yet.
Not to mention the sea drones that have decimated the Russian Black Sea Fleet – if I were the commander of the Russian Baltic Fleet I would also try to acquire these capabilities after China surely built the production lines for them in Russia sometime since 2023. Anything else would be malpractice.
EU/Europe
The naval capabilities we have in the Baltic Sea largely lack advanced air defense – our corvettes do not have it.
But we have the multi-purpose cannon and it works well against drones, but it is a cannon that can be saturated – a bit of a mixed bag.
I was looking through the new German frigates and they were a bit the same – I had a post in the works about why but it never materialized. You know how it would have gone – we build advanced surface combatants without adequate air defense at a time when close protection air defense is critical otherwise they are just big floating bathtubs – who pushed that in politics.
I seem to recall Finland had a bit the same but they are trying to solve it with land-based protection, Poland and Denmark I do not know.
No other countries will have surface combatants in the Baltic Sea when they are needed if we are reactive – which we have so far shown a very strong willingness to be. A few sunk ships in the channel outside Denmark if you read yesterday’s post.
Our ground forces cannot fight in a drone-saturated combat environment at all. Since sometime in 2025 Ukraine always sends a couple of drone groups and they paralyze the blue team – it became a whole post about that the other day, Aurora26
Now defense Twitter is absolutely damn angry at Ukraine who gave us IG during Aurora but it is true, 28 of 32 vehicles were knocked out and they got through the perimeter defense of an airbase in 20 minutes where they engaged targets without own losses.
The exercise leadership had to pause three times and eventually remove OPFOR for there to be any exercise at all – they showed they were world-leading in warfare, but they had to remove the enemy to be able to fight.
If there is a conflict zone in the Baltics where our brigades face Russian counterparts it will look like this –
RU now has the drone troops branch set up after the Ukrainian model with years of practical experience – about 100,000 strong today and rapidly increasing with the ambition to reach +160,000. It is called Rubicon and gets everything they point at.
This branch uses around 10,000 FPV drones daily in Ukraine.
About every other day RU can launch 500 Geran drones and the launch ramps are Toyota pickup-type vehicles.
They have a few thousand missiles in stock and if they want, they can launch 100 in one day; they use them sparingly in Ukraine but Ukraine has targeted a couple of missile depots, more on that below.
In addition, RU drops between 250-300 FAB bombs (on a good day) over fixed defenses in Ukraine which has been such a big problem that Ukraine has completely changed its defensive warfare.
Can the FAB bombs be taken down by Geran drones?
UA now has groups on the front line and then an FPV drone cover that handles the defensive fight – the drone capability we do not yet have.
We still need to defend ourselves with personnel since we lack the drone weapon.
UA artillery, IFV, tank, and all other types of vehicles could initially fight according to our doctrine but with constant movements. Today that is no longer possible – they simply have to be kept beyond 30km-50km (not sure if 50km might be UA range and RU a bit shorter) otherwise they get knocked out. Ukraine has now fully learned this and uses artillery less because of it but their drone weapon has replaced it instead. Just as RU has replaced its artillery with FAB and the drone weapon.
Yes, RU artillery is still used but to an extremely lesser extent than at the start of the war – then RU fired 50,000 – 60,000 shells per day, today 5,000-6,000 shells per day.
The drone weapon has longer range so our IFV and artillery cannot get far enough forward to operate – that’s just how it is.
Against us, however, the Russians’ artillery and IFV can operate according to previous doctrine since we do not yet have any drone weapon.
But we have an air force.
Our air force can also drop missiles or JDAMS beyond the RU air defense umbrella – they will not steal that capability from us.
RU has its own air force so there it will still be traditional warfare – we come out winning from such a fight.
We have about 1700 supersonic planes in Europe’s various air forces and RU has 800 – 1300 so it looks promising.
However, the big weakness of our air force is something completely different – only Sweden uses road bases so all aircraft in Europe stand on large airbases.
Missiles and JDAMS are stored in large central depots.
Yes, in case of war there are more airbases but unless we are proactive, all our capability will be neatly lined up on a couple of large airbases per country when it kicks off.
During 2025 so many drones flew over Europe that it should be accepted that RU has logged all targets already.
In 2025 Germany logged 1000 drone overflights at its bases and other high-value targets – one single country in Europe and what they have disclosed.
https://www.dw.com/en/germany-registers-over-1000-suspicious-drone-flights-in-2025/a-75261162
These targets can be reached with larger efforts with Gerans and missiles which are also present on the shadow fleet’s ships around all of Europe – they can reach any target they want in all of Europe.
In addition, Russia and Iran pay for gang murders and criminal clan services to expand the pool of their own operators and recruited spies – if they want, they can carry out direct sabotage, fly FPV drones close to airbases or wait with MANPADS on planes at takeoff.
The Russian electronic warfare also works and during the war several of our GPS-guided weapons have had problems in Ukraine, SAAB’s GLSDB had problems, right?
GPS jamming from Kaliningrad and St Petersburg is in full swing and increasing by the way.
Recently, aircraft and ships have seen on their systems that they are located somewhere else than where they actually are. Feels like something China has provided and since everything we have is GPS-based, it will be interesting to see what our sharp countermeasure is.
When the USA attacked Iran, their specially equipped F-16 for EW performed excellently, whatever they are called now, and then their SEAD – since the USA no longer seems to want to know about Europe, do we have this capability?
Not enough would probably be the answer but we have it, and RU knows exactly where those airframes are.
A bit off topic but then the USA used that “Cuba embassy sonic weapon” in Venezuela? It paralyzed the soldiers who were supposed to protect Maduro according to rumors – it was probably a Russian weapon originally that the USA immediately started developing themselves?
Ukraine has during the war carried out several spectacular drone operations against RU airbases, the best was probably when they knocked out 30% of the Russians’ strategic bombers in one strike.
Besides that, Magyar, who is the world’s best at this, has explained that he could knock out the entire European air force – if you don’t believe me and are getting angry about defeatism maybe you will be calmer now that you have his confirmation?
“I answered the following, that four of my battle crews standing only 10km away from this base can destroy it fully in 15 minutes, it would look like Pearl Harbor during the second World War,”
https://edition.cnn.com/2025/07/16/politics/ukrainian-military-leaders-drones
RU today has missiles in stock. Ukraine usually targets Russian GRAU from time to time but these are the latest figures a year old, they shoot less – China assists – UA targets GRAU. Could not find a good source for this year but maybe around 2000?
https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/russia-s-weapons-stockpile-revealed-how-many-1750496990.html
China has built up the Russian armaments industry including missile production.
The laws of war apply so if Russia targets goals in Europe we can target goals at them – how many missiles do we have?
Not so many unfortunately because we counted on the USA’s Tomahawks, called “the long range gap”.
Taurus, which is an attractive weapon, I think Germany long delayed – the company wanted early in the war to produce “large volumes much cheaper” but they never got any orders.
Since 2025 there have apparently been orders and the production rate is 50-60 per year.
Storm Shadow is manufactured and according to Google production started seriously in summer 2025 – they should be able to reach 600 per year.
This is how it looks – we have a full war in Ukraine and now the Iran war so we are not very far from the truth.
Europe actually has three conflict zones/threats to handle –
1. The Baltic Sea
2. The Baltics
3. indirect long-range capabilities and hybrid threats.
I want to argue, and will return to this at the end, that the only thing we could now manage is to defend the Baltics, but then we must be prepared for heavy losses and difficult decisions.
Our navies are vulnerable and will quite quickly disappear into the archipelagos.
The strategic drone threat – we cannot even retaliate proportionally.
We are extremely vulnerable to hybrid threats inside Europe.
Here I interject my answers to the two questions even though the post went far beyond them, it almost became a completely different post.
1. NATO Article 5
This must be a consensus of all members including the pro-Russian government in Bulgaria, Donald Trump, Turkey, and pro-Russian Fico in Slovakia – you can forget about Article 5 being activated without delay. It might become a decision but absolutely not within the critical week needed to avoid wading across the Daugava.
The countries whose governments can make decisions on certain capabilities directly are Sweden, France, the UK, and a few others.
Finland, Denmark, Germany, Norway, and Poland all need parliamentary decisions, and many have coalition governments.
Countries without governments or with elections this year – Denmark, probably soon the UK, Sweden, Latvia, Czech Republic.
In Sweden, if it is a government decision, 24 ministers from three parties vote – unclear if it is a simple majority and the Prime Minister presumably has the deciding vote.
Since this whole chain is reactive, I find it incredible that we will manage within a reasonable time – when all decisions are made, the question to consider is, are we prepared to retake terrain in the Baltics from a buried Russian behind the Daugava comfortably under its drone umbrella.
That will not happen, so countries need to start acting preventively now, which is the point I have tried to hammer in since autumn 2025 – if you talk about a DEFENSE it must be in place before the violence breaks out.
2. Europe’s violent response
“We don’t need to retake the Baltics, we knock out the Baltic Sea fleet and invade Kaliningrad instead” is a recurring suggestion for a desirable way forward when I worry about the Baltics.
Kaliningrad will have tactical nuclear weapons “that can self-ignite from boot stomps” and some very scared Chinese colonels there this summer – no one will invade Kaliningrad.
Or we do, and Russia then has territorial claims on us for an enclave they have already written off – since it is the world that judges in such matters and surprisingly many stand on Russia’s side, it is not insignificant.
The Russian Baltic Fleet is a good target, Ukraine will probably get to it after the Russian fleet in the Caspian Sea but we should absolutely knock it out.
Russia has already accounted for this so either it leaves for Murmansk or is sacrificed – and if it is sacrificed they probably want to strike first. Since we are reactive by definition, they have the opportunity to do so.
The Baltic Fleet’s task is to block reinforcements by sea to the Baltics and be a step on the escalation ladder – when that is achieved they probably expect to lose it in exchange for getting the Baltics.
Warning
Warning signs, is a new Zapad 25 underway someone asked on johanno1.se because that could suggest that Russia does as we are used to, a huge exercise to under the cover of it bring forward the units they need for an invasion.
Already in autumn 2025 when I reviewed available information, the Baltic Fleet had for two years (now three years) trained more than the normal curve.
Now it looked like this.
First – Belarus will not join the war, they are flank protection and project a threat against Poland.
Belarus has had 42 military exercises just in May and Lukashenko talks about war (again). Recently they closed off 19 large forest areas at the borders with Ukraine, the Baltics, and Poland.
They have mobilized and trained reserves in shifts and carried out the preparations required for general mobilization.
In addition, they have started building defenses against Ukraine and it was recently confirmed that they have nuclear weapons in Belarus after the larger exercise recently conducted.
The Belarusian armed forces have been trained by old Wagner since 2023 and in Russian drone warfare, both to operate under it and also as their own drone weapon.
In 2022 we laughed heartily at them, today they are probably a factor with just under 100,000, fully mobilized half a million strong.
They have received new Russian equipment.
I guess Lukashenko has a very tightrope to walk here – when too large a portion of the citizens are fingering a Kalashnikov they take over the country. He needs to have a defense against Ukraine and project a threat against Poland as Putin demanded but absolutely not upset the Ukrainians and especially not lose control of his country.
Russia cut off Starlink and Telegram a few months ago so the ground troops in Ukraine became blind – the proposal was unrest in Russia or mobilization, and we hear more and more about preparations for mobilization. 300,000 has been circulating as the number Russia is to mobilize this autumn.
What is happening on the Russian side of the Baltics
In February 2024 Russia began setting up a “Leningrad military district” which included the Baltics and also Finland?
Up near the Finnish border they are building many depots and bases that are currently empty – a good way to keep Finland locked is to station all training of new units they mobilize this autumn up there.
https://bisi.org.uk/reports/near-the-finnish-border-russia-is-quietly-building-its-military
Russia has also built bases and depots in the Pskov area. In previous posts we have discussed how Russia has strived to hide its activity in Pskov, camouflage nets over the train station, artillery units moving in the area but not appearing in Ukraine, and large depot facilities closer to the border with the Baltic states.
From memory, they set up some new Army Corps and two divisions in this new military district.
In the latest weeks, various ships from the Baltic Fleet have begun positioning themselves in the Baltic Sea, it is generally accepted that this is to protect the shadow fleet and not an indication of full war, but they are increasing all the time.
During 2025 Russia conducted extensive intelligence gathering on our defense installations in Europe – air bases, central depots, military bases, radar, infrastructure bottlenecks like bridges, railways, and other things that would complicate the movement of units eastward.
In addition, they rehearsed attacks on our electrical infrastructure, for example opening our hydropower plants wide open for several days through IT attacks.
Their shadow fleet is now publicly known to have special forces onboard and they regularly fly drones from the ships over Europe.
Most recently, GUGI reconned the sea cables outside the UK so they have already spied on all our sea cables and power lines – a total of 13 sabotage incidents against cables in the Baltic Sea were there in 2025, right?
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cre13qn9z7do
Russia is absolutely preparing for a war against us, that is indisputable – and they are putting very large resources into it.
What then would be the warning sign before an immediate start of war?
Europe’s entire analytical corps are idiots because they unanimously say “we see no buildup”.
For alternative “little green men,” the only warning will be when they stand a couple of miles into the forests in eastern Baltics.
Level between medium and high – we barely get any warning when units from the northern front leave and Ukraine calls us. They go directly to pre-calculated UFA where the staffs have already been on site. The entire command structure in the new military district is well in place in their buried staffs.
Equipment is already today in newly built depots in the Pskov area, so the only thing they need to bring for medium/high level is the vehicles and then roll through a prepared TOLO. During conscription, it took a few hours for a company.
Artillery, air defense, and probably drone capability should already be partly in place.
Possibly also if they start reinforcing Kaliningrad, the Baltic Fleet leaves via Denmark with its protected ships, or if they manage to trick China into sending higher-ranking officers to some “exercise” in Belarus or Kaliningrad.
A very sure sign we have actually already seen is the North Koreans; the entire staff structure for the 11AC is now in place in Kursk Oblast and is dimensioned for 80,000 troops.
North Korea marched in the parade on May 9, and recently another contingent of short-haired young men who were “civilian technicians” arrived. The source is what it is, but the film is correct.
https://www.azernews.az/region/257228.html
When Ukraine starts calling us that NK presence at the northern front is beginning to strengthen significantly – then it is medium/high level that applies because they will take over the guard duty at the northern front so RU can free up their units.
Probably those who profile themselves on the issue like Breuer will until the last moment claim that they see no “buildup for an offensive against the Baltics” only to then forget it and continue giving poor advice for high pay.
If they move air defense gathered around Moscow westward, that would also be a good signal – the move to Moscow has already been made under the pretense that Ukraine is the threat, which it might be, but they have amassed enormous air defense a few hundred kilometers away.
Little green men on the islands in the Baltic Sea are probably also a given signal?
What should we then do?
I have been reasoning about this since Zapad 25 and the only play we have left now is to immediately bury deployable light units in SE Estonia and NE Latvia.
Belarus will not go to war; they are the anchor on the flank preparing defense against Ukraine and are there to project a threat against Poland to lock up their units there.
The same with Finland – they place exercise units up there to lock them in.
The Lithuanian border with Belarus is to be handled by Germany and Poland; they have far-reaching plans for that and Poland can spare capability.
Unfortunately, what the Baltics have not yet done is to completely mine the border – they argued for two years about the thickness of bunker walls, recently left the Ottawa Treaty, and the tank ditches were by early 2025 only 400 km of drainage ditches that could be jumped over. Considering that Latvia’s government just fell, it is easy to understand that Russian subversive activity has focused on this and that they have been politically too weak.
This is how the Soviets cleared minefields during World War II, by the way.
I brought up how we should proceed in the Aurora26 post the other day, please read it if you missed it.
Decisions about defense must be made immediately and what we have in place today is far too little in the wrong geographical area as the Swedish battalion and the Canada-led brigade stand in western Latvia just north of the Daugava.
If we do not do this, Russia can use its escalation ladder to preempt us and then we must try to agree on whether to retake lost terrain in the Baltics or not – as long as we do not do that, we have a worry in Europe that will topple governments and shake the financial markets.
If at the same time we enter a 2008-type financial crisis and Russia – USA – China coordinate measures against us, retaking ground in the Baltics quickly will become secondary. Russia gets the open wound in our side they are very comfortable with.
The USA slams tariffs and refuses to deliver oil, gas, and other things because we *(insert any insult against Trump)*.
Constant sabotage against our LNG-oil infrastructure, pressure on countries to stop exporting to us, and attacks on our electricity production.
All this has been practiced by Russia during 2025, we know that.
Our new friends – Canada, India, Japan, Australia, and everywhere – are beginning to feel that we will not come to their aid, the Evil Troika can pick them off one by one.
China holds back our imports of critical products or natural resources so we only get 97% finished with what we manufacture.
Somewhere around here we are back to the Cold War – a divided Europe that cannot unite and is afraid.
When Churchill realized just three days after becoming prime minister that France was done for, it was the biggest shock of his life according to his memoirs – Europe’s by far strongest defense force was overrun.
Swedish defense Twitter has just had its Churchill moment and is furious, but we should thank Ukraine for shaking us up before Russia does.
We have only one play left – your guess is as good as mine but Sweden has so far dared to go further than most countries in Europe, with JEF help maybe these decisions can be made now within the coming months before it is too late.
Yes, I have indicated that the Russian window would close sometime this fall when we have built enough interceptor drones to neutralize the Russian drone threat, but the snail’s pace we currently see might make that too optimistic?
Aurora 2026 became a drone massacre on the blue team – we are simply not ready five minutes to midnight.
Then we have Razpuzitza at the end of October sometime, which usually dampens the desire for large troop movements.
What is then a likely scenario from RU?
Today there is a somewhat agitated atmosphere so there is no absolute guarantee that little green men will manage to come under a will to make difficult decisions for Europe’s leaders. It could be exactly the opposite and sufficiently attractive for Europe to go directly into the Baltics since “little green men” are probably manageable.
The assumption is made that the USA will leave a walkover – if they do not and are prepared to fully defend and retake the entire Baltics, the equation changes immediately.
Eastern Baltics north of the Daugava and south of Tartu is extremely poorly defended – no fieldworks and no real units in a very large area.
If something happens, it will probably be this –
-RU locks Suwalki with remotely placed mines and drone weapons. Quite soon after the conflict starts, refugee trains move through Lithuania towards Poland, making movements north even more difficult.
-They infiltrate specialists deep into the Baltics for sabotage aimed at delaying mobilization and movements. In Sweden, we expected spetsnaz in the police and our military uniforms standing by the roads to the mobilization depots, murdering us. Blown-up mobilization depots, booby-trapped mobilization depots, blown-up railway tracks and bridges – all to buy time.
-Landing units with anti-ship missiles and air defense on Saaremaa and islands in the Gulf of Finland.
-The Baltic Sea fleet goes to sea to prevent reinforcements arriving by air or boat; they declare a large NOTAM over the entire area.
-Large demonstrations in major cities in the Baltics and “popular uprising” (you know what I mean).
-Geran and missiles over all targets north of the Daugava + blow up all crossings over the river.
-An initial mobile attacking force simply drives westward along 3-5 attack vectors. It takes less than four hours to reach the Baltic coast by car; they can drive through terrain until sometime in October, so key points are passed. This force already exists in the larger area today; there will be no direct warning at all.
-All targets passed are logged and receive drones, missiles, artillery, and FAB (free-fall bombs) on them.
-Units from the northern front regroup and pass through a TOLO on the way to then immediately take up defensive positions north of the Daugava and attack from Tartu towards Tallinn. I imagine this takes about three days from when they start moving from the northern front since Bryansk – Rezekne is a 9-hour drive.
The gaps on the northern front are covered by North Korea’s 11th Army Corps, which is sized for 80,000 troops and has been reinforced in the past six months.
Since there were never any troop movements, Europe received no warning despite Ukraine constantly warning us.
Bridges and railway tracks are blown up in Poland and Lithuania, complicating movements.
Suwalki is locked; when the Poles and Germans have worked their way through with losses, RU is already in dug-in defense along the Daugava under their drone shield.
Belarus never joined the war and is thus still neutral in the gray zone we have unfortunately accepted.
Poland overruns Kaliningrad as revenge. Or maybe they don’t because of the nuclear threat, as there are tactical nuclear weapons in the enclave that could “self-detonate.” I don’t know how they reason behind closed doors.
Poland has recently expressed that they think Ukraine should stop drone attacks on oil installations.
-Putin says that the area north of the Daugava is now Russian but he solemnly promises never to set foot south of it, PEACE IN OUR TIME.
-Russia mobilizes during the autumn.
-Estonia immediately throws in the towel, and since the mobilized RU units are training at the border with Finland in all newly built bases, the Finns cannot spare anything.
Step by step until it works, RU ends the war in Ukraine – if needed, they leave the whole of Ukraine just so the Ukrainian threat disappears. China and the USA will push hard for peace between UA-Russia quite soon. Politically, it becomes impossible for Zelensky and Budanov to wage a Finnish continuation war; they feel Europe can handle the Baltics as we have betrayed them throughout the war.
Since Belarus has prepared for a defense against Ukraine, there is no way into the Baltics for Ukraine anyway.
I have half-started to wonder if the USA will enter Crimea to “secure the vital peninsula since no one manages to hold it” – it is unreasonable until it is no longer so, but it must happen before Ukraine is standing eating sausages on the peninsula, because then it will be too late.
The USA and China say that we in Europe must handle the Baltics as best we can, but since we took Kaliningrad, it is no longer black and white in the eyes of the world.
Russia moves much capability from Ukraine into the Baltics as soon as a ceasefire occurs.
What do you think we in Europe will do – the Baltic Sea fleet is knocked out and Kaliningrad overrun.
Putin now promises the same kind of retaliation as in Ukraine – if you shoot at us, you will get 500 Geran drones + missiles over you every other day in continental Europe.
Or if you want peace – then you get all the LNG and oil you can buy at the five-year discount I just promised.
Russia must do something; exactly what they do we will see, but for me, Europe gambling on something like this is incomprehensible – fortify all terrain north of the Daugava now.
Anyway, those of you who feel a paid subscription on Substack was too expensive – please share the posts instead.
It takes time to write these posts – I have worked on these two for a long time since it was supposed to be a concluding word.
And if you now feel the post is completely unreasonable – this is how the latest sandbox war game for the Baltics went in winter 2026
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Thank you for the second part, looking forward to reading and commenting (it’s hard to comment on half a wall, a bit like describing a sandwich without the top slice, a sandwich).
As for the morning report, where the Russian pressure fell mainly in Pokrovsk, Foch with maintained very strong pressure. The Ukrainian pressure (unlocalized) also fell but the ratio rose, 0.91. That is, almost as many Ukrainian as Russian attacks.
N Slobozhansky 5
S Slobozhansky 9💥
Kupyansk 7
Lyman 13💥
Slovyansk 4↘️
Kramatorsk 3
Kostjantynivka 16💥
Pokrovsk 46💥💥💥↘️
Oleksandrivskij 2
Huliaipole 32💥💥
Orikhivsk 2↘️
Prydniprovskij 1
Localized 140↘️
Unlocalized 127↘️
Total 267↘️
Ratio unloc/loc 0.91↗️
We will see in the coming days how the Russian logistics handle the load.
👍
Russian losses in Ukraine 2026-05-29
960 KWIA
2 Tanks
11 AFVs
28 Artillery systems
2 MLRS
1750 UAVs
4 UGVs
324 Vehicles and Fuel tanks
Slava Ukraini
Thank you Johanno1, interesting post and important that we hurry regardless of how we think the barbarians will make their risk assessment.
NATO’s Article 5 is actually quite simple. A member country announces that it wants to activate it and then NATO’s highest political council decides whether NATO should do so.
I believe, contrary to you, that it doesn’t take particularly long at all and that this is due to classic geopolitics. Neither Slovakia nor Bulgaria want to risk their status as independent states or risk a prolonged war in Europe that paralyzes the economy. Their pro-Putin attitudes have more domestic political motives – they are still partly dependent on Russian gas and oil and have voter groups suspicious of the West, but this is not the same as wishing to be part of a future Greater Russia.
A unanimous decision favors a quick and violent end to the attempt at aggression and that is exactly what NATO is for. I think the most likely scenario is that they vote yes to activation but keep a low profile when sending resources. Which doesn’t matter, it is not Slovakia’s military power that is supposed to do it.
I think the same about the USA, possibly with the reservation that Trump and his sycophants first say no, which delays the US decision by a few hours. The Congress will say yes (Congress has already, with a qualified majority, prevented the president from reducing the NATO budget, moving funds from the NATO budget to the military outside Europe, and removing Tomahawk).
However, the USA can decide to support for the time being through logistics, signals intelligence, and activation of higher staffs for coordination.
Then I’m not quite sure what you meant by only Sweden and a few other countries being able to send troops without voting in parliament.
If we continue on the Article 5 track, it works so that NATO, through its various defense scenarios, pre-determines which resources each country shall contribute in the event of armed conflict. This planning is ongoing 24/7 and is maintained by continuously updating the plans.
So when the article is activated, every country knows what is expected of them. The executive decisions are made by governments and do not need to be voted through parliament. That would go against the entire idea of the operation if it were otherwise. In Sweden, it is the government; in Finland, it is the government and the president, etc.
If we instead entertain the thought that Article 5 fails, then we instead have a mix of bilateral and multilateral military cooperation agreements in Europe. JEF is probably the most relevant, I think. JEF also involves the Baltic states, which is practical.
One of the advantages of JEF is that consensus is not required. It is enough that two members decide to carry out a Joint Response Option (JRO) to activate JEF. A JRO corresponds to the plans for various scenarios that form the basis of NATO’s operations. It is the respective countries’ defense ministers who formally decide that a JRO should be activated, so no parliaments are involved here either.
I believe Russia’s only chance to avoid activation of Article 5 is to stay at the level of hybrid warfare. If they cross the threshold, they will have to accept that the Baltic Fleet goes down along with the Northern Fleet.
Yes, NATO has exactly the systems that the USA and Israel have used to suppress Iranian air defenses, and informal sources also say that Sweden with Gripen plays in the absolute top division here, which will soon be seen in Ukraine.
By the way, Finland flies from road bases with their F18s. They have enormous striking power against ground targets and cooperate well with Gripen and Norwegian and Danish F16/F35 as umbrella.
It will be the barbarians who have to crouch under FAB and watch as their air forces fall from the skies. And as I said, if the barbarians start sending drone swarms against our countries, the Baltic Fleet and Northern Fleet will go down. Escalation with drones and missiles will be met with targeted violence.
Russia also cannot afford to lose access to the Baltic Sea, which it has fought for since the Time of Troubles. And it does not require huge resources to close it completely; a few submarines strategically placed by us or our dear neighbors are enough.
So of course, the risks you mention are real and we must arm ourselves and dig in until we can fill the entire border with anti-drone capacity and nasty drone swarms.
And until we have volume on our own attack drones, we must be really on our toes with the capabilities where we have superiority.
I just want to add a bit about the capabilities we actually possess and nuance the threat a little. Yes, we are behind on the drone front. But also ahead, even far ahead in the air domain and maritime domain as well as in industrial capacity. That makes me believe more in Russian hybrid attacks than in Russian kinetic war, regardless of whether it becomes NATO or an activated JRO.
But regardless, now is the time to think the unthinkable, i.e. war. And it is urgent.
Additionally, a kinetic attack against European countries, that is, an Article 5 attack, could possibly be a method for Putin and his close circle to create conditions for general mobilization. There is talk of a holy war against Europe in these circles, and that could indicate that they want to escalate dramatically. But the purpose is more unclear in that case. I believe that if so, the focus would be on Ukraine rather than trying to conquer new countries. The domestic audience currently would probably not accept general mobilization to end the SMO, but if somehow it can be sold that the SMO is actually a war against Europe since the first week of March 2022, and that Europe now really threatens us (Article 5 activated after kinetic Russian violence), then maybe it would work.
Perhaps it would be enough for some country to want to activate Article 5 or for a more kinetically oriented JRO to be activated.
The point is that it may not be so certain that Russia is testing NATO to see it collapse, but for the opposite reason, to then be able to dramatically escalate the war in Ukraine without turning the domestic audience against them.
Not at all impossible that they ultimately want the SMO to transition to a war so they can mobilize and restructure the entire economy, but to dare to do that they need to get the people on board.
Maybe there will be some false-flag where they fake a large-scale brutal attack from the West or Ukraine to make the population want to defend Russia and seek revenge.
Attempted murder of Putin on direct orders from Merz?
Trump won the election on a fake assassination attempt.
Maybe, but who knows, maybe the majority of Russians wouldn’t mind that..😄
Well written!
Worth reading Johan and Lynx. It’s hard to know what to believe about the future, but as long as Putin remains in power, the risk of escalation in some direction is probably quite high, even if it “only” involves a small island in the Baltic Sea to test NATO. Putin probably can’t give up this war as long as Ukraine is winning; that would be too embarrassing. Losing to NATO would probably be “better” from his point of view.
If Putin disappears, the Russians might withdraw for now, blame everything on him, and lick their wounds, while rebuilding their military power over a few years and then start again with recreating the former Soviet Union.
It’s probably not very likely that the Russians would just realize they should shape up and stop trying to achieve some kind of world domination.
They have never acted like this in 400 years.
They are going full throttle straight into the wall and increasing the level of violence if the violence is not enough.
Latvia’s government fell due to two Ukrainian drones crashing into a combined heat and power plant.
There is talk that RU can “hijack and redirect” Ukrainian drones.
In Romania, a RUSSIAN drone crashed into a high-rise building yesterday.
One can suspect that RU will test this more now, “mistakes” with the hope that more governments fall, it was very easy with Latvia.
Yes, one can wonder. How drained is Russia after several years of war in Ukraine? What is left in the warehouses in terms of military equipment? I believe it is starting to run out. The Russians can cut down anything, but we must win in Ukraine at all costs. It’s all in. Otherwise, total humiliation and a shattered self-image await. The Russians have resources only for some provocation. That’s how I see it.
If Article 5 were triggered by an attack on the Baltics, NATO’s air forces might be enough. Bring up some fresh F-35s and that might suffice.
China has built up their war industry and Belarus has been seen operating new Russian vehicles during exercises.
300-400 T90M per year has been discussed as the production rate, long remos but now newly built.
Almost nothing is sent to Ukraine.
To calmly increase production with China’s help takes time. Since 2023, China has actively helped, 3 years.
The drone weapon with 500 gerans every other day and 10,000 FPV every day is China’s doing.
MXT
Can add image if I don’t write first in the box.
Then the button is dead
Good, then I have something to go on when I troubleshoot.
My guess is that the fake button I place on top for the iPhone to register the button press gets the wrong position in some way.
Have I caught an incurable virus?
The button works in Chrome on iPhone. How can Johan’s iPhone work in Safari? I have not added any text.
So you still can’t get it to work at all? You could try clearing the cache/browser history. It might be that you haven’t received the latest update.
Sounds good! 💥
Can UA, can others.
Number two – sure you can drop FAB with Gerans?
Yes, you can put Gerans in the targets instead, but in every real operation they have large amounts of decoy targets without warheads.
Using them as FAB droppers would be an interesting development.
UA drops from their long-range drones. + has others with warheads.
Yes, it was awesome, they use “dumb” rockets that apparently have been around since the Soviet era. It’s probably their FP2 which is almost like a small Cessna in size.
But FAB, how much does one of those weigh? A Geran/Shahed weighs about 150-200 kg. My impression is that FAB are converted aerial bombs of a somewhat heavier type.
FAB 250 and 500 were dropped for a long time
Now they have 1500 and 3000.
in kg.
The lighter ones probably fit a Geran with a short flight distance?
I checked, Geran/Shahid weighs about 200 kg, of which bang 40 kg. It will probably be a short flight distance if you load 250, off the ramp and straight down to the ground I guess.
Don’t think they can carry them either. Probably can’t manage to lift with that weight. But on the other hand, it is probably not so difficult to build a larger Geran with dual operation that might be able to lift the 250kg variant.
But then it probably won’t be suitable to lift from a flatbed.
Then one might wonder what the point would be, they probably can’t carry more than one, so it would probably be smarter to equip them with a larger payload instead.
Part two was also worth reading (although I think you might be underestimating both NATO and the member countries’ will and ability a bit too much). 👍👍👍
Yes, many think so, but why don’t we have the brigades in the Baltics, lost Europe in the summer of 1940, didn’t help Ukraine for several years, shut down sensible electricity production, made ourselves production-dependent on China, and so on.
Aurora26, which was supposed to show strength, ended up like a Polish cavalry charge.
You can be diplomatic and reasonable up to a point, now we have been for 4.5 years and let UA pay the entire bill without shame.
In the end, it just becomes submissive and cowardly.
The assumption everyone is making now is that we will stand up as one if the Baltics get into trouble.
The question is how we cross the Daugava to solve that problem.
All the agreements Lynx talks about above – those brigades are supposed to be standing in the Baltics already in case of an increased threat, right?
The threat level is very high now.
RU ran its October nuclear exercise already now in May.
Haven’t we already shown some tendencies that we don’t have the will yet, I think?
The Baltics have not mined the border again.
Everything I write is supported by the UA war.
I would never have taken a chance with this, and our Supreme Commander warns about something in the near future, islands.
Besides, you wrote the other day that we are putting our foot down against China – do they like that?
RU will never get past 20,000 in the eastern Baltics dug in.
Will we get over the Daugava with Russians dug in behind?
Completely agree with you when it comes to the conclusion that we must prepare better even though I don’t think we would fare as badly as you predict.
So your conclusions about what we must do get 👍👍👍👍👍
**Romania is shutting down Russia’s Consulate General in Constanța after a Russian drone crashed into a residential building and injured two people. President Nicușor Dan said Moscow bears full responsibility for the incident. Romania has also declared Russia’s consul general persona non grata.**
https://bsky.app/profile/kyivpost.com/post/3mmyhtj2xl22c
🤬!
A good answer.
Why wasn’t it shot down – is there no one asking that question?
Belarus opposition leader was in Ukraine and Zelensky said that GUR is already in Belarus.
Easy to see what Ukraine is planning 🤩🤩
Did you see that Japan quickly fortified Hokkaido?
They are absolutely right to do so. I completely missed that.
Do you have a link?
Edited. Found it myself.
https://unn.ua/en/news/japan-concerned-over-russias-increasing-military-activity-in-the-far-east
Answering here Lynx,
NATO’s highest political council votes as the member countries want. So it does not happen automatically.
Russia needs a week without defense forces being able to move in, that’s all. If Article 5 is delayed by a few days, that is enough – our opinions differ but I believe, unlike many, that China-RU-USA are already internally clear about five steps forward.
NATO does not need to fall, it just takes too long to make decisions.
—
The agreements that exist today with the Baltics – the units shall be in the Baltics in case of increased threat.
I believe that all assessors today consider the threat level to be high, our Supreme Commander and MUST for example.
and the Canadian brigade commander.
The units are not in the Baltics – we agree that they should be.
The whole plan is based on them being able to enter.
we are reactive.
RU needs 4 hours to reach the Baltic Sea coast.
On the first day of the war in 2022, RU reached all the way to Kherson.
The fuel shortage near Kiev was a godsend.
—
You write
“Then I don’t quite know what you meant by only Sweden and a few other countries can send troops without voting in parliament”.
After our last discussion you wrote that Sweden’s government on its own can send everything except conscripts to conflict zones abroad.
Have checked various countries and those I wrote need a parliamentary decision for troops outside the country – according to Google.
—
You turned the argument about the Baltic Sea a bit 😀
Isn’t it us who need to use the Baltic Sea to send reinforcements to the Baltics.
—
Yes, of course you are right, the northern fleet is comfortably within our range as well.
Gripen is not just the plane but how we train – overall we should be among the best available?
we also hate Russia as much as the Finns so we are a good resource
The cost of the war against Ukraine will exceed the Russian state budget by at least 260 billion kronor, reports TT. In a letter obtained by the Financial Times, Finance Minister Anton Siluanov asks the government to hold back on other expenditures – despite 40 percent of this year’s budget already being allocated to defense and security. In recent months, the high oil price has brought greater export revenues for Russia, but they have not been sufficient to cover the war costs. And to the Russian newspaper Kommersant, Siluanov said on Wednesday that further budget tightening may become necessary, reports the Financial Times.
https://omni.se/a/GxBJgx
Johan, NATO’s 1700 fast aircraft? What can drone swarms do against them?
It would probably be best for Zelenskyy to apologize and withdraw the name. Not the time to make enemies with Poland.
“Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyj has chosen to name one of the country’s special forces after a nationalist guerrilla army during World War II. Now the announcement is receiving harsh criticism from Poland, reports AFP. The reason is that the army, known as the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, during the war murdered up to 100,000 Poles with the aim of creating an ‘ethnically pure’ Ukraine. Polish President Karol Nawrocki is furious about Zelenskyj’s decision. He now wants to revoke Poland’s highest civilian award, the ‘Order of the White Eagle,’ which the Ukrainian president was awarded three years ago.”
https://omni.se/a/pBnOzX
“Poland’s former president Lech Walesa writes on Facebook that he ‘refuses to support’ Volodymyr Zelenskyj. The reason is the Ukrainian president’s decision to name a special unit after a guerrilla army that during World War II was guilty of ethnic cleansing against Poles, reports AFP. ‘By honoring those bandits, Ukraine’s president has insulted me and all our murdered compatriots. Therefore, I have removed the Ukrainian flag from my chest,’ writes Walesa. As leader of the Polish trade union Solidarity, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1983. From 1990 to 1995, he was Poland’s president.”
https://omni.se/a/3p5ww9
Warning: “Possibly also if they start reinforcing Kaliningrad, the Baltic Fleet leaves via Denmark with its valuable ships or if they manage to trick China into sending higher-ranking officers to some ‘exercise’ in Belarus or Kaliningrad.”
China has been in the Baltic Sea training with the Russian navy. Around 2020?
Homing drone, completely without AI! 😂
More pleasant than a sticky spiral hanging from the ceiling. If they fly out into the forest and crash against a stone with the matchstick facing forward, there is some risk of forest fire. You can release them in strong tailwind.
Today is Veterans Day. Unfortunately, I don’t have a flagpole to raise the flag to honor them.
It will have to be a picture from the city’s (now closed) regiment.
Thank you for your service! 🫡
🫡
Article 5
“We have only one game left – your guess is as good as mine, but Sweden has so far dared to go further than most countries in Europe, with JEF’s help perhaps these decisions can be made now within the coming months before it is too late.”
Yes, JEF, which is an organized form of multi-bilateral arrangement for the Baltics. Which can act before an Article 5. Which can, if the operation is effective, make Article 5 obsolete, for this time. Even an observation of Article 5 relies on some form of ad hoc support, i.e. it is not certain that the USA will send George Washington from the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Finland. And even if JEF is called upon, Article 5 remains a possible lifeline.